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THE

SÁNKHYA APHORISMS

OF

KAPILA.

44388

BOOK I.

अथ त्रिविधदुःखात्यन्तनिवृत्तिरत्यन्तपुरुषार्थः ॥ १ ॥

The summum bonum.

Aph. 1.—Well, the complete cessation of pain [which is] of three kinds is the complete end of man.

न दृष्टात्तत्सिद्धिर्निवृत्तेरप्यनुवृत्तिदर्शनात् ॥ २ ॥

The end, the summum bonum, is not to be attained by ordinary means.

Aph. 2.—The effectuation of this [complete cessation of pain] is not [to be expected] by means of the visible [—means of obviating evil, such as wealth, &c.—], for we see [—on the loss of wealth, &c.—] restoration [of the misery and evil] after [its temporary] cessation.

प्राप्यहिकवदुत्प्रतीकारवत्तत्प्रतीकारचेष्टनात्पुरुषार्थत्वम् ॥ ३ ॥

The question whether the end may not be attained by the recurrent use of ordinary means.

Aph. 3.—[Let us consider the doubt that] the soul's desire [the cessation of pain—may result] from [recurrent and sustained] exertions for the obviation [of pain], as in the case of the obviation of daily hunger.

सर्वासम्भवात्सम्भवेऽपि सत्त्वासम्भवाद्धेयः प्रमाणकुशलैः ॥ ४ ॥

This suggestion negatived.

Aph. 4.—This [method of palliatives], is to be rejected by those who are versed in evidence, because it is not everywhere possible [to employ it at all], and because, even if this *were* possible, there would be an impossibility as regards [ensuring] the perfect fitness [of the appliances].

उत्कर्षादपि मोक्षस्य सर्वोत्कर्षश्रुतेः ॥ ५ ॥

Scriptural evidence in favour of this view.

Aph. 5.—Also [an inferior method of riddance from "the ills that flesh is heir to,"[1] ought not to be adopted] because of the pre-eminence of Liberation [from 'Bondage,'—as proved] by the text [of scripture declaratory] of the pre-eminence above all else [—of Liberation, as the effectual remedy].

अविशेषश्चोभयोः ॥ ६ ॥

An objection met.

Aph. 6.—And there is no difference between the two, [—no difference in the applicability of liberation, as the remedy, on either of the suppositions, which we shall now consider, viz., that the bondage is essential or that it is adventitious.]

न स्वभावतो बद्धस्य मोक्षसाधनोपदेशविधिः ॥ ७ ॥

Liberation must be possible, else the means would not have been enjoined.

Aph. 7.—There were no rule in the enjoining of means for the liberation of one bound *essentially*, [—because, —to explain the meaning by an illustration,—"*fire* cannot be liberated from its *heat* which is essential to it,—since that which is *essential* exists as long as the substance exists."]

स्वभावस्यानपायित्वादननुष्ठानलक्षणमप्रामाण्यम् ॥ ८ ॥

Scripture would be nugatory if pain were inevitable.

Aph. 8.—Since an essential nature is imperishable, unauthoritativeness, betokened by impracticableness, [would be chargeable against

the scripture, instructing us to get *free* from pain, if pain were essential to humanity:—and this is out of the question,—Scripture being assumed here, as in all others of the six systems, to be an exact measure of truth].

नाशक्योपदेशविधिरुपदिष्टेऽप्यनुपदेशः ॥ ९ ॥

An impracticable injunction is no rule.

Aph. 9.—There is no rule where something impossible is enjoined; though it *be* enjoined, it is no injunction ["but only the *semblance* of an injunction; because it stands to reason that not even the *Veda* can make one see sense in an absurdity."]

शुक्लपटवद्बीजवच्चेत् ॥ १० ॥

A doubt whether the essential be not removeable.

Aph. 10.—If [some one says]—as in the case of white cloth, or of a seed, [—something essential may be not irremoveable; then he will find his answer in the next aphorism. The doubter is supposed to argue—"the destruction even of what is essential (—in spite of what is stated under *Aph.* 7—) *is* seen; as for example, the essential whiteness of white cloth is removed by dyeing, and the essential power of germination in a seed is removed by fire. Therefore, according to the analogy of the white cloth and the seed, it is possible that there should be the removal of the bondage of the soul even though it *were* essential. So too there may be (without any impropriety) the enjoinment of the *means* thereof."]

शक्त्युद्भवानुद्भवाभ्यां नाशक्योपदेशः ॥ ११ ॥

Decision that an essential property may be hidden but not removed.

Aph. 11.—Since both perceptibleness and [subsequent] non-perceptibleness may belong to some power [which is indestructible], it is not something *impracticable* that is enjoined [when one is directed to render some indestructible power imperceptible. "In regard even to the two examples mentioned in Aph. 10, people do not give an injunction for the positive destruction of something essential, which is indestruc-

tible. Why do we say this? Because in these two instances of the perceptibleness and non-perceptibleness of a power,—the powers, namely, of appearing white, and of germinating,—there are merely the manifestation and afterwards the *hiding* of the whiteness, &c., but not the *removal* of the whiteness or of the power of germination;—because—that is to say—the whiteness of the dyed cloth and the germinating power of the roasted seed can again be brought out by the processes of the bleacher, in the case of the dyed cloth,—and by the will of the *Yogí*—the possessor of supernatural powers,—in the case of the roasted seed."—An example more in accordance with modern views, when the Scientist has superseded the *Yogí*, would be that of Chlorine—with its suffocating odour hidden by union with Sodium in culinary salt, but ready to reappear—fresh in its indestructibility—on the addition of Sulphuric Acid and black Oxide of Manganese. But the *destruction* of Bondage is enjoined;—hence it cannot be *essential* to man. "Wishing to disprove also the notion that it is the result of some adherent *cause*, he rejects the various supposable causes, viz., Time &c."]

न कालयोगतो व्यापिनो नित्यस्य सर्वसम्बन्धात् ॥ १२ ॥

Time, which applies to all, cannot be the cause of the bondage of a part.

Aph. 12.—Not from connection with *time* [does bondage befall the soul], because this, all-pervading and eternal, is eternally associated [with *all*, and not with those alone who are in bondage].

न देशयोगतो ऽप्यस्मात् ॥ १३ ॥

Place, for the same reason, cannot be the cause.

Aph. 13.—Nor [does bondage arise] from connection with *place* either, for the same reason.

नावस्थातो देहधर्मत्वात्तस्याः ॥ १४ ॥

The soul is not kept in bondage by its being conditioned.

Aph. 14.—Nor [does the bondage of the soul arise] from its being conditioned [by its standing among cir-

cumstances that clog it by limiting it], because *that* is the fact in regard to [not the soul but] the *body*.

असङ्गोऽयम्पुरुष इति ॥ १५ ॥

The soul is absolute.

Aph. 15.—Because this soul is [unassociated with any conditions or circumstances that could serve as its bonds:—it is] absolute. ["The word *iti* here shows that it, i. e. the assertion conveyed in the aphorism, is a *reason*,—the construction, with the preceding aphorism, being this, that, *since* the soul is unassociated, it belongs only to the *body* to be conditioned."]

न कर्मणान्यधर्मत्वादतिप्रसक्तेश्च ॥ १६ ॥

The fruit of works belongs not to the soul.

Aph. 16.—Nor [does the bondage of soul arise] from any work, because these are the property of another, [viz., the mind,] and because it [the bondage] might be eternal [if the case were as you imagine; for, "if through a property of another, the bondage of one quite distinct could take place, then bondage might befall even the liberated"—through some acts of some one else.]

विचित्रभोगानुपपत्तिरन्यधर्मत्वे ॥ १७ ॥

Why it is that the bondage must belong to the soul, and not to the mind merely.

Aph. 17.—If it were the property of any other, then there could not be diverse experience, [—"there could be no such different experience as one man's experiencing pain and another man's not," for, it must be remembered, it is not in point of *mind* but of *soul* that men are held by Kapila to be numerically different;—"therefore it must be admitted that pain is connected with the soul also. And this (pain that belongs to the soul) is in the shape merely of a *reflection* of the pain" that attaches to its own attendant organism].

प्रकृतिनिबन्धनाच्चेन्न तस्यापि पारतन्त्र्यम् ॥ १८ ॥

Nature is not the immediate cause of the soul's bondage.

Aph. 18.—If [you say that the soul's bondage arises] from Nature as its cause, [then I say] no,—[because]

that also is a dependent thing, [—"because that also, i. e. Nature also, is dependent (—for its power of seemingly binding or influencing soul—) on the *conjunction* which is to be mentioned in the next aphorism." "Therefore, since Nature can be the cause of bondage only as depending on something else (—i. e. on the conjunction to be mentioned in the next aphorism), through this very sort of conjunction it follows that the bondage is *reflectional*,—like the heat of water due to the conjunction of fire," —water being held to be essentially cold, and only to *seem* hot while the heat continues in conjunction with it].

न नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावस्य तद्योगस्तद्योगादृते तु ॥ १९ ॥

What really is the relation of its bondage to the soul.

Aph. 19.—But not without the conjunction thereof [i. e. of Nature] is there the connection of that [i. e. of pain] with that [viz. the soul] which is ever essentially a pure and free intelligence,—[while the bondage of the soul is reflectional—and not inherent in it either essentially or adventitiously. "For if bondage were produced by the conjunction (of the soul) with nature, as colour is produced by heating (—in the case of a jar of black clay which becomes red in the baking—), then, just like that, it would continue even after disjunction therefrom,"—as the red colour remains in the jar after the fire of the brick-kiln has been extinguished,—whereas the red colour occasioned in a crystal vase by a China-rose, while it occurs *not without* the China-rose, ceases on the removal thereof. "Next he rejects certain causes of [the soul's] bondage preferred by others."]

नाविद्यातोऽप्यवस्तुना बन्धायोगात् ॥ २० ॥

The Vedántic tenet on this point disputed.

Aph. 20.—Not from Ignorance, too, [does the soul's bondage, as the Vedántin holds, arise], because that which is not a reality is not adapted to binding,—[for "the binding of any one with a rope merely *dreamt* of was never witnessed."]

वस्तुत्वे सिद्धान्तहानिः ॥ २१ ॥

The Vedántin cannot evade the objection without stultifying himself.

Aph. 21.—If it ['Ignorance'] *be* [asserted by you to be] a reality, then there is an abandonment of the [Vedántic] tenet [by you who profess to follow the Vedánta].

विजातीयद्वैतापत्तिश्च ॥ २२ ॥

The Vedántin cannot evade the objection without conceding a duality.

Aph. 22.—And [if you assume 'Ignorance' to be a reality, then] there would be a *duality* through [there being] something of a different kind [from soul,—which you asserters of *non-duality* cannot contemplate allowing. "For the followers of the *Vedánta*, asserting *non-duality*, hold that there is neither a duality through there being something of the same kind with soul nor through there being something of a different kind."]

विरुद्धोभयरूपा चेत् ॥ २३ ॥

The Vedántin must not allege that 'Ignorance' is at once real and unreal.

Aph. 23.—If [the Vedántin alleges, regarding 'Ignorance,' that] it is in the shape of both these opposites, [—then we shall say Nay, for the reason to be assigned in the next aphorism].

न तादृक्पदार्थाप्रतीतेः ॥ २४ ॥

There is no such thing as a thing at once real and unreal.

Aph. 24.—[To the suggestion that 'Ignorance' is at once real and unreal, we say] no,—because no such thing is known [as is at once real and unreal].

न वयं षट्पदार्थवादिनो वैशेषिकादिवत् ॥ २५ ॥

A question whether the Vedántin is bound to avoid self-contradiction.

Aph. 25.—[Possibly the Vedántin may remonstrate—] "*We* are not asserters of any Six Categories like the *Vais'eshikas* and others" [—like the *Vais'eshikas* who arrange all

things under six heads, and the *Naiyáyikas* who arrange them under sixteen;—"therefore we hold that there *is* such a thing —unknown though it be (to people in general)—as 'Ignorance' which is at once real and unreal, or (if you prefer it) which differs at once from the real and the unreal (—see *Vedánta-sára* §21—), because this is established by proofs," scriptural or otherwise, which are satisfactory to *us*, although they may not comply with all the technical requisitions of Gautama's scheme of argumentative exposition,—see Nyáya Aphorisms, Aph. 35. This Vedántic pretence of evading the objection by disallowing the categories of the Nyáya, he disposes of as follows.]

अनियतत्वे ऽपि नायौक्तिकस्य संग्रहो ऽन्यथा बालोन्मत्तादिसमत्वम् ॥ २६ ॥

The self-contradictory is altogether inadmissible.

Aph. 26.—Even although this be not compulsory [that the categories be reckoned six or sixteen], there is no acceptance of the inconsistent, else we come to the level of children and madmen and the like:—[for, "let there be no system of categories, still, since *being* and *not-being* are contradictory, it is impossible for any disciples to admit, merely on your worship's assertion, a thing at once real and unreal, which is inconsistent,—contrary to all fitness; otherwise we might as well accept also the self-contradictory assertions of children and the like;—such is the meaning."]

नानादिविषयोपरागनिमित्तको ऽप्यस्य ॥ २७ ॥

The heretical theory of a succession of momentary objects from all eternity, as causing the soul's bondage, rejected.

Aph. 27.—[The bondage] thereof, moreover, is not caused by any influence of objects from all eternity, [as those imagine who assert that there exist external objects, of momentary duration individually, each being, however, replaced by its fac-simile the next instant, so that the uninterrupted series of productions becomes something equivalent to continuous duration, and so that by the influence of these the bondage of the soul is occasioned.]

न बाह्यान्तरयोरुपरज्योपरञ्जकभावोऽपि देशव्यवधानात् सुघ्नस्थपाटलिपुत्रस्थयोरिव ॥ २८ ॥

A thing cannot act where it is not.

Aph. 28. Also between the external and the internal there is not the relation of influenced and influencer, because there is a local separation, as there is between him that stays at Srughna and him that stays at Pâṭaliputra, [—and, "in the opinion of these (persons whose theory we are at present objecting to), the soul is circumscribed, residing entirely within the body; and that which is thus *within* cannot stand in the relation of the influenced and the influencer as regards an *external* object. Why? Because they are separated in regard to place, like two persons the one of whom remains in Srughna and the other in Pâṭaliputra;—such is the meaning. Because the affection which we call 'influence' (*vâsanâ*) is seen only when there is conjunction,—such as that of madder and the cloth (—to which it gives its colour—) or that of flowers and the flower-basket (—to which they impart their odour.") And if these heretics reply "The influence of objects (on the soul) may be asserted, because there *is* a contact with the object, inasmuch as the soul, according to *us*, goes to the place of the object, just as the senses according to your worship," then we declare as follows.]

द्वयोरेकदेशलब्धोपरागान्न व्यवस्था ॥ २९ ॥

On the heretical view the free soul would be equally liable to bondage.

Aph. 29. [It is impossible that the soul's bondage should arise] from an influence received in the same place [where the object is, because, in that case,] there would be no distinction between the two [—the bond and the free,—the free soul, according to this hypothesis, being just as liable to come across objects as any other—].

अदृष्टवलाच्चेत् ॥ ३० ॥

The heretic's attempted defence.

Aph. 30. If [the heretic, wishing to save his theory, suggests that a differ-

ence between the two cases—*does* exist] in virtue of the *unseen* [—i. e. of merit and demerit,—then he will find his answer in the next aphorism. We suppose the heretic to argue—"But then, granting that they (the free soul and the bound) are alike in respect of their coming into contact with objects, when they become conjoined with them in one and the same locality, yet the *reception of the influence* may result merely from the force of the *unseen*"—i. e. from the merit or demerit of this or that soul,—the soul that is liberated alike from merit and demerit being able to encounter with impunity the object that would enchain one differently circumstanced.]

न द्वयोरेककालायोगादुपकार्य्योपकारकभावः ॥ ३१ ॥

Each back must bear its own burden.

Aph. 31. They [—the soul to-day and the soul to-morrow, on your theory of momentary duration,] cannot stand in the relation of deserver and bestower, since the two do not belong to one and the same time; [—"that is to say, since, in thy opinion, the agent and the patient are distinct, and do not belong to the same time (—believing, as thou heretically dost, not only that *objects* momentarily perish and are replaced, but that the duration of *souls* also is of a like description—), there is positively no such relation (between the soul at one time and its successor at another) as that of deserver and bestower (or transmitter of its merits or demerits); because it is impossible that there should be an influence of objects taking effect on a patient (—say the soul of to-day—) occasioned by the 'unseen' (merit or demerit) belonging to an agent" (—say the soul of yesterday—), which, on the hypothesis in question, is a numerically different individual.]

पुत्रकर्म्मवदिति चेत् ॥ ३२ ॥

Whether merit may or may not be imputed.

Aph. 32. If [the heretic suggests that] the case is like that of the ceremonies in regard to a son, [—then he will find his reply by looking

forward. The heretic—admitting the principle that the merit or demerit of an act belongs entirely to the agent—may urge that "as the son is benefited by ceremonies in regard to a son,—such as that (ceremony—see Colebrooke's Hindú Law, vol. 3, p. 104—celebrated) in anticipation of conception,—which (no doubt) belongs to the *father* (who performs the ceremonies to propitiate the gods),—in like manner there may be an influence of objects on the experiencer (—say the soul of to-day—) through the merit or demerit that belongs even to a different subject (—say the soul of yesterday—) : such is the meaning" of the heretic. He refutes this by showing that the illustration is not a fact.]

नास्ति हि तत्र स्थिर एक आत्मा यो गर्भाधानादिना संस्क्रियेत ॥ ३३ ॥

This will not help the heretic's argument.

Aph. 33. [Your illustration proves nothing,] for on *that* theory [of you heretics], there is no one permanent soul which could be consecrated by the ceremonies in anticipation of conception, &c. [—i. e. "on thy theory moreover the benefit of the son, by means of the performance of the ceremonies in anticipation of conception, &c., could not even take place,—because, on that theory there is not one (self-identical) soul, continuing from the time of conception to birth, which could be consecrated (by the ceremonies in question) so as to be a fit subject for the duties that pertain to the time subsequent to birth (—such as the investiture with the sacred thread, for which the young bráhman would not be a fit subject if the ceremonies in anticipation of his conception had been omitted—); and thus your illustration is not a real one" on your *own* theory ;—(it is not a thing that you can assert as a fact.) "And according to *my* theory also your illustration is not a fact, seeing that it *is* possible that the benefit to the son should arise from the merit deposited in the son by means of the ceremony regarding the son, for it is an implied tenet (of my school) that it (the soul) is permanent (in its self-identity,—so that it is

a conceivable depositary of merit), and there is the injunction' of Manu—ch. 2. v. 26.—, with regard to the ceremonies in question, which proceeds on the assumption of the possibility of imputed righteousness].

स्थिरकार्यासिद्धेः क्षणिकत्वम् ॥ ३४ ॥

Whether bondage too may not be momentary and so require no cause.

Aph. 34. Since there is no such thing as a permanent result [—may some other argue on the heretical view], —the momentariness [of bondage also is to be admitted. "And thus the position fallen back upon is, that bondage need have no cause at all. And this is the application of the argument—viz.—

(1) Bondage, &c., is momentary :—
(2) Because it exists :—and
(3) Every thing that exists is momentary, as the apex of the lamp-flame, or the like.

And (—continues the heretic—) this (reason—viz. 'existence'—) does not extend *unduly* (—as you may object—) to the case of (what *you* choose to regard as a *permanent* product, such as) a jar or the like, because *that* also (in *my* opinion) is like the subject in dispute (in being momentary),—this being precisely what is asserted in the expression 'Since there is *no such thing* as a permanent result.' "]

न प्रत्यभिज्ञाबाधात् ॥ ३५ ॥

The fact of recognition proves that things are not momentary.

Aph. 35. Nay—[we reply to these heretics,—things are *not* momentary in their duration], for the absurdity of this is proved by *recognition* :—["in fact *nothing* is momentary, because the absurdity of its being momentary follows from the opposite argument to yours taken from such facts of recognition as 'What I saw,—that same do I touch,'—(an argument which may be fully stated as follows)—viz.

(1) Bondage, &c., is a permanent thing (—not a momentary thing—);
(2) Because it exists:—and
(3) Every thing that exists is a permanent thing,—as a jar, or the like."]

श्रुतिन्यायविरोधाच्च ॥ ३६ ॥

That things are momentary is contradicted by Scripture and reasoning.

Aph. 36. And [things are not momentary] because this is contradicted by Scripture and by reasoning:—["that is to say,—*nothing* is momentary, because the principle that the whole world, consisting of effects and causes, is momentary, is contradicted by such texts as this—viz. 'All this, O ingenuous one, was antecedently existing,'—and by such scriptural and other arguments as this, viz. 'How should what exists proceed from the non-existent?' "]

दृष्टान्तासिद्धेश्च ॥ ३७ ॥

The heretic's illustration is not a truth.

Aph. 37. And [we reject the argument of this heretic] because his instance is not a fact:—["that is to say,—the principle of the momentariness of all things is denied, because this momentary character does not in fact belong to such instances as the apex of the lamp-flame (on which thou, heretic, dost ground thy generalization):—moreover thou quite errest in regard to momentariness in that instance from not taking account of the minute and numerous instants (really included in a duration the 'latens processus' of which thou failest to discern). Moreover if the momentary duration of things be asserted, then there can be no such thing as the relation of cause and effect in the case of the earth and the jar, and the like. And you must not say that there *is* no such thing as the relation of cause and effect, because it is proved to be a reality by the fact that otherwise there would be no such thing as the efforts of him who desires an effect (—

and who therefore sets in operation the causes adapted to its production). With reference to this he declares as follows."]—

युगपज्ज्ञायमानयोर्न कार्यकारणभावः ॥ ३८ ॥

The causal relation is not between things that arise simultaneously.

Aph. 38. It is not between two things coming simultaneously into existence that the relation of cause and effect exists,— [for, let us ask,—" does the relation of product and material cause exist between the earth and the jar as *simultaneously* coming into (their supposed momentary) existence, or as successive? Not the first,—because there is nothing to determine that, and because we should not in that case find the man who wants a jar operating with earth, &c., (with a view to the jar's *subsequent* production.) Neither is it the last,—in regard to which he declares as follows."]

पूर्वापाये उत्तरायोगात् ॥ ३९ ॥

A product cannot survive its substantial cause.

Aph. 39. Because when the antecedent departs, the consequent is incompetent [either to arise or to survive it.]

तद्भावे तदयोगादुभयव्यभिचाराद्पि न ॥ ४० ॥

The co-existence of substantial cause and product is impossible, if things be momentary.

Aph. 40. Moreover not, [on the theory of the momentary duration of things, can there be such a relation as that of cause and effect,] because while the one [the antecedent] exists, the other [the consequent] is incompatible, because the two keep always asunder. ["To complete the aphorism we must say,—'moreover, (on the theory objected to) there can be no such relation as that of cause and effect, because at the time when the antecedent exists, the consequent cannot co-exist with it, the two being mutually exclusive.' The two suggesters of the relation of cause and effect are (1) this concomitancy of affirmatives—that while the product exists, the substance thereof exists, and (2) this concomitancy of nega-

tives—that when the substance no longer exists, the product no longer exists:—and these two (conditions—on *your* theory—) cannot be, because, since things (in your opinion) are momentary in their duration, the two (—viz., the substance and the product —), inasmuch as they are antecedent and consequent, belong to opposite times,"—(and cannot therefore co-exist,—for the product—according to you—does not come into existence until its substance has perished, which is contrary to the nature of the causal relation just defined. But then the heretic may say —do not let the *co-existence* of substance and product be insisted upon as indispensable to the causal relation between the two,— but) "let the nature of a cause belong to the substantial cause, as it belongs to the *instrumental* cause, in respect merely of its *antecedence*. To this we reply as follows."]

पूर्वभावमात्रे न नियमः ॥ ४१ ॥

Antecedence to the product does not distinguish the Matter from the Instrument.

Aph. 41. If there were merely *antecedence*, then there would be no determination [of a substantial or material cause as distinguished from an instrumental cause; but—as we need scarcely remind you—, "that there *is* a distinction between substantial and instrumental causes, the whole world is agreed. Other heretics say—'Since no thing exists except *Thought*, neither does *Bondage*, any more than the things of a dream. Therefore it has *no* cause, for it is absolutely *false*.' He rejects the opinion of these" as follows].

न विज्ञानमात्रं बाह्यप्रतीतेः ॥ ४२ ॥

We have the evidence of Intuition for the External as well as the Internal.

Aph. 42. Not Thought alone exists, because there is the intuition of the external:—["that is to say—the *reality* is not *Thought* alone, because external objects also are proved to exist, just as Thought is, by intuition." "But then (these heretics may rejoin)—'From the example of intuitive perception in *dreams* (cf. Butler's Analogy, Part I. ch. I.), we find this (—

your supposed evidence of objective reality—) to exist even in the *absence* of objects!' To this we reply."]

तद्भावे तद्भावाच्छून्यं तर्हि ॥ ४३ ॥

The denial of the external amounts to Nihilism.

Aph. 43. Then, since, if the one does not exist, the other does not exist, there is a void [—i. e. nothing exists at all. "Why? Because if the external does not exist, then *thought* does not exist. For it is *intuition* that proves the objective, and if the intuition of the external did not establish the objective, then the intuition of *thought* also would not establish the existence of thought." "Then *let* the reality be a mere void;—and therefore the searching for the cause of Bondage is unfitting, *just because a void is all:*—with such a proposal (as recorded in the next aphorism) does (some one who may claim the title of) the very crest-gem of the heretics rise up in opposition."]

शून्यं तत्त्वं भावो विनश्यति वस्तुधर्म्मत्वादिनाशस्य ॥ ४४ ॥

The heretic goes the length of asserting sheer Nihilism.

Aph. 44. The reality is the void; what is, perishes,—because to perish is the habit of things:—["The void alone (—says this prince of heretics,—or the fact that nothing exists at all—) is the reality (—or the only truth—). Since every thing that exists perishes, and that which is perishable is false, as is a dream, therefore as of all things the beginnings and endings are merely nonentities, Bondage, &c., in the midst (of any beginning and ending), has merely a momentary existence,—is phenomenal and not real. Therefore *who* can be bound by *what?*—this (question) is what we rest upon." "The reason assigned for the perishableness of whatever exists is 'because to perish is the habit of things,'—because to perish (or vanish into nothing) is the *very nature* of things. But nothing continues after quitting its own *nature* (—so that nothing could continue if it *ceased* to perish),—such is the meaning."]

b. He rejects [this heretical view.]

अपवादमात्रमबुद्धानाम् ॥ ४५ ॥

Nihilism denied, as the indiscerptible is indestructible.

Aph. 45. This is a mere counter-assertion of unintelligent persons—["i. e., of blockheads,—a mere *idle* counter-assertion, that a thing must needs be perishable *because it exists;* (and such an assertion is idle) because things that are not made up of parts, since there is no cause of the destruction of such things, cannot perish. But what need of many words? It is not the fact that even *products* perish, for, just as by the cognition that 'the jar is old' [we mean that it has passed from the condition of new to that of old], so too by such a cognition as this that 'the jar has passed away,' it is only settled that the jar, or the like, *in the condition* of having passed away, still *is*."]

उभयपक्षसमानक्षेमत्वादयमपि ॥ ४६ ॥

Nihilism is open to the same objections as both the Momentary and the Ideal theories.

Aph. 46. Moreover this [nihilistic theory is not a right one] because it has the same fortune as both the views [which were confuted just before by the fact of *recognition,* (—which is at least as little consistent with Nihilism as it is with the momentary duration of things), and the intuition of the external,—see *Aphs.* 35 and 42. "Moreover as for the opinion which is accepted by these (heretics)—viz. '*Let the mere void* (of absolute nonentity) be the soul's aim and summum bonum, since herein consist at once the cessation of pain (—which cannot continue when there is absolutely *nothing*)—and also the means thereof (—since there can be no further means required for the removal of any thing if it be settled that the thing positively does not exist),'—this too can hardly be,—so he declares as follows"].

अपुरुषार्थत्वमुभयथा ॥ ४७ ॥

The soul's aim is not annihilation.

Aph. 47. In neither way [—whether as a means or as an end—] is this [annihilation] the soul's aim, [—"because the whole world agrees

that the aim of the soul consists in the joys, &c., that shall abide *in it*,—that is to say, because (*they* hold, while) *you* do not hold, that there is a *permanent* soul,"—see *Aphs.* 33—in respect of which the liberation or beatification should be possible or even predicable].

न गतिविशेषात् ॥ ४८ ॥

It is by no movement that the soul gets into bondage.

Aph. 48. Not from any kind of motion —[such as its entrance into a body— does the soul's bondage result as some have imagined].

निष्क्रियस्य तदसम्भवात् ॥ ४९ ॥

What is all-pervading does not change place.

Aph. 49. Because this is impossible for what is inactive [—or, in other words, without motion, as the soul is, because all-pervading,—and therefore incapable of changing its place].

मूर्त्तत्वात् घटादिवत् समानधर्मापत्तावपसिद्धान्तः ॥ ५० ॥

Were the soul limited it might be perishable.

Aph. 50. [We cannot admit that the soul is other than all-pervading, because] by being limited, since it would come under the same conditions as jars, &c., [in being made up of parts, and hence destructible,] there would be a contradiction to our tenet [of its imperishableness].

गतिश्रुतिरप्युपाधियोगादाकाशवत् ॥ ५१ ॥

Soul moves not, any more than Space.

Aph. 51. The [Vedic] text regarding the *motion* [of the soul], moreover, is [applicable only] because of the junction of an *attendant*, as in the case of the Ether [or *Space*, which moves not, though we talk of the space enclosed in a jar, as moving with the jar. "Since there are such proofs of the soul's unlimitedness as the declaration that 'It is eternal, omnipresent, permanent,' the text regarding its *motion* is to be explained as having reference to a movement pertaining (not to the soul but) to an attendant;"—viz. Nature].

न कर्मणाप्यतद्धर्मत्वात् ॥ ५२ ॥

The bondage of the soul is no result of any merit or demerit.

Aph. 52. Nor moreover [does the bondage of the soul result from the merit or demerit arising] from works, because these belong not thereto,—see Aph. 16].

अतिप्रसक्तिरन्यधर्मत्वे ॥ ५३ ॥

Else bondage might cling even to the emancipated.

Aph. 53. If the case were otherwise [than as I say], then it [the bondage of the soul] might extend unduly [even to the emancipated, for the same reasons as those stated under Aph. 16].

निर्गुणादिश्रुतिविरोधश्चेति ॥ ५४ ॥

A single text of scripture upsets equally all the heretical notions of the soul's relation to bondage.

Aph. 54. And this [opinion that the bondage of the soul arises from any of these causes alleged by the heretics] is contrary to such texts as the one that declares it [the soul] to be without qualities;—and so much for that point. [The case then stands thus, that "the immediate cause of the bondage of the soul is just the conjunction of Nature and of the soul."]

तद्योगोऽप्यविवेकान्न समानत्वम् ॥ ५५ ॥

How the true cause of bondage affects not the emancipated.

Aph. 55. Moreover the conjunction thereof [viz. of Soul and Nature,] does not, through non-discrimination, take place [in the case of the emancipated], nor is there a parity [in this respect between the emancipated and the unemancipated, as the heretics object there must be].

नियतकारणात्तदुच्छित्तिर्ध्वान्तवत् ॥ ५६ ॥

Non-discrimination is removeable by discrimination alone.

Aph. 56. The removal of it [viz. non-discrimination—] is to be effected by the necessary means, just like darkness, [which is removed by light alone].

प्रधानाविवेकादन्याविवेकस्य तद्धाने हानम् ॥ ५७ ॥

The discrimination of Nature, as other than soul, involves all discrimination.

Aph. 57. Since the non-discrimination of other things [such as the body, the human understanding, &c., from soul] results from the non-discrimination of *Nature* [from soul], the cessation of this will take place on the cessation of that Nature, [from which, the body, the human understanding, &c., arise. "The state of the case is this; as, when the soul has been discriminated from *body*, it is impossible but that it should be discriminated from the *colour* and other properties—the effects of the body (which is the substantial cause of its own properties), —so, by parity of reasoning,—from the departure of the cause—when soul, in its character of *unalterableness* &c., has been discriminated from *Nature*, it is impossible that there should remain a conceit of (the soul's being any of) the *products* thereof (i. e. of Nature), such as the 'understanding' and the like, which have the character of being *modifications* (of primal Nature, while the soul, on the other hand, is a thing unalterable). "But then (some one may say)—if we admit the soul's bondage (at one time) and its freedom (at another), and its discrimination (at one time) and its non-discrimination (at another), then this is in contradiction to the assertion (in Aph. 19) that it is 'ever essentially a pure and free intelligence:'—and it is in contradiction to such texts as this—viz.,—'The absolute truth is this, that neither is there destruction (of the soul), nor production (of it), nor is it bound, nor is it an effecter (of any work), nor is it desirous of liberation, nor is it indeed *liberated*'—(seeing that that cannot desire or obtain liberation, which was never *bound*). This charge of inconsistency he repels as follows."]

वाङ्मात्रं न तु तत्त्वं चित्तस्थितेः ॥ ५८ ॥

The bondage of the soul is merely verbal.

Aph. 58.—It is merely verbal, and not a reality, [this so-called bondage of the soul,] since it [the bondage] *resides* in the *mind* [and not in

the soul :—for " since bondage &c. all reside only in the *mind* (and not in the soul), all this, as regards the soul, is merely verbal—i. e. it is ' vox et praeterea nihil,'—because it is merely a *reflection* like the redness of (pellucid) crystal (when a China-rose is near it); but not a reality, with no false imputation, like the redness of the China-rose itself. Hence there is *no* contradiction to what had been said before,"—as the objector would insinuate.]

युक्तितो ऽपि न बाध्यते दिङ्मूढवदपरोक्षादृते ॥ ५९ ॥

The truth must be directly discerned, and not merely accepted on the ground of Testimony or of Inference.

Aph. 59.—Moreover it [the non-discrimination of Soul from Nature—] is not to be removed by argument, as that of the person perplexed about the points of the compass [is not to be removed] without immediate cognition [—i. e. without his directly perceiving how the points of the compass really lie,—to which immediate perception ' testimony' or ' inference' may conduce, but the necessity of which these *media* or instruments of knowledge cannot supersede. A man with the jaundice perceives *white* objects as if they were *yellow*. He may *infer* that the piece of chalk which he looks at is really white; or he may believe the *testimony* of a friend that it *is* white; but still nothing will remove his erroneous *perception* of yellowness in the chalk except a direct perception of its whiteness. " Having thus, then, set forth the fact that Liberation results from the immediate discrimination (of soul from Nature), the next thing to be set forth is—what is meant by the ' discrimination,' here referred to;" and " this being the topic, in the first place since, only if soul and Nature exist, liberation can result from the discrimination of the one from the other, therefore—that ' instrument of right knowledge' *(pramáṇa)* which establishes the existence of these (two *imperceptible* realities) is first to be set forth."]

अचाक्षुषाणामनुमानेन बोधो धूमादिभिरिव वह्नेः ॥ ६० ॥

The evidence for things imperceptible.

Aph. 60.—The knowledge of things imperceptible is by means of Inference,

as that of fire [when not directly perceptible] is by means of smoke, &c. ["Moreover, it is to be understood that that which is (true, but yet is) not established by 'Inference,' is established by Revelation;—but since 'Inference' is the chief (among the instruments of knowledge) in this (the Sánkhya) System, 'Inference' only is laid down (in the aphorism) as the *chief* thing,—but Revelation is not disregarded" in the Sánkhya system,—as will be seen at Aph. 87. "He next exhibits the order of creation of those things among which Nature is the first, and the relation of cause and effect (among these severally), preparatorily to the argument that will be afterwards stated."]

सत्त्वरजस्तमसां साम्यावस्था प्रकृतिः प्रकृतेर्महान् महतोऽहङ्कारोऽहङ्कारात्पञ्च तन्मात्राणि उभयमिन्द्रियं तन्मात्रेभ्यः स्थूलभूतानि पुरुष इति पञ्चविंशतिर्गणः ॥ ६१ ॥

The twenty-five realities enumerated.

Aph. 61.—Nature *(prakriti)* is the state of equipoise of Goodness *(sattwa)* Passion *(rajas)* and Darkness *(tamas)*; from Nature [proceeds] Mind *(mahat)*, from Mind Self-consciousness *(ahankára)*, from Self-consciousness the five Subtile Elements *(tanmátra)*, and both sets [external and internal] of Organs *(indriya)*, and from the Subtile Elements the Gross Elements *(sthúla-bhúta)*. [Then there is] Soul *(purusha)*:—such is the class of twenty-five. ["The 'state of equipoise' of the three things called 'Goodness' &c., is their being neither less nor more (—one than another—), that is to say the state of *not* being (developed into) an *effect* (in which one or other of them predominates):—and thus 'Nature' is the triad of 'Qualities' *(guṇa)* distinct from the products (to which this triad gives rise);—such is the complete meaning." "These things, viz. 'Goodness' &c., (though spoken of as the three *Qualities*), are not 'Qualities' *(guṇa)* in the *Vais'eshika* sense of the word, because (the 'Qualities' of the *Vais'eshika* system have themselves *no* qualities,—see Kaṇáda's 16th Aph.—while) *these* have the qualities of Conjunction, Dis-

junction, Lightness, Force, Weight, &c. In this Sánkhya system, and in Scripture, the word 'Quality' *(guṇa)* is employed (as the name of the three things in question) because they are subservient to Soul (and therefore hold a secondary rank in the scale of being), and because they form the *cords* (—which the word *guṇa* also signifies—), viz. 'Understanding' &c., which consist of the three (so called) 'Qualities,' and which *bind* as a (cow or other) brute-beast, the Soul." "Of this (Nature) the principle called 'the great one' *(mahat)*, viz. the principle of 'Understanding' *(buddhi)*, is the product. 'Self-consciousness' is a conceit (of separate personality). Of this there are two products, (1) the 'Subtile Elements' and (2) the two sets of 'Organs.' The 'Subtile Elements' are (those of) Sound, Touch, Colour, Taste, and Smell. The two sets of 'Organs,' through their division into the external and the internal, are of eleven kinds. The products of the 'Subtile Elements' are the five 'Gross Elements.' But 'Soul' is something distinct from either product or cause. Such is the class of twenty-five,—the aggregate of things:—that is to say, besides these there is nothing." "He next, in several aphorisms, declares the order of the inferring" the existence of these principles—the one from the other].

स्थूलात्यच्चतन्मात्रस्य ॥ ६२ ॥

The existence of the 'Subtile Elements' is inferred from that of the 'Gross.'

Aph. 62.—[The knowledge of the existence] of the 'Subtile Elements' is [by inference] from the 'Gross Elements;'—[for "Earth, &c., the 'Gross Elements,' are proved to exist by Perception; and thereby (—i. e. from that Perception, —for Perception must precede Inference, as stated in Gautama's 5th Aphorism—) are the 'Subtile Elements' inferred—(the στοιχεῖα στοιχείων of Empedocles);—and so the application (of the process of inference to the case) is as follows:—

(1). The Gross Elements, or those which have not reached the absolute limit (of simplification, or of the atomic), consist of things (—Subtile Elements, or Atoms,—) which have distinct

qualities, (—the earthy element having the distinctive quality of Odour, and so of the others) :

(2). Because they are gross :—and

(3). (Everything that is gross is formed of something less gross, or in other words more subtile,) as jars, webs, &c.,"—the gross web being formed of the less gross threads, and so of the others.]

बाह्याभ्यन्ताभ्यां तैश्चाहङ्कारस्य ॥ ६३ ॥

And thence that of self-consciousness.

Aph. 63.—[The knowledge of the existence] of Self-consciousness is [by inference] from the external and internal [organs] and these ['Subtile Elements'—mentioned in Aph. 62. "The application (of the process of inference to the case) is in the following (somewhat circular) manner :—

(1). The Subtile Elements and the Organs are made up of things consisting of Self-consciousness :—

(2). Because they are products of Self-consciousness :—

(3). Whatever is not so (—i. e. whatever is *not* made out of Self-consciousness—) is not thus (—i. e. is not a *product* of Self-consciousness)—as the Soul—which, not being made up thereof, is not a product of it." "But then if it be thus (i. e. if it be, as the Sánkhyas declare, that all objects, such as jars, are made up of Self-consciousness, while Self-consciousness depends on 'Understanding,' or 'Intellect,' or 'Mind,'—the *first* product of 'Nature'—see Aph. 61—,) then (some one may object, that,) since it would be the case that the Self-consciousness of the potter is the material of the jar, the jar made by him would disappear on the beatification of the potter whose 'understanding' then surceases; and this (—the objector may go on to say—) is not found to be the case, because *another* man (*after* the beatification of the potter) recognizes that 'This is that same jar (which you may remember was fabricated by our deceased acquaintance.)' In reply to this we say "Say not so,—because, on one's beatification, there is an end of only those modifications of his inter-

nal organ or 'Intellect' which could be causes (as the *jar* no longer can be) of the emancipated soul's *experiencing* (either good or ill), but not an end of the modifications of intellect in general, nor (an end) of intellect altogether;"—so that we might spare ourselves the trouble of further argument so far as concerns the objection grounded on the assumption that the intellect of the potter *surceases* on his beatification:—but we may go further and admit, for the sake of argument, the surcease of the 'intellect' of the beatified potter, without conceding any necessity for the surcease of his pottery. This alternative theory of the case may be stated as follows:—"Or (as Berkeley suggests in his Principles of Human Knowledge, ch. vi.) let the Self-consciousness of the *Deity* be the cause why jars and the like continue to exist, and not the Self-consciousness of the potter,"—who may lose his Self-consciousness,—whereas the Deity the sum of all life—*Hiraṇya-garbha* (see *Vedánta-s'ara* 62,) never loses *His* Self-consciousness while aught living continues.]

तेनान्तःकरणस्य ॥ ६४ ॥

And thence that of Intellect.

Aph. 64.—[The knowledge of the existence] of Intellect is [by inference] from that [Self-consciousness—"That is to say,—by inference from (the existence of) 'that'—viz. Self-consciousness—which is a product, there comes the knowledge of 'Intellect' *(buddhi)*—the *great* 'inner organ' *(antahkaraṇa)* and hence called 'the great one' *(mahat)*,—(the existence of which is recognised) under the character of the *cause* of this (product—viz. Self-consciousness). And so the application (—again rather circular—of the process of inference to the case) is as follows:—

(1) The thing called Self-consciousness is made out of the things that consist of the moods of judgment (or mind),

(2) Because it is a thing which is a product of judgment (—proceeding in the Cartesian order of 'cogito, ergo sum,)'—and

(3) Whatever is not so (—i. e. whatever is *not* made out of judgment or mental assurance—), is not thus (i. e. is not a product of mental assurance—) as the Soul" (which is not made out of this or anything antecedent.]

ततः प्रकृतेः ॥ ६५ ॥

And thence that of Nature.

Aph. 65.—[The knowledge of the existence] of Nature is [by inference] from that ['Intellect.'] ["The application (of the process of inference to the case) is as follows:—

(1) Intellect, the affections whereof are Pleasure, Pain, and Dulness, is produced from something which has these affections, —of Pleasure, Pain, and Dulness:—

(2) Because, whilst it is a *product* (and must therefore have arisen from something consisting of that which it itself now consists of), it consists of Pleasure, Pain, and Dulness:—and

(3) (Every *product* that has the affections of, or that occasions, Pleasure, Pain, or Dulness, takes its rise in something which consists of these,) as lovely women, &c.

For, an agreeable woman gives pleasure to her husband, and therefore (is known to be mainly made up of or) partakes of the quality of 'Goodness;' the indiscreet one gives pain to him, and therefore partakes of the quality of 'Foulness;' and she who is separated (and perhaps forgotten), occasions indifference, and so partakes of the quality of 'Darkness.'" "And the appropriate refutation (of any objection) in this case is (the principle) that it is fitting that the qualities of the effect should be (in every case) in conformity with the qualities of the cause."]

संहतपरार्थत्वात्पुरुषस्य ॥ ६६ ॥

The argument for the existence of Soul.

Aph. 66.—[The existence] of Soul [is inferred] from the fact that the combination [of the principles of Nature into their various effects] is for the sake of another [than unintelligent Nature or any of its similarly unintelligent products. "But the application (of the argument in this particular case is as follows):—

(1) The thing in question—viz. Nature, the 'Great one,' and the rest (of the aggregate of the unintelligent),—has, as its fruit (or end), the (mundane) experiences and the (eventual) liberation of some other than itself;—

(2) Because it is a combination (or *compages*);—and

(3) (Every combination,) as a couch or a seat, or the like," (is for another's use, not for its own, and its several component parts render no mutual service).]

मूले मूलाभावादमूलं मूलम् ॥ ६७ ॥

Argument for the eternity of Nature.

Aph. 67.—Since the root has no root, the root [of all] is root-less, [that is to say, there is no other cause of Nature, because there would be a *regressus in infinitum* if we were to suppose another cause, which, by parity of reasoning, would require another cause, and so on without end.]

पारम्पर्येऽप्येकत्र परिनिष्ठेति संज्ञामात्रम् ॥ ६८ ॥

The employment of the term Primal Agency, or Nature, is merely to debar the regressus in infinitum.

Aph. 68—Even if there be a succession, there is a halt at some *one* point, and so it is merely a name, [that we give to the point in question, when we speak of the *root* of things under the name of 'Nature.' "Since there would be the fault of *regressus in infinitum* if there were a succession of causes —another cause of Nature, and another cause of that one again,— there must be at last a halt, or conclusion, at some one point, somewhere or other, at some one uncaused, eternal thing;— therefore, that at which we stop is the *Primal Agency (pra-kriti)* —for this word *prakriti* (usually, and conveniently, rendered by the term *Nature*,) is nothing more than a sign to denote the cause which is the *root*."]

समानः प्रक्रतेर्द्वयोः ॥ ६९ ॥

Nature and soul alike uncreated.

Aph. 69.—Alike in respect of Nature and of both [Soul and Nature, is the argument for the uncreated existence.]

अधिकारिचैविध्यान्न नियमः ॥ ७० ॥

All do not profit by the saving truth, because it is only the best kind of people that are fully amenable to reason.

Aph. 70.—There is no rule [or necessity that *all* should arrive at the truth—] because those who are privileged [to engage in the enquiry] are of three descriptions [—"through their distinction into those who, in reflecting, are dull, mediocre, and best. Of these—by the dull, the (Sánkhya) arguments are frustrated (and altogether set aside) by means of the sophisms that have been uttered by the *Bauddhas*, &c. By the mediocre, they (are brought into doubt, or, in other words,) are made to appear as if there were equally strong arguments on the other side, by means of arguments which really prove the reverse (of what these persons employ them to prove), or by arguments which are not true; (—see the section on Fallacies in the *Tarka-sangraha*). But it is only the *best* of those privileged that reflect in the manner that has been set forth (in our exposition of the process of reflection which leads to the discriminating of Soul from Nature);—such is the import. But there is no rule that *all* must needs reflect in the manner so set forth forth;—such is the literal meaning."]

महदाख्यमाद्यं कार्यं तन्मनः ॥ ७१ ॥

By 'the Great one' is meant Mind.

Aph. 71.—That first product [of the Primal Agent, Nature,] which is called 'the Great one,' is Mind. ["'Mind' (*manas*) is so called because its function is 'thinking' (*manana*). By 'thinking' is here meant 'judging' *(nis'chaya)*:—that of which this is the function is 'intellect' *(buddhi)*;—and *that* is the first product—that called 'the Great one' *(mahat)*."]

चरमोऽहङ्कारः ॥ ७२ ॥

The relation of Self-consciousness to Mind.

Aph. 72.—'Self-consciousness,' is that which is subsequent [to Mind, "That is to say, 'Self-consciousness' is the next after the 'Great one.'" "Since 'Self-consciousness' is that whose function is a

conceit (which brings out the *Ego* in every case of cognition, the matter of which cognition would else have lain dormant in the bosom of Nature—the formless Objective)—it therefore follows that the others (among the phenomena of mundane existence) are effects of this (Self-consciousness);—and so he declares as follows"].

तत्कार्यत्वमुत्तरेषाम् ॥ ७३ ॥

All products, save Mind, result from Self-consciousness.

Aph. 73.—To the others it belongs to be the products thereof [—i. e. of Self-consciousness].

आद्यहेतुता तद्द्वारा पारम्पर्ये ऽप्यणुवत् ॥ ७४ ॥

Nature, immediately the cause of Mind, is mediately the cause of all other products.

Aph. 74.—Moreover, mediately, through that [i. e. the 'great one' Aph. 72—], the first [cause—viz. Nature—] is the cause [of all products], as is the case with the Atoms, [—"for in the theory of the Vais'eshikas, the Atoms are the cause of the jar or the like, only [mediately] through combinations of two atoms, and so on." "But then, since both Nature and Soul too are eternal, which of them is [really] the cause of the creation's commencing? In regard to this he declares as follows."]

पूर्वभावित्वे द्वयोरेकतरस्य वाने ऽन्यतरयोगः ॥ ७५ ॥

Why Nature is the sole cause.

Aph. 75.—While both [Soul and Nature] areantecedent [to all products], since the one [viz. Soul] is devoid of this [character of being a cause], it is applicable [only] to the other of the two [—viz. Nature. "But (some one may say)—let *Atoms* alone be causes, since there is no dispute (that *these* are causal). In reply to this he says"].

परिच्छिन्नं न सर्वोपादानम् ॥ ७६ ॥

Why the theory of a plastic Nature is preferable to that of Atoms.

Aph. 76.—What is limited cannot be the substance of all things, ["as yarn cannot be the (material) cause of

a jar;—therefore it would (on the theory suggested) be necessary to mention separate causes of all things severally, and it is simpler to assume a single cause; therefore Nature alone is the cause,"—"and he alleges scripture in support of this," as follows].

तदुत्पत्तिश्रुतेश्च ॥ ७७ ॥

Scripture declares in favour of the theory.

Aph. 77.—And [the proposition that Nature is the cause of all is proved] from the text of scripture that the origin [of the world] is therefrom, [for "Scripture, moreover, declares that Nature is the cause of the world, in such terms as 'From Nature the world arises,' &c." "But then (some one may say), a jar which antecedently did not exist, is seen to come into existence;—let, then, *antecedent non-existence* be the cause (of each product), since this is an invariable antecedent,"—(and hence a cause—'the invariable antecedent being denominated a cause,' if Dr. Brown, in his 6th lecture, is to be trusted.) To this he replies]

नावस्तुनो वस्तुसिद्धिः ॥ ७८ ॥

Ex nihilo nihil fit.

Aph. 78.—A thing is not made out of nothing; [—"that is to say,—it is not possible that out of nothing—i. e. out of a nonentity—a thing should be made—i. e. an entity should arise. If an entity were to arise out of a nonentity, then since the character of a cause is visible in its product, the *world* also would be unreal." Well, "*let* the world too *be* unreal,—what harm is that to *us?* (—if any ask—) he therefore declares as follows."]

अबाधाददुष्टकारणजन्यत्वाच्च नावस्तुत्वम् ॥ ७९ ॥

Reasons why the world is not to be supposed unreal.

Aph. 79.—It [the world] is not unreal, because there is no fact contradictory [to its reality], and because it is not the [false] result of depraved causes [—leading to a belief in what ought not to be believed. "When there is the notion, in regard to a shell (of a

pearl-oyster, which sometimes glitters like silver), that it is silver, its being silver is contradicted by the (subsequent and more correct) cognition that this is *not* silver. But, in the case in question (—that of the world regarded as a reality—), no one ever has the cognition, 'This world is *not* in the shape of an entity,'—by which (cognition—if any one ever really had such —) its being an entity might be opposed." "And it is held that that is false which is the result of a *depraved* cause,—e. g. some one's cognition of a (white) conch-shell as *yellow*, through such a fault as the jaundice (which depraves his eye-sight). But, in the case in question (—that of the world regarded as a reality—), there is no such (temporary or occasional) depravation (of the senses), because all, at all times, cognize the world as a reality; therefore the world is *not* an unreality." "But then (some one may suggest)—*let* nonentity be the (substantial) cause of the world, still the world will not (necessarily therefore) be unreal. In regard to this he declares as follows."]

भावे तद्योगेन तत्सिद्धिरभावे तदभावात्कुतस्तरां तत्सिद्धिः ॥ ८० ॥

The product of something is something, and of nothing nothing.

Aph. 80.—If it [—the substantial cause—] be an entity, then this would be the case [that the product should be an entity], from its union [or identity] therewith:—but if [the cause be] a nonentity, then how could it possibly be the case [that the product should be real] since *it* is a nonentity [like the cause with which it is united in the relation of identity]?—"[But then (—a follower of the *Mímánsá* may say), since (it would appear that) nonentity can take no shape but that of nonentity, let *works* alone be the cause of the world;—what need have we of the hypothesis of 'Nature?' To this he replies."]

न कर्मण उपादानत्वायोगात् ॥ ८१ ॥

Action cannot serve as a substratum.

Aph. 81.—Nay,—for *works* are not adapted to be the *substantial* cause (of

any product.) ["Granting that 'the unseen' (merit or demerit arising from actions) may be an *instrumental* cause (in bringing about the mundane condition of the agent), yet we never see merit or demerit in the character of the *substantial* cause (of any product), and our theories ought to show deference to our experience."

"But then (some one may say)—since Liberation can be obtained by undertaking the things directed by the Veda, what occasion is there for (our troubling ourselves about) *Nature?* To this he replies."]

नानुश्रविकादपि तत्सिद्धिः साध्यत्वेनावृत्तियोगादपुरुषार्थत्वम् ॥ ८२ ॥

Salvation is not to be obtained by ritual observances.

Aph. 82.—The accomplishment thereof [i. e. of Liberation] is not, moreover, through scriptural rites:—the chief end of man does not consist in this [that is gained through such means]; because, since this consists of what is accomplished through *acts*, [and is therefore a *product* and not *eternal*], there is [still left impending over the ritualist] the liability to repetition of births.

तत्र प्राप्तविवेकस्यानावृत्तिश्रुतिः ॥ ८३ ॥

In regard to the attainment of the chief end of man, the Scripture concurs with the Sánkya.

Aph. 83.—There is scripture for it that he who has attained to discrimination in regard to these [i. e. Nature and Soul] has no repetition of births; [for "there is a text declaring that, in consequence of his knowledge of the distinction, there shall be no repetition of births;—the text—viz.—'*He* does not return again,' &c."]

दुःखादुःखं जलाभिषेकवन्न जात्यविमोकः ॥ ८४ ॥

Pain can only lead to pain, not to liberation from it.

Aph. 84.—From pain [occasioned, e. g., to victims in sacrifice] must come pain [to the sacrificer,—and not *liberation* from pain], as there is not relief from chilliness by effusion of water. [For, "if Li-

काम्येऽकाम्येऽपि साध्यत्वाविशेषात् ॥ ८५ ॥

The character of the end contemplated makes no difference in regard to the transitoriness of what is effected by works.

Aph. 85.—[Liberation cannot arise from acts] because, whether the end be something desirable or undesirable, [—and we admit that the *motive* of the sacrifice is not the giving pain to the victim,—] this makes no difference in regard to its being the result of *acts* [and therefore not eternal but transitory, "because it is a *production.*"] And "the text which declares that works done without desire are instruments of Liberation, has reference to *knowledge* (which, I grant, may be gained by such means), and Liberation comes through knowledge,—so that these works are instruments of Liberation *mediately*;" [—but you will recollect that the present enquiry regards the *immediate* cause].

निजमुक्तस्य बन्धध्वंसमात्रं परं न समानत्वम् ॥ ८६ ॥

The right means effect Liberation once for all.

Aph. 86.—Of him who is essentially liberated, his bonds having absolutely perished, it [i. e. the fruit of his saving knowledge] is absolute:—there is no parity [between his case and that of him who relies on works, and who may thereby secure a temporary sojourn in Paradise,—only to return again to earth. Well, "it has been asserted (in Aph. 61) that there is a class of twenty-five (things which are realities):—and since these cannot be ascertained (or made out to be *true*) except by *proof*, therefore he displays this,"—i. e. he shows what he *means* by proof].

द्वयोरेकतरस्य वाप्यसन्निकृष्टार्थपरिच्छित्तिः प्रमा तत्साधकतमं यत्तत् ॥ ८७ ॥

What is meant by evidence.

Aph. 87.—The determination of something not [previously] lodged in both [the Soul and the Intellect] nor in one or other of them, is 'right notion' *(pramá)*. What is in the highest degree

productive thereof [—i. e. of any given 'right notion'], is that, [—i. e., is what we mean by proof, or evidence, *(pramána)*. 'Not lodged'—i. e. not deposited in 'one rightly cognizing' *(pramátri)*,—in short, not previously got at. The 'discrimination,' i. e. the ascertainment (or right apprehension) of such a thing or reality, is 'right notion':—and whether this be an affection 'of *both*'—i. e. of Intellect and also of Soul (as some hold that it is), or of only one or other of the two (as others hold), *either* way, that 'which is in the highest degree productive' of this 'right notion' is (what we term proof or) evidence *(pramána)*. Such is the definition of evidence in general,—the definition of its several species falling to be considered hereafter. "It is with a view to the exclusion of Memory, Error, and Doubt, in their order, that we employ (when speaking of the result of evidence) the expressions 'not previously known' (which excludes things remembered), and 'reality' (which excludes mistakes and fancies), and 'discrimination'" which excludes doubt. And "in regard to this (topic of knowledge and the sources of knowledge), if 'right notion,' is spoken of as located in the *Soul*, then the proof or evidence is an affection of the *Intellect*. If on the other hand, the 'right notion' is spoken of as located in the Intellect, in the shape of an affection (of that, the affections of which are mirrored by the Soul), then it (the proof or evidence—or whatever we may choose to call that from which 'right notion' results), is just the conjunction of an organ (with its appropriate object,—such conjunction giving rise to sense-perception—), &c. But if *both* the Soul's cognition, and the affections of the Intellect, are spoken of as (cases of) 'right notion,' then *both* of these aforesaid (—the affection of the Intellect in the first case, and the conjunction of an organ with its appropriate object, &c., in the other case —) are (to receive the name of) proof *(pramána)*. You are to understand that when the organ of vision, &c., are spoken of as 'evidence,' it is only as being *mediately*" the sources of

right knowledge. "How many kinds of proofs then are there? To this he replies."]

त्रिविधं प्रमाणं तत्सिद्धौ सर्वसिद्धेर्नाधिक्यसिद्धिः ॥ ८८ ॥

There are three kinds of evidence.

Aph. 88.—Proof is of three kinds:—there is no establishment of more, because if these be established then all [that is true] can be established [—by one or other of these three proofs, viz., 'sense' *(pratyaksha)*, 'the recognition of signs' *(anumána)*, and 'testimony' *(s'abda)*, to the exclusion of 'comparison' which is reckoned in the Nyáya a specifically distinct source of knowledge, &c.]

यत्सम्बद्धं सत्तदाकारोल्लेखि विज्ञानं तत्प्रत्यक्षम् ॥ ८९ ॥

Perception defined.

Aph. 89.—Perception *(pratyaksha)* is that discernment which, being in conjunction [with the thing perceived], portrays the form thereof [—as water assumes the form of the vessel into which it is poured—].

योगिनामबाह्यप्रत्यक्षत्वान्न दोषः ॥ ९० ॥

The definition not to be blamed though it should not apply to the perceptions of the mystic.

Aph. 90.—It is not a fault, [in the definition, that it does not apply to the perceptions of adepts in the *Yoga*,] because that of the adepts in the *Yoga* is not an *external* perception, [since the adepts of the Yoga do not perceive through the *external* organs of sense. But, although this reply is as much as the objector has any right to expect, the real justification of the definition in question is next stated].

लोनवस्तुलब्धातिशयसम्बन्धादाऽदोषः ॥ ९१ ॥

But the definition does apply to the perceptions of the mystic.

Aph. 91.—Or, there is no fault [in the definition] because of the conjunction, with *causal* things, of that [mystical mind] which has attained exaltation [—"since the mind

of the *Yogí*, in the exaltation gained from the habitude produced by concentration, *does* come into conjunction with things (as existent) in their causes," whether or not with the things as developed into products perceptible by the external senses. And "here the word rendered 'causal' *(lína)* denotes the things, *not* in conjunction (with the senses), alluded to by the objector:—for *we*, who assert that effects *exist* (from eternity in their causes before taking the shape of effects, and likewise in these same causes when again resolved into their causes), hold that even what is past, &c., still essentially exists, and that hence its conjunction (with the mind of the mystic or the clairvoyant) is possible." "But then (some one may say—still this (definition) does not extend to the *Lord's* perceptions, because, since these are from everlasting, they cannot *result* from (emergent) conjunction. To this he replies"].

ईश्वरासिद्धेः ॥ ९२ ॥

That any 'Lord' exists is not proved.

Aph. 92.—[This objection to the definition of Perception has no force] because it is not proved that there *is* a Lord *(ís'wara)*; [but observe that this demurring to there being any 'Lord,' is merely in accordance with the arrogant dictum of certain partisans (who hold an opinion not recognised by the majority); therefore, it is to be understood, the expression employed is 'because it is not *proved* that there is a Lord,'—but not the expression 'because there *is no* Lord.' And further, "on the implication that there *is* a 'Lord,' what we mean to speak of (in our definition of Perception—in Aph. 89—) is merely the being of the same kind with what is produced by conjunction" of a sense-organ with its object,—and the perceptions of the 'Lord' may be of the same *kind* with such perceptions, though they were not to come from the same *source*.]

मुक्तबद्धयोरन्यतराभावान्न तत्सिद्धिः ॥ ९३ ॥

A dilemma to exclude proof that there is any 'Lord.'

Aph. 93.—[And further] it is not proved that He [the 'Lord'] exists, because [whoever exists must be either free or bound, and] of free and bound, He can be neither the one nor the other.

उभयथाप्यसत्करत्वम् ॥ ९४ ॥

The force of the dilemma.

Aph. 94.—[Because] either way He would be inefficient, [—since, if He were free, He would have no desires which (as compulsory motives, would) instigate Him to create; and, if He were bound, He would be under delusion;—He must be (on either alternative,) unequal to the creation, &c., of this world. "But then (it may be asked,) if such be the case, what becomes of the scripture texts which declare the 'Lord?' To this he replies."]

मुक्तात्मनः प्रशंसा उपासा सिद्धस्य वा ॥ ९५ ॥

The import of the texts which speak of the 'Lord.'

Aph. 95.—[The scriptural texts which make mention of the 'Lord,' are] either glorifications of the liberated Soul, or homages to the recognised [deities of the Hindú pantheon. But then, if God be nothing but the Soul, and if Soul does nothing, then "what is heard (in scripture—viz.—) the fact that it (viz. Soul) is the *governor* of Nature, &c., would not be the case,—for, in the world, we speak of government only in reference to modifications (preceded and determined) by resolutions (that so and so shall take place), &c. To this he replies"].

तत्सन्निधानादधिष्ठातृत्वं मणिवत् ॥ ९६ ॥

Soul, like the loadstone, acts not by resolve but through proximity.

Aph. 96.—The governorship thereof [i. e. of Soul over Nature] is from its proximity [thereto,—not from its resolving to act thereon—], as is the case with the gem [—the

load-stone—in regard to iron. For, if it were alleged that its (Soul's) creativeness or its governorship were through a *resolve* (to create or to govern,) then this objection would apply;—but (it is not so—for) by *us* (Sánkhyas) it is held that the Soul's governorship, in the shape of creatorship, or the like, is merely from its *proximity* (to Nature)—"as is the case with the (load-stone) gem;"—for "as the gem, the load-stone, is attracted by iron, merely by proximity, without resolving (either to act or to be acted upon), so by the mere conjunction of the primal Soul, Nature is changed into the principle called the 'Great One' (or Mind—see Aph. 61). And in this alone consists (what we speak of as) its acting as *creator* towards that which is superadded to it:"—and thus it is declared (in some one of the Puránas)—"As the iron acts whilst the gem (the loadstone) stands void of volition, just so the world is created by a deity who is mere Existence. Thus it is that there is in the Soul both agency (seemingly), and non-agency (really):—it is *not* an agent, inasmuch as it is devoid of volition; and it *is* an agent, merely through approximation" to Nature].

विशेषकार्येष्वपि जीवानाम् ॥ ९७ ॥

In like manner Embodied souls do not energize.

Aph. 97.—In the case of individual products also, [the apparent agency] of animal souls [is solely through proximity. But then (some one may say), if there were no eternal and omniscient 'Lord,' then, through the doubt of a blind tradition (in the absence of an intelligently effective guardianship), the *Vedas* would cease to be an authority—(a possibility which, of course, cannot be entertained for an instant). To this he replies"].

सिद्धरूपवोद्भृत्वादाक्यार्थोपदेशः ॥ ९८ ॥

How the Vedas need not any 'Lord' to authenticate them.

Aph. 98. The declaration of the texts or sense [of the Veda, by Brahmá for example], since *he* knows the truth—[*is* authoritative evidence. "But then if Soul, by

its simple proximity (to Nature) is an overruler in a *secondary* sense only of the term, (—as the magnet may be said, in a secondary sense, to draw the iron, while the conviction is entertained that actually, and literally, the iron draws the magnet,—) then who is the *primary* (or actual) overruler (in the creation of the world)? In reference to this he says"].

अन्तःकरणस्य तदुज्ज्वलितत्वाल्लोहवदधिष्ठातृत्वम् ॥ ९९ ॥

It is in the shape of the internal organ that Nature affects Soul.

Aph. 99.—The internal organ, through its being enlightened thereby [—i. e. by Soul—] is the over-ruler, —as is the iron [in respect of the magnet. "The internal organ, i. e. the understanding, is the over-ruler, through its fancying itself to be Soul, (as it does fancy) by reason of its being enlightened by the Soul, through its happening to reflect itself in (and contemplate itself in) Soul;—'just as the iron'—that is to say—as the attracting iron, though inactive, draws (the magnet) in consequence of its mere proximity," and so acquiring magnetism by Magnetic Induction].

He now, (having discussed the evidence that consists in direct perception), gives his definition of an induction *(anumána)*.

प्रतिबन्धदृशः प्रतिबद्धज्ञानमनुमानम् ॥ १०० ॥

Inference defined.

Aph. 100.—The knowledge of the connected [e. g. fire] through perception of the connection [e. g. of fire with smoke] is inference.

आप्तोपदेशः शब्दः ॥ १०१ ॥

Valid Testimony defined.

Aph. 101.—Testimony [such as is entitled to the name of evidence—] is a declaration by one worthy [to be believed].

उभयसिद्धिः प्रमाणात्तदुपदेशः ॥ १०२ ॥

Why the kinds of Evidence have been here set forth.

Aph. 102.—Since the establishment of [the existence of] both [soul and not-soul] is by means of evidence,—the declaration thereof [i. e. of the kinds of evidence, has been here made. And "among these (several kinds of proof) he now describes that one by which especially—viz. by a proof which is one kind of inference—Nature and Soul are here to be established discriminatively"].

सामान्यतो दृष्टादुभयसिद्धिः ॥ १०३ ॥

The existence of Soul and Nature argued from analogy.

Aph. 103.—The establishment of both [Nature and Soul] is by analogy [the necessity of axes for cutting, leading us, analogically, to the necessity of Senses for perceiving,—which Senses are products of Nature; and, again, that houses, and other structures, exist not for themselves, leading us to the conclusion that Nature, which is a compound thing, is not designed for itself but for something different, viz. Soul. "But then (some one may say)—since Nature is eternal, and exertion is habitual to her, (and the result of her action is the bondage of the Soul,) there should constantly be experience (whether of pleasure or of pain), and hence no such thing as thorough emancipation. To this he replies"].

चिद्वसानो भोगः ॥ १०४ ॥

When it is that experience ceases.

Aph. 104.—Experience [whether of pain or pleasure] ends with [the discernment of] Thought—[or Soul, as contradistinguished from Nature. "By 'Thought' is meant Soul. Experience (whether of pain or pleasure) ceases on the discerning thereof. As 'antecedent non-existence,' though devoid of a beginning, (—see *Tarkasangraha* §92) surceases (—when the thing antecedently non-existent begins to be—), so eternal Nature (—eternal as regards the absence of any beginning—) continues (no further than) till the discernment of the difference

(between Nature and Soul) :—so that experience (whether of pain or pleasure) does *not* at all times occur :—such is the state of the case.". But some one may say—if Nature be agent, and Soul experiencer, then it must follow (—which seems unreasonable—) that another is the experiencer of (the results of) the acts done by one different. To this he replies"].

अकर्तुरपि फलोपभोगोऽन्नाद्यवत् ॥ १०५ ॥

The fruit of the action is not always the agent's.

Aph. 105.—The experience of the fruit *may* belong even to another than the agent, as in the case of food, &c., [—for, "as it belongs to the cook to prepare the food, &c., and to one who was not the agent, viz. the master, to enjoy the fruit thereof (—i. e. the fruit of the cook's actions—), so is the case here." But, "having stated this exoteric principle, he next declares his own doctrine" on the point].

अविवेकाद्वा तन्निष्ठेः कर्तुः फलावगमः ॥ १०६ ॥

That Soul acts and experiences is an error.

Aph. 106.—Or [—to give a better account of the matter than that given in Aph. 105—], since it is from non-discrimination that it is derived, the notion that the *agent* [—soul being mistaken for an agent—] has the fruit [of the act, is a wrong notion. For "the soul is neither an agent nor a patient, but, from the fact that the Great Principle (—the actual agent—) is reflected in it, there arises the *conceit* of its being an agent." And "it is from the failure to discriminate between Nature and Soul that this takes place,—i. e. that the conceit takes place that it is the *agent* that experiences the fruit;"—whereas the actual agent is Nature, which, being unintelligent, can experience neither pain not pleasure].

नोभयच्च तत्त्वाख्याने ॥ १०७ ॥

Soul is really neither agent nor experiencer.

Aph. 107.—And when the truth is told, there is neither. ["'When the truth is told' (and discerned), i. e. when, by means of evidence,

Nature and Soul are *perceived* (in their entire distinctness one from the other), 'there is neither'—i. e. neither the condition (as regards soul) of an agent nor a patient."

"Having thus discussed (the topic of) evidence, he next states the distribution of the object-matter of evidence"].

विषयो ऽविषयो ऽप्यतिदूरादेर्घानोपादानाभ्या-
मिन्द्रियस्य ॥ १०८ ॥

What is perceptible under certain circumstances may be imperceptible under others.

Aph. 108.—[A thing may be] an object [perceptible] and also [at another time] not an object, through there being, in consequence of great distance, &c., a want of [conjunction of the sense with the thing] or [on the other hand] an appliance of the sense [to the thing. To explain the '&c.,' and exemplify the causes that may prevent the conjunction, required in order to perception, between the thing and the sense, we may remark that—"it is in consequence of great distance that a bird (flying very high up) in the sky is not perceived:—(then again) in consequence of extreme proximity the collyrium located in the eye (is not perceived by the eye itself):—a thing placed in (the inside of, or on the opposite side of,) a wall (is not perceived) in consequence of the obstruction:—from distraction of mind the unhappy, or other (agitated person), does not perceive the thing that is at his side (—or under his very nose—):—through its subtilty an Atom (is not perceived):—nor is a very small sound when overpowered by the sound of a drum:—and so on." Now "how," or, for which of the possible reasons just enumerated,—"comes the imperceptibleness of *Nature?* In regard to this he declares"].

सौक्ष्म्यात्तदनुपलब्धिः ॥ १०९ ॥

The subtilty of Nature.

Aph. 109.—Her [i. e. Nature's] imperceptibleness arises from her subtilty, [and "by 'subtilty' is meant the fact of being difficult to

investigate, not (—as a Naiyáyika might perhaps here prefer understanding the term—) the consisting of Atoms,—for Nature is (not atomic, in the opinion of the Sánkhyas, but) all-pervasive." "How then (it may be asked) is (the existence of) Nature determined? To this he replies"].

कार्यदर्शनात्तदुपलब्धेः ॥ ११० ॥

Nature inferred from the existence of productions.

Aph. 110.—[Nature exists] because her existence is gathered from the beholding of productions ["which have the three Qualities," —see Aph. 61.,—and the existence of which implies a cause, to which the name of Nature is given, in which these three constituents are held to exist from eternity].

वादिविप्रतिपत्तेस्तदसिद्धिरिति चेत् ॥ १११ ॥

A doubt thrown on the existence of Nature by the contradiction of dissentients.

Aph. 111.—If [you throw out the doubt that] it [—viz. the existence of Nature—] is not established, because of the contradiction of asserters [of other views,—the *Naiyáyikas* asserting that atoms are the cause of the world, *and* the *Vedántins* that *Brahma* is the cause,—then he retorts as follows].

तथा त्वेकतरदृष्ट्या एकतरसिद्धेर्नापलापः ॥ ११२ ॥

Mutual denials settle nothing.

Aph. 112.—But since thus each [doctrine] is established in the opinion of each, a [mere unsupported] denial is not [decisive. "If one side were disproved merely by the dissent of the opponent, then (look you) there is dissent against the other side too,—so how should *it* be established?" "Well then (—the opponent may say—), let (the inference of) cause from effect be granted, how is it that this (cause) is *Nature*—and nothing else (—such as Atoms, for instance)? To this he replies"].

त्रिविधविरोधापत्तेः ॥ ११३ ॥

Nature the only hypothesis consistent with what appears.

Aph. 113. Because [if we were to infer any other cause than Nature] we should have a contradiction to the threefold [aspect which things really exhibit. For "if the character of cause (of all things around us) belonged to Atoms, or the like, then there would be a contradiction to the fact of being an aggregate of pleasure, pain, and delusion, which is recognisable in the world;"—because nothing, we hold, can exist in the effect which did not exist in the cause,—and pleasure, pain, &c., are no properties of Atoms. "He next repels the doubt as to whether the production of an effect is that of what existed (antecedently) or of what did *not* exist—at least *potentially*—Aph. 117.]

नासदुत्पादो नृशृङ्गवत् ॥ ११४ ॥

What never existed will never exist.

Aph. 114.—The production of what is no entity, as a man's horn, does not take place.

उपादाननियमात् ॥ ११५ ॥

A product cannot be of nothing.

Aph. 115.—Because of the rule that there must be some material [of which the product may consist. "And only when both are extant is there from the presence of the cause the presence of the effect:—otherwise everywhere, and always, every effect might be produced,"—the presence of the cause being, on the supposition, superfluous. "This he insists upon as follows"].

सर्वत्र सर्वदा सर्वासम्भवात् ॥ ११६ ॥

Else any thing might occur at any time anywhere.

Aph. 116.—Because every thing is not possible every where, always, [which it might be if materials could be dispensed with. "And for the following reason also, he declares, there is no production of what existed not" antecedently].

शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात् ॥ ११७ ॥

Effects pre-exist potentially in their causes.

Aph. 117.—Because it is that which is competent [to the making of anything] that makes what is possible [as a product of it. "For the being the material (of any future product) is nothing else than the fact of (being it *potentially*, i. e. of) having the power to be the product; and this power is nothing else than the product's condition as that of what has not yet come to pass;—therefore, since 'that which has the power,' viz., the cause, makes the product which is 'capable' (of being made out of it), it is not of any *nonentity* that the production takes place;" but of an entity—whose *esse* antecedently was *possibility*].

कारणभावाच्च ॥ ११८ ॥

The product is nothing else than the cause.

Aph. 118.—And because it [—the product—] is [nothing else than] the cause [in the shape of the product].

न भावे भावयोगश्चेत् ॥ ११९ ॥

A doubt whether that which is can be said to become.

Aph. 119.—If [it be alleged that] there is no possibility of that *becoming*, which already *is*—[then the answer will be found in the next aphorism].

नाभिव्यक्तिनिबन्धनौ व्यवहाराव्यवहारौ ॥ १२० ॥

Production is only manifestation, and so of the opposite.

Aph. 120.—Nay, [—do not argue that what *is* cannot *become*,—for] the employment and the non-employment [of the term 'production'] are occasioned by the *manifestation* [or non-manifestation of what is spoken of as produced or not. "As the whiteness of white cloth which had become dirty is brought manifestly out by means of washing, &c., so, by the operation of the potter is the pot brought into manifestness; —whereas, on the blow of a mallet, it becomes hidden," and

no longer appears as a *pot.* "And 'manifestation' (is no fiction of ours, for it) is seen;—for example, that of oil, from sesamum-seeds, by pressure; of milk, from the cow, by milking; of the statue, that resided in the midst of the stone, by the operation of the sculptor; of shelled rice from rice in the husk, by threshing; &c." And "therefore the employment or non-employment of the term the *production* of an effect are dependent on *manifestation*—dependent on the manifestation of the *effect*:—that is to say,—the employment of the term production is in consequence of the manifestation (of what is spoken of as produced), and the non-employment of the term production is in consequence of there being no manifestation (of that which is therefore not spoken of as produced),—but (the employment of the term production is) not in consequence of that becoming an entity which was not an entity." But "if (the employment of the term) *production* is occasioned by (the fact of) *manifestation,* by what is occasioned the employment of the term *destruction?* To this he replies"].

नाशः कारणलयः ॥ १२१ ॥

What is meant by destruction.

Aph. 121.—Destruction [of any thing] is the resolution [of the thing spoken of as destroyed,] into the cause [from which it was produced, as when, by the blow of a mallet, a jar is resolved into its cause,—i. e. into the particles of clay which constituted the jar. But some one may say—"if there were only a resolution (of a product into that from which it arose), a resurrection (or παλιγγενεσια) of it might be seen, and this is *not* seen:—well (—we reply—) it is not seen by blockheads, but it *is* seen by those who can discriminate. For example, when thread is destroyed, it is changed into the shape of earth (—as when burned to ashes):—and the earth is changed into the shape of a cotton-tree; and this (successively) changes into the shape of flower, fruit, and thread (spun again from the fruit of the

cotton-plant). So is it with all entities." But "pray—(some one may ask)—is this *manifestation* (that you speak of under Aph. 119) something real, or something not real? If it be something real (and which, therefore, never anywhere ceases to be) then all effects (during this constant manifestation) ought constantly to be *perceived;* and if it be *not* real, then there would be a non-existence of all products [in the absence of all manifestation. Manifestation, therefore, must be something *real* and] there must be [in order to give rise to it] another manifestation, and of this another, [—seeing that a *manifestation* can be the result of nothing else than a manifestation,—on the principle that an effect consists of neither more nor less than its cause], and thus we have a *regressus in infinitum.* To this he replies."

पारम्पर्यतोऽन्वेषणा बीजाङ्कुरवत् ॥ १२२ ॥

How manifestation may occur without being an entity.

Aph. 122.—You are to understand that successively, as is the case with seed and plant, [—manifestation may generate manifestation from eternity to eternity. "Be it so, that there are thousands of manifestations, still there is no fault, for there *is* no starting point,—as is the case with seed and plant,"—which people may suppose to have served from eternity as sources one to another reciprocally].

उत्पत्तिवद्वाऽदोषः ॥ १२३ ॥

The objections to the theory of manifestation retorted.

Aph. 123.—Or, [at all events, our theory of 'manifestation' is as] blameless as [your theory of] 'production':—[for let us ask, "pray —is *production* produced, or is it not? If it is produced, then of this (production of production) there must be production; —so that there is a *regressus in infinitum,* (such as you allege against *our* theory). If it be *not* produced, then, pray is this because it is *un-real,* or because it is eternal? If because it is un-real, then production never is at all, so that it should

never be perceived, (as you allege that it is). Again, if (production is not something produced) because it is *eternal*, then there should be at all times the production of (all possible) effects,—(which you will scarcely pretend is the case). Again, if you say,—since 'production' itself *consists* of production, what need of supposing an ulterior production (of production) ?—then, in like manner, *(I* ask,)—since 'manifestation' itself *consists* of manifestation, what need of supposing an ulterior manifestation (of manifestation) ? The view which you hold on this point is *ours* also,"—and thus every objection stated or hinted under Aph. 121., is capable of being retorted].

हेतुमदनित्यमव्यापि सक्रियमनेकमाश्रितं लिङ्गम् ॥ १२४ ॥

The characters common to all products.

Aph. 124.—[A product of nature is] caused, un-eternal, mutable, not all-pervading, multitudinous, dependent, mergent.

a. 'Caused'—i. e. having a cause. 'Un-eternal,'—i. e. destructible. 'Not all-pervading,' i. e. not present everywhere. 'Mutable'—i. e. distinguished by the act of leaving (one form) and assuming (another form). It (the soul) leaves the body it had assumed, (and probably takes another) ; and bodies, &c., move (and are mutable, as is notorious). 'Multitudinous'—i. e., in consequence of the distinction of souls, (—each man —e. g. having a separate body. 'Dependent'—i. e. on its cause. Mergent,—that is to say, it (i. e. each product, in due time,) is resolved into that from which it originated. But some one may say—" if realities be the twenty-five (which the Sánkhyas enumerate—see Aph. 60—and no more), pray, are such common operations as knowing, enjoying, &c., absolutely *nothing ?*—(if you say that they are so) then you give up what you *see*—in order to save a hypothesis, with which that which you see is irreconcilable. To this he replies."]

आञ्जस्याद्भेदतो वा गुणसामान्यादेस्तत्सिद्धिः प्रधान-व्यपदेशाद्वा ॥ १२५ ॥

The qualities of the Nyáya are implied in the term Nature.

Aph. 125.—There is the establishment of these, [24 'Qualities' of the *Nyáya*, which you fancy that we do not recognise because we do not explicitly enumerate them,] either by reason that these ordinary qualities [—as contradistinguished from the *three* Qualities of the Sánkhya—] are in reality nothing different; or [—to put it in another point of view—] because they are hinted by [the term] Nature [—in which, like our own three Qualities, they are implied].

त्रिगुणाचेतनत्वादि द्वयोः ॥ १२६ ॥

The characters common to Nature and her products.

Aph. 126.—Of both [Nature and her products] the fact that they consist of the three Qualities and that they are irrational—[is the common property].

प्रीत्यप्रीतिविषादाद्यैर्गुणानामन्योन्यं वैधर्म्यम् ॥ १२७ ॥

In what the three Qualities differ.

Aph. 127.—The Qualities differ in character, mutually, by pleasantness, unpleasantness, lassitude, &c., [in which forms severally the Qualities present themselves].

लघ्वादिधर्मैरन्योन्यं साधर्म्यं वैधर्म्यं च गुणानाम् ॥ १२८ ॥

In what respects the Qualities agree as well as differ.

Aph. 128.—Through Lightness and other habits, the Qualities mutually agree and differ: [—i. e. "through the characters of Lightness, Restlessness, and Heaviness,—the Qualities differ. Their *agreement* is through what is hinted by the expression 'and other.' And this consists in their mutually predominating (one over the other from time to time), producing each other, consorting together, and being reciprocally present (—the one in the other—), for the sake of the soul." "By the ex-

pression (—in Aph. 124—) 'caused,' &c., it was declared that the 'Great one,' or Mind, &c., are *Products*. He states the proof of this].

उभयान्यत्वात्कार्यत्वं महदादेर्घटादिवत् ॥ १२९ ॥

Proof that Mind, &c., are products.

Aph. 129.—Since they are other than both [Soul and Nature—the only two uncaused entities—], Mind, and the rest, are products, as is the case with a jar or the like. ["He states another reason."]

परिमाणात् ॥ १३० ॥

A second proof.

Aph. 130.—Because of their measure, [which is a limited one, Mind and the rest are products; whereas the only two that are uncaused, viz. Nature and Soul, are unlimited].

समन्वयात् ॥ १३१ ॥

A third proof.

Aph. 131.—Because they conform [to Nature. Mind and the rest are products, "because they will (follow and) correspond with Nature, i. e., because the Qualities of Nature are seen in all things:" and it is a maxim that what is in the effect was derived from the cause, and implies the cause].

शक्तितश्चेति ॥ १३२ ॥

A fourth proof.

Aph. 132.—And, finally, because it is through the power [of the cause alone, that the product can do aught, as a chain restrains an elephant only by the force of the iron that it is made of].

तद्वाने प्रकृतिः पुरुषो वा ॥ १३३ ॥

Converse proof of the same.

Aph. 133.—On the quitting thereof [—quitting the condition of product—], there is Nature or Soul, [into one or other of which the product must needs have resolved itself. "Product or not-product,—such is the pair of alternatives. 'On the quitting

thereof,'—i. e. when Mind and the rest quit the condition of product,—Mind and the rest (of necessity) enter into Nature or Soul,"—these two alone being not-products. But perhaps some one may say "Mind and the rest may exist quite independently of the pair of alternatives (just mentioned). In regard to this he declares as follows"].

तयोरन्यत्वे तुच्छत्वम् ॥ १३४ ॥

Mind and the rest would not be at all, if neither product nor not-product.

Aph. 134.—If they were other than these two they would be void [—seeing that there is nothing self-existent besides Soul and Nature. "Well now, (some one may say,) why should it be under the character of a *product* that Mind and the rest are a sign of (there being such a principle as) nature? They may be (more properly said to be) a sign merely in virtue of their not *occurring apart* from it. To this he replies"].

कार्यात्कारणानुमानं तत्साहित्यात् ॥ १३५ ॥

What kind of causes can be inferred from their effects.

Aph. 135.—The cause is inferred from the effect [—in the case of Nature and her products—], because it accompanies it. ["That (other relation, other than that of material and product, which you would make out to exist between Nature and Mind,) may indeed be where the nature (or essence) of the cause is not seen in the effect, as (is the case with) the inference—from the rising of the moon—that the sea is swollen (into full tide,—rising, with maternal affection, towards her son who was produced from her bosom on the occasion of the celebrated Churning of the Ocean. Though the swelling of the tide does not occur 'apart from' the rising of the moon, yet here the cause—moon-rise—is not seen in the effect—tide; and consequently, though we infer the effect from the cause, the cause could not have been inferred from the effect). But in the present case, since we see in Mind and the rest, the characters of Nature, the

cause *is* inferred from the effect. 'Because it accompanies it'—i. e. because, in Mind and the rest, we see the properties of Nature," i. e. Nature herself actually present, as we see the clay which is the cause of a jar actually present in the jar. But it may still be objected,—"if it be thus, then let that principle itself—the 'Great one,' or Mind,—be the cause of the world:—what need of *Nature?* To this he replies"].

अव्यक्तं त्रिगुणालिङ्गात् ॥ १३६ ॥

How Mind must have an antecedent.

Aph. 136.—The undiscrete, [Nature, must be inferred] from its [discrete and dissoluble] effect, [Mind], in which are the three Qualities, [which constitute Nature. "'It goes to dissolution'—such is the import of the term *linga,* here rendered 'effect.' From that (dissoluble effect),—viz. the 'Great' principle, or Mind,—in which are the three Qualities, Nature must be inferred. And that the 'Great' principle, in the shape of ascertainment (or distinct intellection), is limited (or discrete), and perishable is established by direct observation. Therefore (—i. e. since Mind, being perishable, must be resolvable into something else,) we infer that into which it is resolvable,"—in other words its 'cause,'—here analogously termed *lingin,* since 'effect' had been termed *linga.* "But then, (some one may say,) still something quite different may be the cause (of all things);—what need of this *Nature* of yours? In regard to this he remarks as follows"].

तत्कार्यतस्तत्सिद्धेर्नापलापः ॥ १३७ ॥

Why Nature, and nothing else, must be the root of all.

Aph. 137.—There is no denying that it [—Nature—] *is* because of its effects; [—for, "is the cause of this (world) a product or not a product? If it were a product, then, the same being (with equal propriety to be assumed to be) the case with *its* cause, there would be a *regressus in infinitum.* If effects be from any *root* (—to which there is nothing antecedent—), then *this* is that" to which we give the name of *Nature*].

सामान्येन विवादाभावात् धर्मवन्न साधनम् ॥ १३८ ॥

It is not from any effect that Soul is inferred.

Aph. 138.—[The relation of cause and effect is] not [alleged as] the means of establishing [the existence of Soul], because, as is the case with [the disputed term] 'merit,' there is no dispute about there being such a kind of thing, [though *what* kind of thing *is* matter of dispute. "The dispute is (not as to Soul's *being*, but) as to its peculiarity (of being),—as (whether it be) multitudinous or sole, all-pervading or *not* all-pervading, and so forth. Just as in every (philosophical system or) theory there is no dispute as to (there being something to which may be applied the term) 'merit' *(dharma)*, for the difference of opinion has regard to the particular kind" of thing,—such as sacrifices according to the Mímánsa creed, or good works according to the Nyáya,—which shall be held to involve 'merit.' But some one may say—"Souls are nothing else than the body and its organs, &c.; —what need of imagining anything else? To this he replies"].

शरीरादिव्यतिरिक्तः पुमान् ॥ १३९ ॥

Materialism scouted.

Aph. 139.—Soul is something else than the body, &c.

संहतपरार्थत्वात् ॥ १४० ॥

The discerptible is subservient to the indiscerptible.

Aph. 140.—Because that which is combined [and is therefore discerptible,] is for the sake of some other [*not* discerptible. "And that which is discerptible is intended for something else that is indiscerptible. If it were intended for something else that is discerptible, there would be a *regressus in infinitum*; combinedness (—involving discerptibleness—) exists occultly in Nature as well as the rest, because, otherwise, discerptibleness would not prove discoverable in the products thereof"].

त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययात् ॥ १४१ ॥

Soul presents no symptom of being material.

Aph. 141.—[And Soul is something else than the body, &c.], because there is [in Soul] the reverse of the three Qualities, &c. [—i. e., "because they are *not* seen in it"].

अधिष्ठानाच्चेति ॥ १४२ ॥

Another proof that soul is not material.

Aph. 142.—And [Soul is not material] because of its superintendence [over Nature. "For a superintendent is an intelligent being, and Nature is unintelligent."]

भोक्तृभावात् ॥ १४३ ॥

Another proof.

Aph. 143.—And [Soul is not material] because of its being the experiencer. ["It is Nature that is experienced ;—the experiencer is Soul. Although Soul, from its being unchangeably the same, is not (really) an experiencer, still the assertion (in the aphorism) is made because of the fact that the reflection of the Intellect befals it,"—and thus makes it *seem* as if it experienced :—see Aph. 58. Well, "efforts are engaged in for the sake of Liberation. Pray, is this (for the benefit) of the Soul or of Nature,"—since Nature, in the shape of Mind, is, it seems, the experiencer ?]

कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेः ॥ १४४ ॥

For Soul, not Nature, is liberation wanted.

Aph. 144.—[It is for Soul and not for Nature,] because the exertions are with a view to isolation [from all qualities,—a condition to which Soul is competent, but Nature not. For "the very essence of Nature cannot depart from it (so as to leave it in the state of absolute solitary isolation contemplated,) for the three Qualities are its very essence, (the departure of which from it would leave nothing behind) ; and because it would thus prove to be *not* eternal (—while in reality it *is* eternal.) The isola-

tion *(kaivalya)* of that alone is possible of which the qualities are reflectional (and not constitutive—see Aph. 58—) and that is Soul"].

जडप्रकाशायोगात् प्रकाशः ॥ १४५ ॥

The nature of the Soul.

Aph. 145.—Since light does not pertain to the unintelligent, light, [which must pertain to something or other, is the essence of the Soul, which, self-manifesting, manifests whatever else is manifest. "It is a settled point that the unintelligent is not a light—(it is not self-manifesting). If Soul also were unintelligent (—as the Naiyáyikas hold it to be in *substance*—knowledge being by them regarded not as its essence or substratum but as one of its *qualities*—), then there would need to be another light for *it*;—and, as the simpler theory, let Soul itself consist essentially of light." "And there is scripture (in support of this view:—for example the two following texts from the *Vrihadáraṇyaka Upanishad)*:—'Wherewith shall one distinguish that wherewith one distinguishes all this (world)?' 'Wherewith shall one take cognizance of the cognizer?'" But the Naiyáyika may urge—"*let* Soul be unintelligent [in its substance], but having Intelligence as its attribute. *Thereby* it manifests all things, but it is not essentially intelligence. To this he replies"].

निर्गुणत्वान्न चिद्धर्मा ॥ १४६ ॥

Soul has no quality.

Aph. 146.—It [Soul] has not Intelligence as its attribute, because it is without quality. ["He declares that there is a contradiction to Scripture" in the view which he is contending against.]

श्रुत्या सिद्धस्य नापह्नापस्तत्प्रत्यक्षबाधात् ॥ १४७ ॥

Scripture higher evidence than supposed intuition.

Aph. 147.—There is no denial [to be allowed] of what is established by Scripture, because the [supposed] evidence of intuition for this [i. e. for the existence of qualities in the Soul] is confuted [by

the scriptural declaration of the contrary. "The text—'For this Soul is un-companioned,' &c., would be confuted if there were any annexation of qualities" to Soul:—and the notion of confuting Scripture is not to be entertained for a moment].

सुषुप्त्याद्यसाक्षित्वम् ॥ १४८ ॥

Argument against the soul's being unintelligent.

Aph. 148.—[If soul were unintelligent] it would not be witness [of its own comfort] in profound [and dreamless] sleep, &c. ["But that this is not the case (may be inferred) from the phenomenon that 'I slept *pleasantly*, &c.' By the '&c.' (in the aphorism) dreaming is included." "The Vedántins say that 'soul is *one* only'; and so, again, 'For Soul is eternal, omnipresent, changeless, void of blemish:'—'Being one (only), it is divided (into a seeming multitude) by Nature *(s'akti)*—i. e.—Illusion *(máyá)*,—but not through its own essence, (—to which there does not belong multiplicity).' In regard to this he says as follows."]

जन्मादिव्यवस्थातः पुरुषबहुत्वम् ॥ १४९ ॥

There is a multiplicity of soul.

Aph. 149.—From the several allotment of birth, &c., a multiplicity of souls [is to be inferred. "If soul were one only, then when *one* is born, *all* would be born, &c."].

उपाधिभेदेऽप्येकस्य नानायोग आकाशस्येव घटादिभिः ॥ १५० ॥

The view of the Vedánta on this point.

Aph. 150.—[The Vedantins say that] there being a difference in its investments, moreover, multiplicity attaches [seemingly] to the one [Soul], as is the case with Space by reason of jars, &c., [which mark out the spaces that they occupy. But the argument, though partially stating a truth, does not prove the non-plurality of Soul. "As Space

is one, (and yet) in consequence of the difference of adjuncts, —jars, &c.—when the jar is destroyed, it is (familiarly) said 'the jar's space is destroyed'—(for there then no longer exists a *space marked out by the jar)* ;—so also, on the hypothesis of there being but one Soul, since there is a difference of corporeal limitation, on the destruction thereof (—i. e. of the limitation occasioned by any particular human body—), it is merely a way of talking (to say) 'The soul has perished.' (This indeed is so far true that there is really no perishing of the soul, but then it is true) also on the hypothesis that there are *many* souls ; (and it must be true,) otherwise, since soul is eternal (—without beginning or end—as both parties agree—), how could there be the appointment of birth and death ?"]

उपाधिर्भिद्यते न तु तद्वान् ॥ १५१ ॥

Refutation of the Vedánta on this point.

Aph. 151.—The investment is different [—according to the Vedántins—], but not that to which this belongs [—and the absurd consequences of such an opinion will be seen. " 'The investment is different'—(—there are diverse bodies, of John, Thomas, &c.) ; 'that to which this belongs' —i. e. that (Soul) to which this investment (of body in all its multiplicity) belongs,' is *not* different (—but is one only—) ; such is the meaning. And (now consider), in consequence of the destruction of one thing, we are not to speak as if there were the destruction of something else,—because this (if it were evidence of a thing's being destroyed) would present itself where it ought not—(the destruction of Devadatta e. g. presenting itself as a fact when we are considering the case of Yajnadatta, who is not for *that* reason to be assumed to be dead) ;—and on the hypothesis that Soul is one, the (fact that the Vedánta makes an) imputation of inconsistent conditions is quite evident, since Bondage and Liberation do not (and cannot) belong (simultaneously) to *one*. But the conjunction and (simultaneous) non-conjunction of the sky

(or space) with smoke, &c., (of which the Vedántin may seek to avail himself as an illustration,) are *not* contradictory, for Conjunction is not pervasion;" (—whereas, on the other hand, it would be nonsense to speak of Bondage as affecting one portion of a monad, and Liberation affecting another portion, as a monkey may be in conjunction with a branch of a tree without being in conjunction with the stem].

एवमेकत्वेन परिवर्तमानस्य न विरुद्धधर्माध्यासः ॥ १५२ ॥

**The Sánkhya is free from the charge of absurdity to which the Vedánta is open.*

Aph. 152.—Thus [—i. e. by taking the Sánkhya view—] there is no imputation of contradictory conditions to [a Soul supposed to be] everywhere present as *one* [infinitely extended monad. "But (the—Vedántin may contend)—we *see* the condition of another attributed even to one quite different, as—e. g.—Nature's character as an agent (is attributed) to soul—which is one other (than Nature). To this he replies"].

अन्यधर्मत्वेऽपि नारोपात्तत्सिद्धिरेकत्वात् ॥ १५३ ॥

Imputation is not proof.

Aph. 153.—Even though there be [imputed to Soul] the possession of the condition of another, this [—that it really possesses such—] is not established by the imputation, because it [Soul] is *one* [absolutely simple unqualified entity. The notion "that Soul is an agent is a mistake, because, that Soul is *not* an agent is true, and the imputation (of agency to Soul) is *not* true, and the combination of the true and the untrue is not real." "But (the Vedántin may say)—then thus there will be an opposition to the scripture,—for according to that —'Brahma is one without a second;—there is nothing here diverse;—death after death does he (—deluded man—) obtain who here sees as it were a multiplicity.' To this he replies"].

नाद्वैतश्रुतिविरोधो जातिपरत्वात् ॥ १५४ ॥

Scripture, speaking of Soul as one, is speaking of it generically.

Aph. 154.—There is no opposition to the scriptures [declaratory] of the non-duality [of Soul], because the reference [in such texts] is to the *genus* [or to Soul in general. "By *genus* we mean sameness, the fact of being of the same nature;—and it is to this alone that the texts about the non-duality [of Soul] have reference. It is not the indivisibleness (of Soul,—meaning by its indivisibleness the impossibility that there should be more souls than one,—that is meant in such texts—) because there is no motive" for viewing Soul as *thus* indivisible. "But then (—the Vedántin may rejoin—) Bondage and Liberation are just as incompatible in any single soul, on the theory of him who asserts that souls are many, (and that each is at once bound and free). To this he replies"].

विदितबन्धकारणस्य दृष्ट्या तद्रूपम् ॥ १५५ ॥

The compatibility of Bondage and Freedom.

Aph. 155.—Of him [i. e. of that soul] by whom the cause of Bondage is known, there is that condition [of isolation, or entire liberation], by the perception [of the fact that Nature and soul are distinct, and that he really was *not* bound even when he seemed to be so. The soul in Bondage which is no real bondage, may be typified by Don Quixote hanging in the dark from the ledge of a supposed enormous precipice, and bound to hold on for his life, from not knowing that his toes were within six inches of the ground. Well, rejoins the Vedántin, "Bondage (—as you justly observe—) is dependent on non-perception (of the truth), and is not real:—it is a maxim that non-perception is removed by perception:—and, on this showing, we see the (force of the) reasoning on the hypothesis that soul is one, but not on that of Soul's being multitudinous. To this he replies".]

नान्धादृष्ट्या चक्षुष्मतामनुपलम्भः ॥ १५६ ॥

He jeereth the Vedántin.

Aph. 156.—Nay—because the blind do not see can those that have their eyesight not perceive? ["There are *many* arguments (in support of the view) of those who assert that souls are many," though *you* do not see them.]

वामदेवादिर्मुक्तो नाद्वैतम् ॥ १५७ ॥

Scripture proof that Souls are many.

Aph. 157.—Vámadeva, as well as others, has been liberated, [if we are to believe the scriptures, therefore] non-duality is not [asserted in the same scriptures in the Vedántic sense. "In the Puránas, &c., we hear 'Vámadeva has been liberated,' 'Suka has been liberated,' and so on. If Soul were *one*, since the liberation of all would take place on the liberation of one, the scriptural mention of a diversity (of separate and successive liberations) would be self-contradictory." But the Vedántin may rejoin—"on the theory that Souls are many,—since the world has been from eternity, and from time to time some one or other is liberated, so, by degrees *all* having been liberated, there should be a universal void:—but on the theory that Soul is *one*, Liberation is merely the departure of an adjunct,"—which, the Vedántin flatters himself, does not involve the inconsistency which he objects to the Sánkhya. To this he replies.]

अनादावद्य यावद्भावाच्चविष्यदप्येवम् ॥ १५८ ॥

As it has been, so will it be.

Aph. 158.—Though it [—the world—] has been from eternity, since there, up to this day, has not been [an entire emptying of the world], the future also [may be inferentially expected to be] thus [as it has been heretofore. "Though the world *has* been from eternity, since up to this day we have not seen it become a void, there is no proof (in support) of the view that there will be Liberation" of *all* Souls so as to leave a void].

इदानीमिव सर्वत्र नात्यन्तोच्छेदः ॥ १५९ ॥

The stream of mundane things will flow on for ever.

Aph. 159.—As now [things are, so] everywhere [will they continue to go on;—hence there will be] no absolute cutting short [of the course of mundane things. "Since souls are (in number) without end, though Liberation successively take place, there will not be (as a necessary consequence) a cutting short of the world. As now, so every where,—i. e. in time to come also,—there will be Liberation, but not therefore an absolute cutting short (of the world), since of this the on-flowing is eternal." Moreover, "on the theory also that Liberation is the departure of an adjunct we should find a universal void,—so that the doubt is alike (in the application to either view). Just as there might be an end of all things on the successive liberation of many souls, so since all adjuncts would cease when (the fruit of) works (—this fruit being in the shape of Soul's association with body as its adjunct—) came to an end, the world would become the void," on the Vedánta theory as well as on the Sánkhya one. If the Vedántin says "there will not be a void, because adjuncts are (in number) endless; then it is the same on the theory that Souls are many too;—for while those get liberated who become knowing (in regard to the fact that Nature and Soul are different), there will not be a void, because there is everlastingly no end of multitudes of souls in the universe." But some one may ask—"is Soul *essentially* bound or free? If (essentially) bound, then, since its essence cannot depart, there is no Liberation;—for if it (the essence) departed, then it (Soul) would (cease with the cessation of its essence and) not be eternal. If (on the other hand, you reply that it is essentially) free, then meditation, and the like, (which you prescribe for the attainment of liberation) is unmeaning. To this he replies."]

व्यावृत्तोभयरूपः ॥ १६० ॥

Soul is ever free, though it may seem bound in all sorts of ways.

Aph. 160.—It [Soul] is altogether free, [but seemingly] multiform [or different in appearance from a free thing, through a delusive semblance of being bound. "It is not bound, nor is it liberated, but it is ever free;" (see Aph. 19). But the destruction of ignorance (as to its actual freedom) is effected by meditation, &c.," which are therefore not unmeaning, as alleged under Aph. 159. "It has been declared that Soul is a witness. Since it is a witness (—some one may object—) even when it has attained to discriminating (between Nature and Soul), there is no Liberation,—(Soul, on this showing, being not an absolutely simple entity but something *combined* with the character of a spectator or witness.) To this he replies."]

अक्षसम्बन्धात् साक्षित्वम् ॥ १६१ ॥

How Soul is a spectator.

Aph. 161.—It [Soul] is a witness through its connection with sense-organs [—which quit it on Liberation].

नित्यमुक्तत्वम् ॥ १६२ ॥

The real condition of Soul.

Aph. 162.—[The nature of Soul is] constant freedom, [—"that is to say, it is positively always devoid of the Bondage called Pain, because Pain, and the rest, are modifications of Understanding,"—which is a modification of Nature, from which Soul is really distinct].

औदासीन्यञ्चेति ॥ १६३ ॥

Soul's indifference.

Aph. 163.—And finally [the nature of the Soul is] indifference [to Pain and Pleasure alike. "By 'indifference' is meant inaction." But some one may say—"the fact of Soul's being an agent is declared in Scripture:—how is this (—if, as you say, it be *not* an agent)? To this he replies].

उपरागात्कर्तृत्वं चित्सान्निध्याच्चित्सान्निध्यात् ॥ १६४ ॥

How Soul, which is not an agent, is yet spoken of as such.

Aph. 164.—Its [—Soul's—fancy of] being an agent is from the proximity of Intellect, from the proximity of Intellect. ["Its 'being an agent'—i. e. its, Soul's, *fancy* of being an agent, is 'from the proximity of Intellect,'—i. e. from the influence of Nature,"—see *Aph.* 19—of which Intellect—see *Aph.* 61—is a modification. "The repetition of the expression 'from the proximity of Intellect' is meant to show that we have reached the conclusion :—for thus do we see (practised) in the scriptures,"—e. g. where it is said in the Veda—"Soul is to be known, it is to be discriminated from Nature : thus it does not come again, it does not come again." "So much, for the First Book—that on the (topics or) object-matter (of the Sánkhya system)."]

BOOK II.

INTRODUCTION.

["THE object-matter (of the Institute) has been set forth (in B. I.). Now, in order to prove that it is not the *Soul* that undergoes the alterations (observable in the course of things), he will tell diffusely in the Second Book how the creation is formed out of the Primal Principle. There too the nature of the products of Nature is to be declared fully, with a view to the very clear discrimination of Soul from these. Therefore, according to the verses:—"Whoso rightly knows its changes, and the Primal Agent [Nature], and Soul the eternal, he, thirsting no more, is emancipated,"—we remark that, with reference to the character, &c., of Emancipation, all the three (things mentioned in these verses) require to be known. And here, in the first place, with advertence to the consideration that if Nature, which is unintelligent, were to create without a motive, we should find even the emancipated one bound, he states the *motive* for the creation of the world.]

विमुक्तमोक्षार्थं स्वार्थं वा प्रधानस्य ॥ १ ॥

The motive for creation.

Aph. 1.—Of Nature [the agency, or the becoming a maker, is] for the emancipation of what is [really, though not apparently] emancipated, or else for [the removal of] itself. ["The expression 'the becoming a maker' is borrowed from the last aphorism of the preceding Book. Nature makes the world for the sake of removing the pain, which is really a shadow, belonging to the Soul which is in its very nature free from the bonds of pain,—or (—to explain it otherwise—) for the sake of

removing pain (connected) by means of but a shadowy link; or (on the other hand) it is 'for the sake of itself,'—that is to say, for the sake of removing the actually real pain (which consists) of itself." "Although experience (of good and ill) also, as well as Emancipation, is a motive for creation, yet Emancipation alone is mentioned, inasmuch as it is the principal one." "But then if creation were for the sake of Emancipation, then, since Emancipation might take place through creation once for all, there would not be creation again and again:—to which he replies."]

विरक्तस्य तन्सिद्धेः ॥ २ ॥

Successive creation why.

Aph. 2.—Because this [Emancipation] is [only] of him that is devoid of passion, ["emancipation does not take place through creation once for all, but it is (the lot only) of him that has been extremely tormented many times by the various pain of birth, death, sickness, &c.; and therefore (successive creation goes on) because Emancipation actually occurs in the case only of him in whom complete dispassion has arisen through the knowledge of the distinctness of Nature and Soul:—such is the meaning." "He tells the reason why dispassion does not take place through creation once for all."]

न श्रवणमात्रात् तन्सिद्धिरनादिवासनाया बलवत्त्वात् ॥ ३ ॥

Force of the foregoing reason.

Aph. 3.—It is not effected by the mere hearing, because of the forcibleness of the impressions from eternity. ["Even the hearing (of scripture, in which the distinctness of Nature from Soul is enounced,) comes (—not to all alike, but only—) through the merit of acts done in many births (or successive lives): Even then, dispassion is not established through the mere hearing, but through direct cognition; and direct cognition does not take place suddenly, because of the forcibleness of false impressions that have existed from eternity,—but (the required direct cognition takes place) through the completion

of Concentration, and there is an abundance of obstacles to Concentration (—see Yoga Aphorisms, B. II.);—therefore only after many births does dispassion and Emancipation take place at any time of any one at all:—such is the meaning. He states another reason for the continuous flow of creation."]

बहुभृत्यवद्वा प्रत्येकम् ॥ ४ ॥

Another reason for continuous creation.

Aph. 4.—Or as people have severally many dependent [on them, as wife, children, &c., so also the Qualities, have to emancipate innumerable Souls severally. Therefore, however many Souls may have been emancipated, the on-flow of creation takes place for the emancipation of other Souls,—for Souls are (in number) without end." "But why is it asserted that Nature alone creates, when, by the text 'From that or this Soul, proceeded the Ether,' &c., it is proved that *Soul* also creates? To this he replies."]

प्रकृतिवास्तवे च पुरुषस्याध्याससिद्धिः ॥ ५ ॥

Nature, not Soul, creates.

Aph. 5.—And since it [the character of creator] belongs really to Nature, it follows that it is fictitiously attributed to Soul. ["But how is it laid down that Nature's creativeness is *real*, since we are told (in scripture) that creation is on a level with a dream? To this he replies."]

कार्यतस्तत्सिद्धेः ॥ ६ ॥

The reality of Nature's creativeness.

Aph. 6.—Since it is proved from the products, ["for *products* are real, inasmuch as they produce impressions and exhibit acts." The reality of external things is established here just as it is by Locke, who says "I think God has given me assurance enough as to the existence of things without me; since by their different application I can produce in myself both *pleasure and pain (artha)*, which is one great concernment of my present state." These existing products being admitted, the

Sánkhya argues that they must have a cause;—and, as this cause means neither more nor less than something creative, whatever proves the existence of the cause, proves, at the same time, its creative character].

चेतनोद्देशान्नियमः कण्टकमोक्षवत्। ७ ॥

Who escape nature.

Aph. 7.—The rule is with reference to one knowing,—just as escape from a thorn, [—for "as one and the same thorn is not a cause of pain just to him who, being 'one knowing,' i. e., aware of it, escapes from that same, but actually is so in respect of *others*, —so Nature also is escaped just by 'one knowing,'—one aware,—one who has accomplished the matter;—just to *him* does it not consist of pain; but to others, who are *not* knowing, it actually is a cause of pain;—such is the 'rule,'—meaning the distribution."

अन्ययोगेऽपि तत्सिद्धिर्नाञ्जस्येनायोदाहवत्॥ ८ ॥

Soul not creative, though associated with what is so.

Aph. 8.—Even though there be conjunction [of Soul] with the other [viz. Nature], this [power of giving rise to products] does not exist in it [Soul] immediately,—just like the burning action of iron. ["Even though there be conjunction with Nature, there belongs to Soul no creativeness 'immediately,' i. e., directly. An illustration of this is, 'like the burning action of iron':—as iron does not possess directly a burning power, but this is only fictitiously attributed to it, being through the fire conjoined with it;—such is the meaning. But in the example just mentioned, it is admitted that there is an alteration of both, for this is proved by sense-evidence; but in the instance under doubt, since the case is accounted for by the modification of one only, there is cumbrousness in postulating the modification of both;—because, otherwise, by the conjunction of the China-rose, it might be held that the colour of the crystal was changed."]

रागविरागयोर्योगः सृष्टिः ॥ ९ ॥

Creation when.

Aph. 9.—When there is passion or dispassion, there is concentration [in the latter case, and] creation [in the former. "When there is passion, there is creation; and when there is dispassion, there is 'concentration,' i. e., the abiding (of Soul) in its own nature;—in short, emancipation."]

महदादिक्रमेण पञ्चभूतानाम् ॥ १० ॥

Order of creation.

Aph. 10.—In the order of Mind, &c., [is the creation] of the five elements [—or of the material world].

आत्मार्थत्वात् तदर्थेनैषामात्मार्थ आरम्भः ॥ ११ ॥

Nature's products not for themselves.

Aph. 11.—Since creation is for the sake of Soul, the origination of these [products of Nature] is not for their own sake.

दिक्कालावाकाशादिभ्यः ॥ १२ ॥

Relative time and space whence.

Aph. 12.—[Relative] Space and Time [arise] from the Ether, &c., [but "the Space and Time which are *eternal* (and absolute), *those* two, being the *source* of the Ether, are really sorts of qualities of Nature;—therefore it is consistent that Space and Time should be all-pervading. But the Space and Time which are limited, *these* arise from the Ether, through the conjunction of this or that (limiting) object." "Now he exhibits, in their order, through their nature and their habits, the things mentioned (in *Aph.* 10) as in the order of Mind, &c."]

अध्यवसायो बुद्धिः ॥ १३ ॥

Mind or Intellect defined.

Aph. 13.—Intellect is judgment. ["'Intellect' is a synonyme of the Great Principle (or Mind,—see B. I. 71); and 'judgment,' called also ascertainment, is its peculiar modification; such

is the meaning;—but they are set forth as identical,—because a property, and that of which it is the property, are indivisible. And it is to be understood that this Intellect is 'Great,' because it pervades all effects other than itself, and because it is of great power." "He mentions other properties also of the Great Principle."]

तत्कार्यं धर्मादि ॥ १४ ॥

Products of intellect.

Aph. 14.—Merit, &c., are products of it, [for "Merit, Knowledge, Dispassion, and (supernatural) Power, are formed out of *intellect*, —not formed of *self-consciousness (ahankára)*, because intellect alone (and not self-consciousness), is a product of superlative Purity,"—without admixture of Passion and Darkness. "But then, if it be thus, how can the prevalence of demerit, in the portions of intellect lodged in men, cattle, &c., be accounted for? To this he replies"].

महदुपरागाद्विपरीतम् ॥ १५ ॥

Opposite products of intellect.

Aph. 15.—The Great one [—Intellect—] becomes reversed through adjacent tincture, [i. e., "through being tinged by Passion and Darkness, it also becomes 'reversed' i. e., vile, with the properties of Demerit, Ignorance, Non-dispassion, and want of (supernatural) Power." "Having characterised the Great Principle, he defines its product—Self-consciousness"].

अभिमानोऽहङ्कारः ॥ १६ ॥

Self-consciousness.

Aph. 16.—Self-consciousness is a conceit, [—"what makes the Ego, as a potter (makes a pot),—the thing (called) the internal instrument *(anta'karaṇa)*; and this, inasmuch as a property and that of which it is the property are indivisible, is spoken of as 'a conceit (viz. of personality,') in order to acquaint us that this is its peculiar modification. Only when a thing has been determined by intellect (—i. e., by an act of judg-

ment—see *Aph.* 13—), do the making of an Ego, and the making of a Meum, take place"].

एकादशपञ्चतन्मात्रं तत्कार्यम् ॥ १७ ॥

Products of Self-consciousness.

Aph. 17.—The product of it [viz. of Self-consciousness] is the eleven [organs], and the five Subtile Elements, [but "among these he mentions a distinction"].

सात्त्विकमेकादशकं प्रवर्तते वैकृतादहङ्कारात् ॥ १८ ॥

The Mind whence.

Aph. 18.—The eleventh, consisting of [the principle of] Purity, proceeds from modified Self-consciousness.

["The 'eleventh,' i. e., the completer of the eleven, viz., the Mind, (or 'the internal organ,' which is not to be confounded with 'the great one' called also Intellect and Mind), alone among the set consisting of sixteen [*Aph.* 17] consists of Purity:—therefore it is produced from Self-consciousness 'modified,' i. e., pure;—such is the meaning. And hence, too, it is to be reckoned that the ten organs are from the Passionate Self-consciousness, and the Subtile Elements from the Dark Self-consciousness"].

कर्मेन्द्रियबुद्धीन्द्रियैरान्तरमेकादशकम् ॥ १९ ॥

Of the Organs.

Aph. 19.—Along with the organs of action and the organs of understanding, another is the eleventh. ["The organs of action are five, the vocal organ, the hands, the feet, the anus, and the generative organ; and the organs of understanding are five, those called the organs of sight, hearing, touch, taste, and smell. Along with these ten, 'another,' viz., the Mind, is 'the eleventh,' i. e., is the eleventh organ."]

आहङ्कारिकत्वश्रुतेर्न भौतिकानि ॥ २० ॥

The Nyáya view rejected.

Aph. 20.—They [the organs] are not formed of the Elements, because there is scripture for their being formed of Self-consciousness.

देवतालयश्रुतिर्नारम्भकस्य ॥ २१ ॥

A text explained.

Aph. 21.—The text regarding absorption into deities is not [declaratory] of an originator, [—for although a thing, e. g., a jar, when it ceases to be a jar, is usually spoken of as being resolved into its originator, viz., into earth,—yet "we see the absorption of a drop of water into what notwithstanding is *not* its originator, viz., the ground," and such is the absorption into a deity from whom the Mind absorbed did not originally emanate.]

तदुत्पत्तिश्रुतेर्विनाशदर्शनाच्च ॥ २२ ॥

No organ eternal.

Aph. 22.—[No organ is eternal as some hold the mind to be], because we have scripture for their beginning to be, and because we see their destruction, [—for "we are certified of their destructibleness by the fact that, in the conditions of being aged, &c., the mind also, like the sight and the rest, decays."]

अतीन्द्रियमिन्द्रियं भ्रान्तानामधिष्ठाने ॥ २३ ॥

The Sense not to be confounded with its site.

Aph. 23.—The Sense is supersensuous, [it being the notion] of mistaken persons [that the Sense exists] in [identity with] its site [—Sight, e. g., in identity with the eye-ball].

शक्तिभेदेऽपि भेदसिद्धौ नैकत्वम् ॥ २४ ॥

All the organs not one organ.

Aph. 24.—Moreover, a difference being established if a difference of *powers* be conceded, there is not a oneness [of the organs. "Even by the admission that a diversity of powers belongs to one single organ, the diversity of organs is established, because the *powers* are the organs." And if you say "there is something unphilosophical in supposing various kinds of organs to arise from one single Self-consciousness,—he replies"].

न कल्पनाविरोधः प्रमाणदृष्टस्य ॥ २५ ॥

Theoretical considerations cannot upset facts.

Aph. 25.—A theoretical objection is not [of any weight] in the case of what is matter of ocular evidence.

उभयात्मकं मनः ॥ २६ ॥

Diversified operation of Mind.

Aph. 26.—The Mind identifies itself with both ["the organs of intellection and of action,"—as he proceeds to explain].

गुणपरिणामभेदान्नानात्वमवस्थावत् ॥ २७ ॥

How this happens.

Aph. 27.—By reason of the varieties of transformation of [which] the Qualities [are susceptible], there is a diversity [of their product the Mind], according to circumstances. [For, "as one single man supports a variety of characters, through the force of association,—being, through association with his beloved, a lover,—through association with one indifferent, indifferent, —and, through association with some other, something other, —so the Mind also, through association with the organ of vision, or any other, becomes various, through its becoming one with the organ of vision, or any other,—by its being (thereby) distinguished by the modification of seeing, or the like."]

रूपादिरसमलान्त उभयाः ॥ २८ ॥

What the organs deal with.

Aph. 28.—Of both [sets of organs the object is that list of things] beginning with Colour, and ending with the dirt of Taste, [—"meaning by the 'dirt' of the tastes of food, &c., ordure, &c.," into which the food, consisting of the *quality* Taste, &c., is partly transformed].

द्रष्टृत्वादिरात्मनः करणत्वमिन्द्रियाणाम् ॥ २९ ॥

The Organs and their possessors.

Aph. 29.—The being the seer, &c., belongs to the Soul; the instrumentality belongs to the Organs, [—"for as a king, even without himself energizing, becomes a warrior through his instrument, his army, by directing this by orders simply,—so the Soul, though quiescent, through all the organs, of vision, &c., becomes a seer, a speaker, and a judger, and the like, merely through the proximity called 'Conjunction,'—because it moves these as the loadstone" does the iron, without exerting any effort].

त्रयाणां स्वालक्षण्यम् ॥ ३० ॥

Differences in the internal organs.

Aph. 30.—Of the three [internal organs, meaning here (1) Intellect, (2) Self-consciousness, and (3) the Mind], there is a diversity among themselves, ["the aspect of Intelligence being attention,—of Self-consciousness, conceit [of personality],—of the Mind, decision and doubt].

सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च ॥ ३१ ॥

A character common to the three.

Aph. 31.—The five airs, Breath, &c., are the modification, in common, of the [three internal] instruments; [—"that is to say, the five, in the shape of Breath, &c., which are familiarly known as 'airs,' because of their circulating as the air does,—these (animal spirits) are the joint or common 'modification,' or kinds of altered form, 'of the instruments,' i. e., of the triad of internal instruments." And "the opinion is not *ours*, as it is that of the Vaiseshikas, that the modifications of the organs take place successively only, and not simultaneously;—so he next tells us"].

क्रमशोऽक्रमशश्चेन्द्रियवृत्तिः ॥ ३२ ॥

Sense-impressions, &c., not exclusively successive.

Aph. 32.—The modifications of the organs take place both successively and simultaneously.

वृत्तयः पञ्चतय्यः क्लिष्टाक्लिष्टाः ॥ ३३ ॥

The ideas which constitute the world.

Aph. 33.—The modifications [of the understanding, which are to be shown to be the cause of the world, and] which are five, are [some of them] painful and [others] not painful, [and "that the modifications are of five sorts, is declared by Patanjali's aphorism,"—see Yoga Aphorisms B. I., 6].

He acquaints us with the nature of Soul.

तन्निवृत्तावुपशान्तोपरागः स्वस्थः ॥ ३४ ॥

Soul's relation thereto.

Aph. 34.—On the cessation thereof [viz., of mundane influences], its tincture ceasing, it [Soul] abides in itself, [—"that is to say, during the state of repose of these modifications, it (the Soul), the reflection of these having ceased, is abiding in itself,—being at *other* times also, as it were, in isolation, (—though seemingly not so). And to this effect there is a triad of Aphorisms of the Yoga," viz. B. I., 2, 3, and 4].

कुसुमवच्च मणिः ॥ ३५ ॥

This illustrated.

Aph. 35.—And as [by] a flower the gem, [—i. e., "as the gem called rockcrystal, by reason of a flower of the Hibiscus, becomes red,—not abiding in its own state,—and, on the removal thereof, becomes colourless,—abiding in its own state,—in like manner" is the Soul apparently tinged by the adjunction of the Qualities. "But then (it may be asked), by whose *effort* does the aggregate of the organs come into operation, since Soul is motionless, and since it is denied that there is any Lord (or Demiurgus)? To this he replies"].

पुरुषार्थं करणोद्भवोऽप्यदृष्टोल्लासात् ॥ ३६ ॥

What moves the Organs to operate.

Aph. 36.—The Organs also [—just as Nature energizes—] arise, for the sake of Soul, from the development of *desert*, [which, we repeat, "belongs entirely to the investment,"—the Soul not really possessing either merit or demerit. "He mentions an instance of a thing's spontaneously energizing for the sake of another"].

धेनुवद्वत्साय ॥ ३७ ॥

An illustration.

Aph. 37.—As the cow for the calf ["quite spontaneously distils milk, and awaits no other effort, just so, for the sake of the master, Soul, the Organs energize quite spontaneously; such is the meaning. And it is *seen* that, out of profound sleep, understanding of its own accord wakes up"].

करणं त्रयोदशविधमवान्तरभेदात् ॥ ३८ ॥

The number of the Organs.

Aph. 38.—Organ is of thirteen sorts, through division of the subordinates, ["'division of the subordinates' having reference to the fact that it is *understanding* which is the *principal* organ." "But then, understanding (it seems) alone is the principal instrument in furnishing its object (of emancipation) to Soul, and the instrumentality of the others is secondary,—in this case what is meant by *secondariness?*"—why are they said to be instrumental at *all?* He replies].

इन्द्रियेषु साधकतमत्वगुणयोगात् कुठारवत् ॥ ३९ ॥

Efficiency of the organs whence.

Aph. 39.—Because the quality of being most efficient, is conjoined with the organs,—as in the case of an axe. ["The quality of the (principal) organ, the understanding, in the shape of being most efficient, on behalf of soul, exists derivatively in the (other derivative) organs; therefore it is made out that an organ is of thirteen kinds;—such is the connexion with the

preceding aphorism." "'As in the case of an axe.' As, although the blow itself, since it is this that puts an end to our non-possession of the result, is the principal efficient in the cutting, yet the axe also is an efficient, because of its close proximity to the being the principal efficient;—so here also:—such is the meaning. He does not here say that Self-consciousness is secondarily efficient,—meaning to imply that it is one with the internal organ. Specifying the precise state of the case in regard to the condition of secondary and principal, he says]

द्वयोः प्रधानं मनो लोकवद्भृत्यवर्गेषु ॥ ४० ॥

Pre-eminent efficiency of Intellect illustrated.

Aph. 40.—Among the two [the external and the internal organs] the principal is Mind, just as, in the world, among troops of dependents. ["'Among the two,' viz., the external and the internal, 'Mind,' i. e., understanding simply, is 'the principal,' i. e., chief;—in short is the immediate cause;—because it is it that furnishes Soul with its end;—just as, among troops of dependents, some one single person is the prime minister of the king, and the others, governors of towns, &c., are his subordinates;—such is the meaning." And it must be carefully observed that "here the word 'Mind' does not mean the third internal organ" spoken of in *Aph.* 30, but Intellect, or 'the Great One.']

अव्यभिचारात् ॥ ४१ ॥

Reason why Understanding is the principal.

Aph. 41.—[And Intellect is the principal or immediate and direct efficient in Soul's emancipation,] because there is no wandering away,—["that is to say, because it (understanding) pervades all the organs,—or because there is no result apart from it"].

तथाशेषसंस्काराधारत्वात् ॥ ४२ ॥

Another reason.

Aph. 42.—So too because it [the understanding] is the depository of all the self-continuant impressions, ["and not the Sight, &c.,

or Self-consciousness, or the Mind; else it could not happen that things formerly seen, and heard, &c., should be remembered by the blind, and deaf, &c."].

स्मृत्यानुमानाच्च ॥ ४३ ॥

Another reason.

Aph. 43.—And because we infer this [its pre-eminence] by reason of its meditating: [" for the modification of thought called 'meditation' is the noblest of all the modifications (incident to Soul or pure Thought—whose blessedness or state of emancipation it is to have no *modification* at all), and the Understanding itself, which, as being the depository thereof, is further named Thought (*chitta*,—from the same root as *chintá*—), is nobler than the organs whose modifications are other than this."—" But then suppose that the modification 'meditation' belongs only to the *Soul* (—suggests some one). To this he replies"].

सम्भवेन्न स्वतः ॥ ४४ ॥

Meditation not essential in Soul.

Aph. 44.—It cannot be of its own nature, [—" that is to say, meditation cannot belong to Soul essentially, because of the immobility" of Soul,—whereas 'meditation' is an effort.

आपेक्षिको गुणप्रधानभावः क्रियाविशेषात् ॥ ४५ ॥

An organ may be relatively principal and secondary.

Aph. 45.—The condition [—as regards Soul's instruments—] of secondary and principal is relative, because of the difference of function, [—e. g., " in the operations of the Sight, &c., the Mind is principal; and in the operation of the Mind, Self-consciousness, and in the operation of Self-consciousness, Intellect is principal," or precedent. "But then, what is the cause of this arrangement, viz., that of this (or that) Soul, this (or that) Intellect alone, and not another Intellect, is the instrument? With reference to this he says"].

तत्कर्मार्जितत्वात् तदर्थमभिचेष्टा लोकवत् ॥ ४६ ॥

Each one reaps as he hath sowed.

Aph. 46.—The energizing [of this or that Intellect] is for the sake of this [or that Soul], because of its having been purchased by the works [or deserts] of this [or that Soul],—just as in the world. ["As in the world (or in ordinary affairs), whatever axe, or the like, has been purchased by the act, e. g., of buying, by whatever man,—the operation of that (axe, or the like), such as cleaving, is only for the sake of that man (who purchased it) :—such is the meaning. The import is, that, *therefrom* is the distributive allotment of instruments" inquired about, under the preceding aphorisms. And we must again repeat that "although there is *no* act in Soul, because it is immoveable, still, since it is the means of Soul's experience, it is *called* the act of Soul, just like the victories, &c., of a king (which are really the acts of his servants), because of Soul's being the owner" of the results of acts, as the king is of the results of the actions of his troops. And "in order to make clear the chiefship of Intellect, he sums up," as follows.]

समानकर्मयोगे बुद्धेः प्राधान्यं लोकवल्लोकवत् ॥ ४७ ॥

Summing up.

Aph. 47.—Admitting that they [—the various instruments of Soul, all] equally act, the pre-eminence belongs to Intellect,—just as in the world, just as in the world, [—"because, that is to say, it is just as the pre-eminence, in the world, belongs to the prime minister,—among the rulers of towns, and the rest, even although there be no difference in as far as regards their being (all alike workers) for the sake of the king. Therefore, in all the institutes, is Intellect alone celebrated as 'the great one.' The repetition (viz., 'just as in the world, just as in the world,') implies the completion of the Book"].

BOOK III.

INTRODUCTION.

["From this forward, the gross product of Nature, the great elements and the duad of bodies, are to be described; and thereafter the going into various wombs, and the like, (this description being given) with a view to that less perfect degree of dispassionateness which is the cause of one's engaging upon the means of knowledge; and thereafter, with a view to perfect freedom from passion, all the means of knowledge are to be told: so the Third Book commences."]

अविशेषाद्विशेषारम्भः ॥ १ ॥

The elements whence.

Aph. I.—The origination of the diversified [world of sense] is from that which has no difference, [—i. e., "from that in which there exists not a distinction in the shape of calmness, fierceness, dulness, &c.,—viz., the Subtile Elements, called 'the five somethings simply;'—from this (set of five) is the origination of 'the diversified,'—(so called) from their possessing a difference in the shape of the calm, &c.,—viz., the gross, the great Elements:—such is the meaning. For the fact of consisting of pleasure, or the like, in the shape of the calm, and the rest, is manifested, in the degrees of greater and less, &c., in the gross Elements only, not in the Subtile,—*because these,* since they have but the one form of the calm, are manifest to the 'concentrated'" practitioners of meditation, but to no others. "So then, having stated, by composing the preceding Book, the origin of the twenty-three Principles, he states the origination, therefrom, of the duad of bodies"].

तस्माच्छरीरस्य ॥ २ ॥

The Body whence.

Aph. 2.—Therefrom [i. e., from the twenty-three Principles, there is the origination of] the Body [or pair of Bodies, the Gross and the Subtile. "Next he proves that mundane existence could not be accounted for otherwise than on the ground of the twenty-three Principles"].

तद्बीजात् संसृतिः ॥ ३ ॥

Mundane existence whence.

Aph. 3.—From the seed thereof is mundane existence:—["'thereof,' i. e., of the Body;—'from the seed,' i. e., from the Subtile one, as its cause, in the shape of the twenty-three Principles,—is 'mundane existence,' i. e., do the going and coming of Soul take place;—for it is impossible that, of itself, there should be a going, &c., of that which, in virtue of its all-pervadingness, is immovable:—such is the meaning. For Soul, being conditioned by the twenty-three Principles, only by means of that investment migrates from Body to Body, with a view to experiencing the fruits of previous works"].

आविवेकाच्च प्रवर्तनमविशेषाणाम ॥ ४ ॥

Mundane existence till when.

Aph. 4.—And till there is discrimination, there is the energizing of these which have no differences, [for "of all Souls whatever, devoid of the differences of being Lord or not Lord, &c., (—though seemingly possessed of such differences,—) 'energizing,' i. e., mundane existence, is inevitable just till there is discrimination (of Soul from its seeming investments), and it does not continue thereafter"].

उपभोगादितरस्य ॥ ५ ॥

The reason of this.

Aph. 5.—Because of [the necessity of] the other's experiencing, [i. e., because of the necessity 'that the other,' i. e., that that (Soul) which does not discriminate, should experience the fruit of its own (reputed) acts"].

सम्प्रति परिमुक्तो द्वाभ्याम् ॥ ६ ॥

Soul's bondage only seeming.

Aph. 6.—It [Soul] is now quite free from both; [—"'now,' i. e., during the time of mundane existence, Soul is really free 'from both,' i. e., from the pairs, viz., cold and heat, pleasure and pain, &c."].

मातापितृजं स्थूलं प्रायश इतरन्न तथा ॥ ७ ॥

The gross and Subtile Bodies distinguished.

Aph. 7.—The Gross [Body] usually arises from father and mother; the other one is not so:—["the Gross one arises from father and mother 'usually,' i. e., for the most part,—for there is mention also of a Gross Body *not* born of a womb;—and 'the other,' i. e., the Subtile Body, is 'not so,' i. e., does not arise from a father and mother, because *it* arises from creation, &c." "He next decides the question—through disguise by which one, of the Bodies—Gross and Subtile,—the conjunction of the pairs (pleasure and pain, &c.,) with Soul takes place"].

पूर्वोत्पत्तेस्तत्कार्यत्वं भोगादेकस्य नेतरस्य ॥ ८ ॥

Which of the bodies is the cause of Soul's bondage.

Aph. 8.—To that which arose antecedently it belongs to be that whose result is this,—because it is to the one that there belongs fruition, not to the other: [—that is to say, "to have pleasure and pain as its effect (reflected in Soul), belongs to that Subtile Body alone whose origin was 'antecedent,' i. e., at the commencement of the creation (or annus magnus). Why?—because the fruition of what is called pleasure and pain belongs to only 'the one,' i. e., the Subtile Body, but not to 'the other,' i. e., the Gross Body, because all are agreed that there is neither pleasure nor pain, &c., in a body of *earth*"].

सप्तदशैकं लिङ्गम् ॥ ९ ॥

The Subtile Body how constituted.

Aph. 9.—The seventeen, as one, are the Subtile Body. ["The Subtile Body, further, through its being container and contained, is

twofold. Here the seventeen (—to be just mentioned—), mingled, are the Subtile Body; and that, at the beginning of a creation, is but one, in the shape of an aggregate (—as the forest, the aggregate of many trees, is but one—): such is the meaning. The seventeen are the eleven organs, the five Subtile Elements, and Understanding. Self-consciousness is included under Understanding." "But (one may ask) if the Subtile Body be *one*, then how should there be diverse experiences accordingly as Souls are numerically distinct from one another? To this he replies"].

व्यक्तिभेदः कर्मविशेषात् ॥ १० ॥

How there come to be individuals.

Aph. 10.—There is distinction of individuals through diversity of desert; [—for "although at the beginning of the creation (or annus magnus), there was but one Subtile Body, in the shape of that investment (—of Soul,—see *Vedánta-sára Aph.* 62—named) *Hiraṇya-garbha*, still, subsequently moreover, there becomes a division of it into individuals,—a plurality partitively in the shape of individuals,—as at present there is, of the Subtile Body of a father, a plurality, partitively, in the shape of the Subtile Body of son, daughter, &c. He tells the cause of this, saying, 'through diversity of desert,'—meaning through actions, &c., which are causes of the experiences of other animal souls." "But then, on this showing, since the Subtile one alone, from its being the site of fruition, is (what ought to be denoted by the term) *Body*, how is the term Body applied to the Gross one? To this he replies"].

तदधिष्ठानाश्रये देहे तद्वादात् तद्वादः ॥ ११ ॥

Why the gross Body is called a Body.

Aph. 11.—Because of its being applied to *it* [—viz., to the Subtile one], it is applied to the Body which is the tabernacle of the abiding thereof.

न स्वातन्त्र्यात् तदृते छायावच्चित्रवच्च ॥ १२ ॥

The Subtile Body dependent on the gross body.

Aph. 12.—Not independently [can the Subtile Body exist], without that [Gross Body],—just like a shadow and a picture:—["that is to say,—the Subtile Body does not stand independently, 'without that,' i. e., without a support; as a shadow, or as a picture, does not stand without a support. And so, having abandoned a Gross Body, in order to go to another world, it is settled that the Subtile Body takes another body, to serve as its tabernacle:—such is the import." "But then (it may be said), of the Subtile Body, since it is limited substance, as the Air, or the like, let the *Ether* (or *Space)*, without its being attached to anything, be the site,—it is purposeless to suppose anything else:—to this he replies"].

मूर्तत्वेऽपि न सङ्घातयोगात् तरणिवत् ॥ १३ ॥

For it must have a material support.

Aph. 13.—Nay,—even though it be limited,—because of its association with masses,—just as the sun; [—"for since, just like the sun, it consists of *light*—it is inferred to be associated with a mass. All lights,—the sun and the rest—are seen only under the circumstances of association (of the luminiferous imponderable) with earthy substances; and the Subtile Body consists of 'Purity,' which is Light,—therefore it must be associated with the Elements"].

अणुपरिमाणं तत्कृतिश्रुतेः ॥ १४ ॥

Size of the Subtile Body.

Aph. 14.—It is of atomic magnitude, for there is scripture for its acting: ["'It' the Subtile Body, is 'of atomic magnitude,' i. e., limited,—but not absolutely an *atom*, because it is declared to have parts. Wherefore?—'for there is scripture for its acting,'—i. e., because there is a text about its acting. When a thing is all-pervading, it cannot act, (action being motion): but the proper reading is 'because there is scripture for its *moving*.'"]

तदन्नमयत्वश्रुतेश्च ॥ १५ ॥

Another proof of this.

Aph. 15.—And because there is scripture for its being formed of food.

पुरुषार्थं संहतिर्लिङ्गानां रूपकारवद्राज्ञः ॥ १६ ॥

Why the Subtile Body migrates.

Aph. 16.—The mundane existence of Subtile Bodies is for the sake of Soul,—just like a king's cooks: ["that is to say,—as the cooks of a king frequent the kitchens for the sake of the king, so the Subtile Bodies transmigrate for the sake of Soul." "The Subtile Body having been discussed in respect of all its peculiarities, he next discusses the Gross Body so also"].

पाञ्चभौतिको देहः ॥ १७ ॥

The Gross Body whence.

Aph. 17.—The Body consists of the five elements.

चातुर्भौतिकमित्येके ॥ १८ ॥

Another opinion.

Aph. 18.—Some say that it consists of *four* elements, [—alleging this "with the import that the *Ether* does not originate" anything].

ऐकभौतिकमित्यपरे ॥ १९ ॥

Another opinion.

Aph. 19.—Others say that it consists of *one* element, ["meaning that the body is of Earth only, and the other elements are merely nourishers. Or 'of one element' means of one or other element:"—see the Rosicrucian doctrine in the *Tarka-sangraha*, § 13, &c].

न सांसिद्धिकं चैतन्यं प्रत्येकादृष्टेः ॥ २० ॥

Intellect not the result of organization.

Aph. 20.—Intellect is not natural [—a natural result of organization—] because it is not found in them severally; ["that is to say,—

since we do not find intellect in the separated Elements, intellect is not natural to the Body which consists of the Elements, but is adventitious"].

प्रपञ्चमरणाद्यभावश्च ॥ २१ ॥

A further argument.

Aph. 21.—And [if the Body had intellect natural to it] there would not be the death, &c., of anything, [" for death, profound sleep, &c., mean the body's being non-intelligent;—and this, if it were by its own nature intelligent, would not take place,—because the essential nature of a thing remains as long as the thing remains." " Pondering a doubt, as to the assertion (in *Aph.* 20), viz., 'because it is not found in them severally,' —he repels it"].

मदशक्तिवच्चेत् प्रत्येकपरिदृष्टे सांहत्ये तदुद्भवः ॥ २२ ॥

An illustrative objection disposed of.

Aph. 22.—If you say that [Intellect results from organization, and that] it is like the power of something intoxicating, [the ingredients of which separately have no intoxicating power, we reply, that] this might arise, on conjunction, if we had seen in each [element something conducive to the result. " If it *had* been seen in each [constituent], its appearance in the compound might have had place. But in the case in question, it is not the case that it is seen in each. Therefore, in the illustration (of something intoxicating resulting from mixture), it being established, by the Institutes, &c., that there is in each ingredient a *subtile* tendency to intoxicate, it is only settled that, at the time when these combine, there will be a *manifestation* of the (latent) power of intoxicating;—but in the thing illustrated, it is not established by any proof whatsoever, that there is intelligence, in a subtile (or undeveloped) state, in the elements separately." In *Aph.* 16, " it was stated that the Subtile Bodies transmigrate for the sake of Soul:—in regard to this, he tells, in two aphorisms, by what operation

dependent on the birth of the Subtile Bodies, which means their transmigrations into Gross Bodies, what aims of Soul are accomplished"].

ज्ञानान्मुक्तिः ॥ २३ ॥

Purpose of the Subtile Body's taking a gross one.

Aph. 23.—From knowledge [acquired during mundane existence, comes] salvation—[soul's *chief* end].

बन्धो विपर्ययात् ॥ २४ ॥

Bondage whence.

Aph. 24.—Bondage [which may be viewed as one of the ends which soul could arrive at only through the Subtile Body], is from misconception.

नियतकारणत्वान्न समुच्चयविकल्पौ ॥ २५ ॥

Knowledge has neither co-operater nor substitute, in liberating Soul.

Aph. 25.—Since this [viz., knowledge] is the precise cause [of liberation], there is neither association [of anything else with it, e. g., good works], nor alternativeness, [e. g., of good works in its stead].

स्वप्नजागराभ्यामिव मायिकामायिकाभ्यां नोभयोर्मुक्तिः पुरुषस्य ॥ २६ ॥

This illustrated.

Aph. 26.—The emancipation of soul does not depend on both [knowledge and works, or the like], just as [any end that one aims at is not obtained] from dream and from the waking state, [together or alternatively,—which are severally] illusory and not illusory. ["But even if it be so (—may some one say—), there may be association, or alternativeness, of knowledge of the truth, with that knowledge which is termed Worship of (the One all-constitutive divine) Soul,—since there is no *illusoriness* in *this* object of Worship. To this he replies"].

इतरस्यापि नात्यन्तिकम् ॥ २७ ॥

Man's conception of the All is faulty.

Aph. 27.—Even of that other [the object of worship just mentioned], it [—the non-illusoriness—] is not complete, ["because imaginary things also enter into (our conception of, and overlie, and disguise) the object of worship—the (One all-constitutive) Soul." "And he next tells us in what *part* of it—is the illusoriness of the (object of) Worship" just referred to].

सङ्कल्पितेऽप्येवम् ॥ २८ ॥

Where the fault applies.

Aph. 28.—Moreover it is in what is *fancied* that it is thus [illusory; "in that portion, of the thing meditated, which (portion of it) is fancied by the Mind, (—while it does not exist in reality). For,—the object of worship having been declared in such texts as 'All this indeed is Brahma,'—the illusoriness belongs entirely to that portion (of the impure conception of 'the All', which presents itself, to the undiscriminating, under the aspect of) the world." "Then what profit is there in Worship? With reference to this, he declares" as follows].

भावनोपचयाच्छुद्धस्य सर्वं प्रकृतिवत् ॥ २९ ॥

The fruit of Worship.

Aph. 29.—From the achievement of [the worship termed] meditation there is to the pure [Soul] all [power],—just like Nature,—["that is to say,—as Nature creates, sustains and destroys,—so also the Purity of the understanding of the worshipper, by instigating Nature, creates, &c.," [but this is not Liberation—or Soul's chief end. "It having been settled that Knowledge alone is the means of Liberation, he now mentions the *means* of Knowledge"].

रागोपहतिर्ध्यानम् ॥ ३० ॥

Removal of obstacles to knowledge.

Aph. 30.—Meditation is [the cause of] the removal of Desire—["that

affection of the mind by objects, which is a hinderer of knowledge"].

वृत्तिनिरोधात् तत्सिद्धिः ॥ ३१ ॥

Meditation at what point perfected.

Aph. 31.—It [Meditation, "from the effectuation of which, and not from merely commencing upon it, Knowledge arises,"] is perfected by the repelling of the modifications [of the Mind, which ought to be abstracted from all thoughts *of* anything].

धारणासनस्वकर्मणा तत्सिद्धिः ॥ ३२ ॥

Practices conducive to meditation.

Aph. 32.—This [Meditation] is perfected by Restraint, Postures, and one's Duties.

निरोधश्छर्दिविधारणाभ्याम् ॥ ३३ ॥

Restraint of the breath.

Aph. 33.—Restraint [of the breath] is by means of expulsion and retention.

a. That it is 'of the breath' is gathered from the notoriousness [of its being so].

b. He characterises Postures, which come next in order.

स्थिरसुखमासनम् ॥ ३४ ॥

Postures.

Aph. 34.—Steady, and [promoting] ease, is a [suitable] Posture, [—"such as the crossing of the arms"].

स्वकर्म स्वाश्रमविहितकर्मानुष्ठानम् ॥ ३५ ॥

One's duty.

Aph. 35.—One's Duty is the performance of the actions prescribed for one's religious order.

वैराग्यादभ्यासाच्च ॥ ३६ ॥

Knowledge, by Concentration, how attained.

Aph. 36.—Through Dispassion and Practice, ["mere Practice, in the shape of Meditation, accompanied by Dispassion, Knowledge, and its instrument Concentration, takes place in the case of the best of those competent" to engage in the matter at all. "Thus has liberation, through knowledge, been expounded. After this the cause of Bondage, Misconception," declared in the assertion "Bondage is from Misconception," is to be expounded; and first he states the nature of Misconception"].

विपर्ययभेदाः पञ्च ॥ ३७ ॥

Misconception divided.

Aph. 37.—The kinds of Misconception are five, [viz., "Ignorance, Egotism, Desire, Aversion, and Fear of dissolution,—the five mentioned in the *Yoga*,"—see *Yoga Aphorisms*, B. II., 3].

अशक्तिरष्टाविंशतिधा तु ॥ ३८ ॥

The varieties of Disability.

Aph. 38.—But Disability [the cause of Misconception] is of twenty-eight sorts [—as explained in the *Yoga*].

तुष्टिर्नवधा ॥ ३९ ॥

Acquiescence.

Aph. 39.—Acquiescence is of nine sorts.

सिद्धिरष्टधा ॥ ४० ॥

Perfections.

Aph. 40.—Perfection is of eight sorts.

अवान्तरभेदाः पूर्ववत् ॥ ४१ ॥

Their subdivisions.

Aph. 41.—The subdivisions [of Misconception] are [such] as [they have been declared] aforetime ["by preceding teachers;—they are not explained here, for fear of prolixity"].

एवमितरस्याः ॥ ४२ ॥

Of this further.

Aph. 42.—So of the other [viz. Disability, the divisions, which are twenty-eight, are to be found elsewhere].

आध्यात्मिकादिभेदान्नवधा तुष्टिः ॥ ४३ ॥

Acquiescence divided.

Aph. 43.—Acquiescence is nine-fold, through the distinction of 'the internal' and the rest, [and "this aphorism is explained by a memorial verse," viz., No. 50, which see in Professor Wilson's edition of the *Sánkhya Kárikás*].

ऊहादिभिः सिद्धिः ॥ ४४ ॥

Perfection divided.

Aph. 44.—Through Reasoning, &c., [which are its subdivisions,] Perfection [is eight-fold, being divided into Reasoning, &c.; and "this also has been explained in a memorial verse," No. 51, which see in Professor Wilson's edition. "But then,—how is it said that Perfection consists only of 'Reasoning, &c.,'—seeing that it is determined in all the Institutes that the eight Perfections, viz., (the capacity of assuming) Atomic bulk, &c., result from recitations, austerity, meditation, &c.? To this he replies"].

नेतरादितरहानेन विना ॥ ४५ ॥

The enumeration defended.

Aph. 45.—Not from any other [than what we have just stated, does real Perfection arise;—because what does arise therefrom, e. g. from austerities, is] without abandonment of something else [viz., Misconception; "therefore *that* Perfection, since it is no antagonist to mundane existence, is only a *semblance* of a Perfection, and not real Perfection." Next, "the individuated creation, which was mentioned concisely in the assertion 'The distinction of individuals arises from the difference of desert,' is set forth diffusely"].

दैवादिप्रभेदा ॥ ४६ ॥

The creation viewed in its parts.

Aph. 46.—[The creation is that] of which the subdivisions are the demons, &c., [and "this is explained in a memorial verse," No. 53,—which see in Professor Wilson's edition].

आब्रह्मस्तम्बपर्यन्तं तत्कृते सृष्टिराविवेकात् ॥ ४७ ॥

This creation also for Soul's sake.

Aph. 47.—From Brahmá down to a post, for its [Soul's] sake is creation, till there be discrimination [between Soul and Nature, on which Soul's liberation ensues].

ऊर्ध्वं सत्त्वविशाला ॥ ४८ ॥

The celestial world.

Aph. 48.—Aloft,—[—"above the world of mortals"] it [the creation] abounds in [the Quality of] Purity.

तमोविशाला मूलतः ॥ ४९ ॥

The infernal world.

Aph. 49.—Beneath, ["that is to say, under the world of mortals"] [the creation] abounds in Darkness.

मध्ये रजोविशाला ॥ ५० ॥

The world of mortals.

Aph. 50.—In this midst ["i. e. in the world of mortals"] it [the creation] abounds in Passion. ["But then,—for what reason are there, from one single Nature, creations diverse in having, in excess, purity and the rest? With reference to this he says."]

कर्मवैचित्र्यात् प्रधानचेष्टा गर्भदासवत् ॥ ५१ ॥

Why Nature operates diversely.

Aph. 51.—By reason of diversity of desert is Nature's [diverse] behaviour,—just like a born slave; [—"that is to say,—as of him who is a slave from the embryo state upwards, there are,

through the cleverness arising from the habit of being a dependent, various sorts of behaviour, i. e., of service, for the sake of his master,—just so" does Nature serve Soul in various ways. "But then—if the creation aloft is abundant in Purity (—the element of joy—), then, since Soul's object is really thereby effected, what need is there of *Liberation?* To this he replies"].

आवृत्तिस्तत्रापि उत्तरोत्तरयोनियोगाद्धेयः ॥ ५२ ॥

Why Heaven is to be shunned.

Aph. 52.—Even there, there is return [to miserable states of existence]; it is to be shunned by reason of the successive subjections to birth [from which the inhabitants of heaven enjoy no immunity].

समानं जरामरणादिजं दुःखम् ॥ ५३ ॥

Transitoriness of heavenly bliss.

Aph. 53.—Alike [belongs to all] the sorrow produced by decay and death:—["common to all alike, those that are aloft and those beneath, beginning with Brahmá and ending with a stock, is the sorrow produced by decay and death:—therefore moreover is it (heaven) to be shunned." "What need of more? The end is not effected by absorption into the cause either,—as he tells us"].

न कारणलयात् कृतकृत्यता मग्नवदुत्थानात् ॥ ५४ ॥

Absorption into Nature ineffectual.

Aph. 54.—Not by absorption into the cause is there accomplishment of the end, because, as in the case of one who has dived, there is a rising again. ["In the absence of knowledge of the distinction (between Soul and Nature), when indifference towards Mind, &c., has resulted from devotion to Nature, then absorption into Nature takes place;—for it is declared—'Through Dispassion there is absorption into Nature.' Even through this, i. e., the absorption into the cause, the end is not gained, 'because there is a rising again,—as in the case

of one who has dived.' As a man who has dived under water rises again, exactly so do Souls, which have been absorbed into Nature, re-appear (at the commencement of a new annus magnus), in the condition of Lords :—because it is impossible that one's Faults should be consumed without a familiarity with the distinction (between Soul and Nature), in consequence of the re-appearance of Passion through the non-destruction of habits, &c." "But then,—the cause is not by any one caused to act;—being independent, then, why does she (Nature) make that grief-occasioning resurrection of her own worshipper? To this he replies."]

अकार्यत्वेऽपि तद्योगः पारवश्यात् ॥ ५५ ॥

Nature free to act, yet guided by an end.

Aph. 55.—Though she be not constrained to act, yet this is fitting, because of her being devoted to another. ["Though Nature is 'not constrained to act,' not instigated, not subject to the will of another, yet 'this is fitting,'—it is proper that he who is absorbed in her should arise again:—why?—'because of her being devoted to another,'—i. e., because she seeks Soul's end. The meaning is, that, he who is absorbed in her is again raised up by Nature for the sake of Soul's end which consists in knowledge of the distinction (between Nature and Soul). And Soul's end, and the like, are not *constrainers* of Nature, but occasions for the energizing of her whose very being is to energize;—so that there is nothing detracted from her independence." "He mentions further a proof that Soul rises from absorption into Nature."]

स हि सर्ववित् सर्वकर्ता ॥ ५६ ॥

The gain of absorption into Nature.

Aph. 56.—[He who is absorbed into Nature must rise again] for he becomes omniscient and omnipotent, ["The Lord, the First Spirit" in a subsequent creation. "But then,—if that be so, it is impossible to deny a *Lord*,"—which, nevertheless, the *Sánkhyas* seem to do;—to this he replies].

ईदृशेश्वरसिद्धिः सिद्धा ॥ ५७ ॥

In what sense there is a Lord.

Aph. 57.—The existence of *such* a Lord is a settled point, [—for "it is quite agreed by all, that there is an emergent Lord, he who had been absorbed into Nature; for the ground of dispute (between the *Sánkhyas* and the rest) is altogether about an *eternal* Lord." "He next expounds diffusely the motive for Nature's creating, which was mentioned only indicatorily in the first aphorism of the Second Book."]

प्रधानस्रष्टिः परार्थं स्वतोऽप्यभोक्तृत्वादुष्ट्रकुङ्कुमवहनवत् ॥ ५८ ॥

Nature's disinterestedness.

Aph. 58.—Nature's creating is for the sake of another, though it be spontaneous,—for she is not the experiencer,—just like a cart's carrying saffron [for the sake of its master. "But then,—it is quite impossible that Nature, being unintelligent, should be spontaneously a creator,—for we see that a cart, or the like, operates only by reason of the efforts of another. To this he replies."]

अचेतनत्वेऽपि क्षीरवच्चेष्टितं प्रधानस्य ॥ ५९ ॥

Nature's spontaneous action illustrated.

Aph. 59.—Though she be unintelligent, yet Nature acts,—as is the case with milk;—["that is to say,—as milk, without reference to men's efforts, quite of itself changes into the form of curd,—so Nature, although she be unintelligent, changes into the form of Mind, &c., even without the efforts of any other." And in regard to this aphorism the commentator observes, "this is not rendered tautological by the aphorism 'As a cow—for her calf,'—because there the question was only of the operation of *instruments*, and because cows *are* intelligent."]

By means of the exhibition of another illustration, he mentions the cause of the thing asserted as aforesaid.

कर्मवदृष्टेर्वा कालादेः ॥ ६० ॥

Another illustration.

Aph. 60.—Or as is the case with the acts, [or on-goings], for we see them, of Time, &c., ["the spontaneous action of Nature is proved from what is seen. The action of Time, for example, takes place quite spontaneously, in the shape of one season's now departing and another's coming on:—let the behaviour of Nature also be thus,—for the supposition conforms to observed facts." "But still, a senseless Nature would never energize, or would energize the wrong way,—because of there being (in her case) no such communing as—'This is my means of producing experience, &c.' To this he replies."]

स्वभावाच्चेष्टितमनभिसन्धानाद्भृत्यवत् ॥ ६१ ॥

Nature acts from habit.

Aph. 61.—From her own nature she acts, not from thought,—just like a servant, [—"that is to say,—as, in the case of an excellent servant, naturally, just from habit, the appointed and necessary service of the master is engaged in, and not with a view to his own enjoyment, just so does Nature energize from habit alone."]

कर्माकृष्टेर्वानादितः ॥ ६२ ॥

Or through the influence of Desert.

Aph. 62.—Or from attraction by deserts—which have been from eternity.

विविक्तबोधात् सृष्टिनिवृत्तिः प्रधानस्य सूदवत् पाके ॥ ६३ ॥

Nature desists when the end is gained.

Aph. 63.—From discriminative knowledge is there a cessation of Nature's creating,—just as is the case with a cook when the cooking has been performed. ["But at that rate, since Nature's creating ceases through the production of discriminative knowledge in the case of a single Soul, we should find *all* liberated. To this he replies."]

इतर इतरवत् तद्दोषात् ॥ ६४ ॥

Liberation of one involves not that of all.

Aph. 64.—Another [i. e., one *devoid* of discriminative knowledge] remains like another, [i. e., just like one bound by Nature,—] through her fault, [i. e., through the fault which may be described as her not accomplishing that soul's aim].

द्वयोरेकतरस्य वोदासीन्यमपवर्गः ॥ ६५ ॥

Liberation consists in what.

Aph. 65.—[The fruit of Nature's ceasing to act,] the solitariness of both [Nature and Soul], or [—which comes to the same thing—] of either, is liberation. ["But then, how should Nature, having attained indifference, through the mood in the shape of discrimination, on the liberation of a single Soul, again engage in creation for the sake of another Soul? And you are not to say that this is no objection because Nature consists of different portions,—(it is not *another* Nature but the same,), because we see that, even out of the (mortal) constituents of the liberated person, his dust, &c., things are created for the experience of another. To this he replies."]

अन्यदृष्ट्युपरागेऽपि न विरज्यते प्रबुद्धरज्जुतत्त्वस्यै-
वोरगः ॥ ६६ ॥

How Nature affects one and not another.

Aph. 66.—Moreover [when Nature has left off distressing the emancipated] she does not desist in regard to her creative influence on another,—just as is the case with the snake [which ceases to be a terror] in respect of him who is aware of the truth in regard to the rope [which another still mistakes for a snake. "And Nature is likened to a snake, because of her disguising Soul, which is likened to a rope. Certain unintelligent persons, calling themselves *Vedántins*, having quite failed to understand that such is the drift of such examples as those of the rope, the snake, &c., suppose that Nature is an absolute nothing, or something merely imaginary. The matters of

scripture, and of the legal institutes, are to be *elucidated* by means of this or that example offered by the *Sánkhyas* who assert the reality of Nature;—it is not the case that the matter is simply *established* to be as is the example," the analogy of which is not to be overstrained as if the cases were parallel throughout.]

कर्मनिमित्तयोगाच्च ॥ ६७ ॥

Another consideration why Nature should act.

Aph. 67.—And from connection with Desert, which is the cause, [Nature "creates, for the sake of another Soul" than the emancipated one. "But then, since all Souls are alike indifferent, inasmuch as they do not desire (Nature's interference), what is it that here determines Nature to act only in regard to this one, and desist in regard to that one? To this he replies"].

नैरपेक्ष्येऽपि प्रकृत्युपकारेऽविवेको निमित्तम् ॥ ६८ ॥

Nature's selection how determined.

Aph. 68.—Though there is [on soul's part] this indifference, yet want of discrimination is the cause of Nature's service, ["Nature, just through [her own] non-discrimination, saying "This is my master," "This is I myself,"—serves Souls (towards their eventual emancipation) by creation, &c. And so, to what Soul, not having discriminated herself therefrom, she has the habit of showing herself, in respect just of that one does Nature energize:—and this it is that determines her." But "since it is her *nature* to energize, how can she desist even when discrimination has taken place? To this he replies"].

नर्तकीवत् प्रवृत्तस्यापि निवृत्तिस्थारितार्थात् ॥ ६९ ॥

Nature energizes only till the end is attained.

Aph. 69.—Just like a dancer, does she, though she had been energizing, desist, because of the end's having been attained; [—for "Nature's disposition to energize is only for the sake of Soul, and not universally. Therefore is it declared that Nature desists, though she had been energizing, when the end has

been attained, in the shape of the effectuation of Soul's aim. Just as a dancer, who had been energizing with the view of exhibiting a dance to the spectators, desists on the accomplishment of this"].

दोषबोधेऽपि नोपसर्पणं प्रधानस्य कुलवधूवत् ॥ ७० ॥

This illustrated.

Aph. 70.—Moreover, when her fault is known, Nature does not approach [Soul], just like a woman of good family; [—"that is to say,—Nature, moreover, ashamed at Soul's having seen her fault,—in her transformations and her taking the shape of pain,—does not again approach Soul;—'just like a woman of good family,'—i. e.,—just as a (frail) woman of good family, ashamed at ascertaining that her fault has been seen by her husband, does not approach her husband." "But then,—if Nature's energizing be for the sake of Soul, then Soul must be *altered* by Bondage and Liberation (—and not remain the unalterable entity which you allege it to be). To this he replies"].

नैकान्ततो बन्धमोक्षौ पुरुषस्याविवेकादृते ॥ ७१ ॥

Soul's relation to Bondage.

Aph. 71.—Bondage and Liberation do not belong actually to Soul,—[and would not even appear to be] but for non-discrimination. ["But, in reality, the aforesaid Bondage and Liberation belong to Nature alone:—so he asserts:"]

प्रकृतेराञ्जस्यात् ससङ्गत्वात् पशुवत् ॥ ७२ ॥

Bondage is really Nature's.

Aph. 72.—It really belongs to Nature, through consociation,—like a beast, [i. e., "through her being hampered by the habits, &c., which are the causes of Pain;—just as a beast, through its being hampered by a rope, experiences Bondage and Liberation:—such is the meaning.]

रूपैः सप्तभिरात्मानं बध्नाति प्रधानं कोशकारवद्विमोचयत्येकरूपेण ॥ ७३ ॥

How Nature binds and liberates herself.

Aph 73.—In seven ways does Nature bind herself, like the silk-worm;—in one way does she liberate herself, [—for, "by Merit, Dispassion, supernatural Power, Demerit, Ignorance, Non-dispassion, and Want of power,—by habits, causes of Pain, in the shape of these seven, does Nature bind herself with Pain, 'like the silk-worm,'—i. e., just as the worm that makes the cocoon bind itself by means of the dwelling which it itself constructs. And that same Nature liberates herself from Pain 'in one way,' i. e., by Knowledge alone." "But then, that which you assert, viz., that Bondage and Liberation result from Non-discrimination alone, is improper,—because Non-discrimination can neither be quitted nor assumed,—and because, in the world, Pain, and its negative Pleasure, can themselves be neither quitted nor assumed:—otherwise (—if you still insist on retaining the opinion objected to—) there is disparagement of sense-evidence. Having pondered this, he himself (—not leaving it to a commentator—) explains what was asserted in the fourth aphorism"].

निमित्तत्वमविवेकस्य न दृष्टहानिः ॥ ७४ ॥

An objection met.

Aph. 74.—Non-discrimination is the cause [—not the thing itself—], so that there is no disparagement of sense-evidence, [for "what was asserted before was this, that Non-discrimination was only the *occasion* of Bondage and Liberation in souls, and not that Non-discrimination itself was these two; therefore there is no disparagement of sense-evidence,"—for, though we see that Pain and Pleasure cannot be directly assumed or quitted, yet we also see that causes of them *can* be assumed or quitted. "He next mentions, among the means conducive to Discrimination, Study, which is the essence of them"].

तत्त्वाभ्यासान्नेति नेतीति त्यागाद्विवेकसिद्धिः ॥ ७५ ॥

Means of Discrimination.

Aph. 75.—Discrimination is perfected through abandonment [of everything]—expressed by a "Nay—nay,"—through study of the [twenty-five] Principles, [the student "abandoning, by a 'Nay—nay,' in regard to things unintelligent, ending with Nature, the conceit (that Nature, or any of her products, is Soul). All the others [enumerated in the list of means are only supplemental to Study"].

He states a specialty in regard to the perfecting of Discrimination.

अधिकारिप्रभेदान्न नियमः ॥ ७६ ॥

The means not efficacious everywhere.

Aph. 76.—Through the difference of those competent [to engage in the matter at all], there is no necessity [that each and every one should at once be successful; for "since there is a division, of those competent, into the sluggish, &c., though study be made, there is no certainty that, in this very birth, Discrimination will be accomplished:—such is the meaning. Therefore each one should, by cleverness in study, acquire for himself the *highest* degree of competency:—such is the import"].

बाधितानुवृत्त्या मध्यविवेकतोऽप्युपभोगः ॥ ७७ ॥

Imperfect Discrimination inefficacious.

Aph. 77.—Since what [Pain] has been repelled, returns again, there comes, even from medium [but imperfect] discrimination, experience [which it is desired to get entirely rid of. "But sluggish Discrimination (—lower even than the middling variety—), antecedently to direct intuition, consists only of Hearing, Pondering, and Meditating:—such is the division" of Discrimination].

जीवन्मुक्तश्च ॥ ७८ ॥

Of Liberation during life.

Aph. 78.—And he who living is liberated ["is just in the condition of medium Discrimination." "He adduces evidence for there being some one liberated though still living"].

उपदेश्योपदेष्टृत्वात् तत्सिद्धिः ॥ ७९ ॥

Proof that this may be.

Aph. 79.—It is proved, by the fact of instructed and instructor, ["that there are such as are liberated during life,—by the mention, in the Institutes, on the subject of Liberation, of the relation of preceptor and pupil:—i. e., because it is only one liberated during life who can [really] be an instructor" in this matter].

श्रुतिश्च ॥ ८० ॥

Further proof.

Aph. 80.—And there is scripture ["for there being persons liberated during life"].

इतरथान्धपरम्परा ॥ ८१ ॥

A suggestion repelled.

Aph. 81.—[And not through merely hearing is one qualified to become an instructor,] otherwise [—"we should have a blind handing down" of doctrines which would speedily become corrupted or lost. "But then,—when, through Knowledge, one's works (—which are the cause of mundane existence—) have perished, how can there still be life? To this he replies"].

चक्रभ्रमणवद्धृतशरीरः ॥ ८२ ॥

How life is compatible with Liberation.

Aph. 82.—Possessed of a body [the emancipated sage goes on living],—just like the whirling of a wheel, [—for as "even on the cessation of the action of the potter, the wheel of itself revolves for some time in consequence of the motal inertia resulting from the previous action; so, after knowledge,

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though actions do not arise, yet, through the self-continuant action of antecedent acts, possessing an energizing body, he remains living yet liberated;" and if he did not, but every one who gained true knowledge were to disappear on gaining it, true knowledge would cease to be handed down orally,—and Kapila probably did not contemplate books, or did not think these a secure depository of the doctrine. "But then, since the continuance of experience, &c., is put an end to by that 'Meditation with distinct recognition of the object,' which (—see *Yoga* Aphorisms, B. I. 17—) is the cause of knowledge, how can one retain a body? To this he replies"].

संस्कारलेशतस्तत्सिद्धिः ॥ ८३ ॥

Difficulty of shuffling off this mortal coil.

Aph. 83.—This [retention of a body] is occasioned by the least vestige of impression, ["by even the least access of those impressions of objects which are the causes of having a body." Finally, "he sums up the sense of the declarations of the Institute"].

विवेकान्निःश्रेषदुःखनिवृत्तौ कृतकृत्यता नेतरान्नेतरात् ॥ ८४ ॥

Recapitulation.

Aph. 84.—That which was to be done has been done, when entire cessation of Pain has resulted from Discrimination;—not otherwise—not otherwise; [and "so much for the Third Book,—on Dispassion"].

BOOK IV.

["Now, by means of a collection of narratives, recognised in the Institute, the means of discriminative knowledge are to be displayed:—so, for this purpose, the Fourth Book is commenced."]

राजपुत्रवत् तत्त्वोपदेशात् ॥ १ ॥

Soul set right by hearing the truth.

Aph. 1.—As in the case of the king's son,—from instruction as to the truth, [comes discrimination between Soul and Nature. "The story here is as follows. A certain king's son, in consequence of his being born under the (unlucky) star of the tenth portion (of the twenty-seven portions into which the ecliptic is divided), having been expelled from his city, and reared by a certain forester, remains under the idea that 'I am a forester.' Having learned that he was alive, a certain minister informs him—'Thou art not a forester, thou art a king's son.' Just as he immediately, having abandoned the idea of his being an outcast, betakes himself to his true royal state—saying 'I am a *king*,'—so too it (—the Soul—), in consequence of the instruction of some kind person—to the effect that 'Thou, who didst originate from the First Soul, which manifests itself merely as pure Thought, art thyself a portion thereof,'—having abandoned the idea of being Nature (—or of being anything material or phenomenal—) rests upon its own nature,—saying—'Since I am the son of the Deity, I am myself Deity, and not something mundane different therefrom.'" Next "he exhibits another story, to prove that even women, *Súdras*, &c., may gain the [one desirable] end, through a Bráhman, by hearing the instructions of a Bráhman"].

पिशाचवदन्यार्थोपदेशेऽपि ॥ २ ॥

Even when the instruction is not addressed to the hearer.

Aph. 2.—As in the case of the goblin,—even when the instruction was for the sake of another,—[the chance hearer may be benefited. "Though the instruction in regard to the truth was being delivered, by the divine Krishna, for Arjuna's benefit, knowledge of the distinction (between Soul and Nature) was produced in the case of a goblin standing near (and overhearing the discourse):—and so too it may happen in the case of others"].

आवृत्तिरसकृदुपदेशात् ॥ ३ ॥

Necessity of inculcation.

Aph. 3.—Repetition [is to be made], if not from once instructing [the end be gained. "That is to say,—a reiteration of instruction also is to be made,—because, in the *Chhándogya Upanishad*, and the like, there is mention of Áruṇi and the like as having more than once instructed S'wetaketu and others." Next, "with a view to the removal of desire, he sets forth, with an illustration, the fragility, &c., of Soul's accompaniments"].

पितापुत्रवदुभयोर्दृष्टत्वात् ॥ ४ ॥

Transitoriness of mundane things.

Aph. 4.—As in the case of father and son, since both are seen [—the one to die, and the other to be born. "That is to say,—Discrimination takes place, through dispassion, in consequence of its being inferred in respect of one self also, that there are death and birth, since these are seen in the case of father and son." And "he next explains by illustrative stories, the subservients to the *perfecting* of knowledge in him in whom knowledge has arisen, and who is devoid of passion"].

श्येनवत् सुखदुःखी त्यागवियोगाभ्याम् ॥ ५ ॥

Voluntary distinguished from involuntary abandonment.

Aph. 5.—One experiences pleasure or pain [alternatively] from [voluntary] abandonment or [forcible] separation;—as in the case of a hawk, ["for a hawk, when he has food before him, if he be driven away by any one, is grieved by being separated from the food; but if of his own accord he leaves it, then he is freed from grief"].

अहिनिर्ल्वयनीवत् ॥ ६ ॥

How Soul ought to abandon Nature.

Aph. 6.—As in the case of a snake and its skin: [—"that is to say,—as a snake readily abandons its old skin, from knowing that it ought to be quitted;—just so he who desires liberation should abandon Nature, experienced through a long period, and effete,—when he knows that it ought to be quitted." And "when abandoned, he should not again accept Nature and the rest;—so, in regard to this, he says"].

छिन्नहस्तवद्वा ॥ ७ ॥

Its resumption prohibited.

Aph. 7.—Or as an amputated hand; [—i. e., "as no one takes back again an amputated hand,—just so this (Nature), when abandoned, he should not readmit"].

असाधनानुचिन्तनं बन्धाय भरतवत् ॥ ८ ॥

Duty to be sacrificed to salvation.

Aph. 8.—What is not a means [of liberation] ought not to be thought about, [as this only conduces] to bondage,—as in the case of Bharata, [—for "that which is not an immediate cause of Discrimination, even though it may be a *duty*, still is 'not to be thought about,'—i. e. intention of the mind towards the performance thereof is not to be made;—since it is a cause of Bondage, from its making us forget Discrimination,—'as in the case of Bharata,'—that is to say,—as was the case with the great sage Bharata's cherishing of Dínánátha's young fawn, though this was in accordance with duty"].

बहुभिर्योगे विरोधो रागादिभिः कुमारीशङ्खवत् ॥ ९ ॥

Company to be avoided.

Aph. 9.—Through [association with] many, there is obstruction to concentration through Passion, &c.,—as in the case of a girl's shell-bracelet; [—so "association is not to be made with many,—because, when there is association with many, there is disturbance, through the development of Passion, &c., which destroys concentration,—just as a jingling is produced by the mutual contact of the shells on a girl's wrist"].

॥ द्वाभ्यामपि तथैव ॥ १० ॥

Even that of one.

Aph. 10.—Just so also from [the company of] two [—"there is obstruction to concentration; therefore one ought to abide *alone*"].

निराशः सुखी पिङ्गलावत् ॥ ११ ॥

Blessedness of those that expect nothing.

Aph. 11.—He who is without hope, is happy, just like Pingalá; [—i. e., "having abandoned hope, let a man become possessed of the happiness called contentment,'—'just like Pingalá,—that is to say,—just as the courtesan, called Pingalá, desiring a lover, having found no lover, being despondent, became happy when she had left off hoping." "But then, granting that Pain may cease on the cessation of hope, yet how can there be *happiness* in the absence of causes thereof? It is replied. That natural happiness, resulting from the predominance of Purity in the mind, which remains obscured by hope, of itself resumes its influence on the departure of hope,—just as is the case with the coolness of water which (supposed natural coolness) had been hindered (from manifesting itself) by heat;—there is not in this case any need of *means*. And *this* in reality is what is expressed by the word 'happiness.'" "Since it is an obstructor of Concentration, exertion with a view to experience is not to be made, since this may be effected otherwise,—as he next states"].

॥ अनारम्भेऽपि परगृहे सुखी सर्पवत् ॥ १२ ॥

Exertion needless.

Aph. 12.—[One may be happy] even without exertion, like a serpent —happy in another's house,—["as it has been said,—'The building of a house is painful, and in no way pleasant;—a serpent, having entered the dwelling made by another (e. g., a rat), does find comfort.'" And "from Institutes,—and from preceptors, only the *cream* is to be accepted, since otherwise it may be impossible to concentrate the attention;"—so he next tells us].

बहुशास्त्रगुरूपासनेऽपि सारादानं षट्पदवत् ॥ १३ ॥

A bee-like eclecticism recommended.

Aph. 13.—Though he devote himself to many Institutes and teachers, a taking of the essence [is to be made],—as is the case with the bee,—["as it has been said—'From small Institutes and from great, the intelligent man should take from all quarters the essence,—as the bee does from the flowers.'" "Be the other means what they may, the direct possession of Discrimination is to be effected only by intentness—through maintaining Meditation,—as he next tells us"].

इषुकारवन्नैकचित्तस्य समाधिहानिः ॥ १४ ॥

Intentness on one object.

Aph. 14.—The Meditation is not interrupted of him whose mind is intent on one object,—like the maker of arrows; [—for, "as in the case of the maker of arrows, with his mind intent solely on the making of an arrow, the exclusion of other thoughts was not interrupted even by a king's passing at his side,—so too, of him whose mind is intent on one point, there is in no way an 'interruption of meditation,' i. e., a failure to exclude other thoughts"].

क्षतनियमलङ्घनादानर्थक्यं लोकवत् ॥ १५ ॥

Rules not to be transgressed with impunity.

Aph. 15.—Through transgression of the enjoined rules, there is failure in the aim,—as in the world: [—"whatever rule, for the prac-

tisers of Concentration, has been laid down in the Institutes, if it be transgressed, then the end, viz., the perfecting of knowledge, is not effected;—'as in the world,'—that is to say, just as, in ordinary life, if the enjoined procedures, &c., in regard to a medicine, or the like, be neglected, the effect thereof will not be obtained"].

तद्विस्मरणेऽपि भेकीवत् ॥ १६ ॥

Rules must not be forgotten.

Aph. 16.—Moreover if they [the rules] be forgotten,—as in the case of the female frog,—[the end will be lost. "And the story of the female frog is this. A certain king, having gone to hunt, saw a beautiful damsel in the forest. And she, being solicited in marriage by the king, made this stipulation,—'When water shall be shown to me by thee, then I must depart.' But on one occasion, when wearied with sport, she asked the king—'Where is water?' The king too, forgetting his agreement, showed her the water. Then she, having become the she-frog *Kámarúpiní*, daughter of the king of the frogs, entered the water; and then the king, though he sought her with nets, &c., did not regain her." "He next mentions a story, with reference to the necessity of reflecting on the words of the teacher, as well as hearing them"].

नोपदेशश्रवणेऽपि कृतकृत्यता परामर्शादृते विरोचनवत् ॥ १७ ॥

Reflection necessary as well as hearing.

Aph. 17.—Not even though instruction be heard, is the end gained without reflection,—as in the case of Virochana; [—and "by 'reflection' is meant such consideration as determines the import of the teacher's words. Without this, though the instruction be heard, knowledge of the truth does not necessarily follow;—for it is written that, though hearing the instructions of Prajápati,—Virochana,—out of Indra and Virochana,*—erred through the want of reflection"].

* See *Chhándogya Upanishad.*

दृष्टस्तयोरिन्द्रस्य ॥ १८ ॥

Of this further.

Aph. 18.—Of those two [viz, Indra and Virochana], it [viz., reflection] was seen in the case of Indra, [and not of Virochana, on whom the instruction was therefore thrown away].

प्रणतिब्रह्मचर्योपसर्पणानि कृत्वा सिद्धिर्बहुकालात् तद्वत् ॥ १९ ॥

The process requires time.

Aph. 19.—Having performed reverence, the duties of a student, and attendance, there is success after a long time,—as in *his* case; [—"that is to say, as in the case of Indra, so in the case of another too, only by having exhibited, towards one's preceptor, reverence, the study of the *Vedas*, service, &c., is there 'success,' i. e., the development of truth,—not otherwise"].

न कालनियमो वामदेववत् ॥ २० ॥

The time for the process may embrace successive states of being.

Aph. 20.—There is no determination of the time,—as in the case of Vámadeva, [—i. e., "there is no necessity, as regards the time, that, in the arising of knowledge, it must be, e. g., from *present* causes alone;—'as in the case of Vámadeva,'—that is to say,—as, in consequence of causes pertaining to a previous life, knowledge arose, in the case of Vámadeva, even when in embryo, so may it in the case of another."

"But then,—since it is written that the means of knowledge need be no other than devotion to those [viz., Brahmá, &c.,] who (unlike the Absolute) have Qualities,—knowledge may result from *this*. Why, then, a hard and subtle process of Concentration? To this he replies"].

अध्यस्तरूपोपासनात् पारम्पर्येण यज्ञोपासकानामिव ॥ २१ ॥

Inferior means not altogether unprofitable.

Aph. 21.—Through devotion to something under a superinduced form, [attainment or approach towards perfect knowledge takes place] *by degrees*,—as in the case of those who devote themselves to sacrifices:—[that is to say—"through devotion to the Souls, Brahmá, Vishṇu, S'iva, &c., under the forms superinduced on them, the perfecting of knowledge takes place 'by degrees,'—i. e., by the successive attainment of the world of Brahmá, &c.,—or else through the purification of the Good principle, &c., but not *directly*;—just as is the case with sacrificers"—whose slaughter of animals, requiring to be expiated, throws them back so far, in the road to emancipation. "He tells us, that, moreover, there is no necessity that the successive rise to the world of Brahmá should *perfect* one's knowledge"].

इतरलाभेऽप्यावृत्तिः पञ्चाग्नियोगतो जन्मश्रुतेः ॥ २२ ॥

Scriptural proof that heaven gives not liberation.

Aph. 22.—Moveover, after the attainment of what [—like the world of Brahmá—] is other [than the state of emancipated soul], there is return [to mundane existence]; because it is written [in the 5th *Prapáṭhaka* of the *Chhándogya Upanishad*], "From conjunction with the five fires, there is birth."—&c. He next exhibits an illustration, to the effect that the perfecting of knowledge takes place only in the case of him who is free from passion"].

विरक्तस्य हेयत्वानुपादेयोपादानं हंसक्षीरवत् ॥ २३ ॥

Discrimination illustrated.

Aph. 23.—By him who is free from passion, what is to be left is left, and what is to be taken is taken,—as in the case of the swan and the milk; [—"that is to say,—only by him who is free from passion is there a quitting 'of what is to be left,' i. e.,

of Nature, &c., and a taking 'of what is to be taken,' i. e., of Soul:—as it is only the swan,—and not the crow, or the like,—which, out of milk and water mingled, by means of leaving the unimportant water, takes the valuable milk," as the Hindús insist it does].

लब्धातिशययोगाद्वा तद्वत् ॥ २४ ॥

Benefit of good society.

Aph. 24.—Or through association with one who has obtained excellence, —just as in the case thereof; ["that is to say,—moreover, from association with him by whom 'excellence,' i. e., excellence in knowledge, has been obtained, the aforesaid (discrimination) takes place,—as in the case of the swan. Just as in the case of Alarka, Discrimination manifested itself spontaneously, merely through association with Dattátreya"].

न कामचारित्वं रागोपहते शुकवत् ॥ २५ ॥

Danger of unsuitable society.

Aph. 25.—Not of his own accord should one go near one influenced by desire,—just like the parrot; [—"that is to say, just as the bird called a parrot, by reason of its being exceedingly beautiful, does not (—by going near people—) act in a rash manner, through fear of being imprisoned by those who covet it for its beauty." And next "he states the harm of association with the passionate"].

गुणयोगाद्बद्धः शुकवत् ॥ २६ ॥

Of this further.

Aph. 26.—[Else he may become] bound by conjunction with the cords, —as in the case of the parrot;—[for "in the case of associating with those persons, he may become bound 'by conjunction with the cords,' i. e., by conjunction with their Desire, &c., (—the Qualities, punningly compared to cords—) just 'as in the case of the parrot,'—that is to say, just as the bird called a parrot becomes bound by the cords, i. e., the ropes, of the hunter." So "he determines, by two aphorisms, the means of dispassion"].

न भोगाद्रागशान्तिर्मुनिवत् ॥ २७ ॥

Means of dispassion.

Aph. 27.—Not by enjoyment is desire appeased,—just as in the case of the saint;—["that is to say,—as, in the case of the saint, Saubhari, desire was not appeased by enjoyment, so also in the case of others is it not." And further—].

दोषदर्शनादुभयोः ॥ २८ ॥

Of this further.

Aph. 28.—From seeing the fault of both, [—i. e.,—"only from seeing the fault, e. g., of being changeable, of consisting of pain, &c., 'of both,' i. e., of Nature and her productions, does the assuaging of Desire take place,—just as in the case of the saint. For it is written that Saubhari became indifferent to society, just through seeing the evil of society." And "he tells us that incapacity even to accept instruction attaches to him who is affected by the fault of Desire, &c.].

न मलिनचेतस्युपदेशबीजप्ररोहोऽजवत् ॥ २९ ॥

Agitation excludes instruction.

Aph. 29.—Not in the case of him whose mind is disturbed does the seed of instruction sprout,—as in the case of Aja;—["in him whose mind is rendered impure by Passion, &c., not even does a sprout spring up from that seed of the tree of knowledge which is in the shape of instruction;—'as in the case of Aja,' —that is to say, as not a sprout from the seed of instruction, though offered to him by Vasishṭha, sprang up in the king named Aja, whose mind was disturbed by grief for his wife.

What need of more?—"].

नाभासमात्रमपि मलिनदर्पणवत् ॥ ३० ॥

Of this further.

Aph. 30.—Not even a semblance of this [true knowledge arises in him whose mind is disturbed],—as in the case of a rusty mirror, [—for "even superficial knowledge does not arise, from in-

struction, in one whose mind is impure, through the obstruction caused by its wandering away, e. g., to other objects,—just as an object is not reflected in a foul mirror, through the obstruction caused by the impurities"].

न तज्जस्यापि तद्रूपता पङ्कजवत् ॥ ३१ ॥

Knowledge not necessarily perfect knowledge.

Aph. 31.—Nor, even though sprung therefrom, is that [knowledge necessarily] in accordance with that [instruction, this not having been entirely understood,]—just like the lotus, [that is to say, "just as the lotus, though the seed be of the best, is not in accordance with the seed when the swamp is faulty. The mind of the student is compared to the swamp," in which the lotus-seed was sown. But then,—"since Soul's end is gained by the attainment of supernatural power in the worlds of Brahmá, &c., to what purpose is the production of knowledge, with so much toil, for liberation? To this he replies"].

न भूतियोगेऽपि कृतकृत्यतोपास्यसिद्धिवदुपास्यसिद्धिवत् ॥ ३२ ॥

Heaven not perfect bliss.

Aph. 32.—Not, even on the attainment of glorification, has that been done which was to be done,—as is the case with the perfection of the objects worshipped,—as is the case with the perfection of the objects worshipped,—[for "even though one attain to supernatural power, 'that has not been done which was to be done,'—i. e., the end has not been gained,—because it is attended by the grief of deficiency and excess:—'as is the case with the perfection of the object worshipped,'—that is to say, as, though the possession of perfection (so-called) belongs to 'the objects worshipped,' i. e., to Brahmá, &c., still that has not been done which was to be done,—since it is written that even *these*, while in the sleep of Concentration, &c., still *practice* Concentration (—from fear of losing what they have attained to—):—just in like manner is the case with him who, by the worship of these, has attained to glorification"].

BOOK V.

["The tenets of his Institute are completed. Next is begun a Fifth Book, in order to set aside the crude notions of others in regard to his Institute. Here, in the first place, he disposes of the objection that the Benediction implied by the expression 'Well then,' in the first Aphorism (of Book I.), is purposeless."]

मङ्गलाचरणं शिष्टाचारात् फलदर्शनात् श्रुतितश्चेति ॥ १ ॥

Reasons for a Benedictory opening.

Aph. 1.—The use of a Benediction [is justified] by the practice of the good, by our seeing its fruit, and by scripture. ["The word *iti* is intended to preclude the expectation of any other reasons." "He next repels those who entertain the primâ facie view, that what was asserted in the expression 'Because it is not proved that there is any Lord' (—see B. I. Aph. 92.), is not made out, because (forsooth) His existence is proved by his being the giver of the fruits of works."]

नेश्वराधिष्ठिते फलनिष्पत्तिः कर्मणा तत्सिद्धेः ॥ २ ॥

Needlessness of a Lord.

Aph. 2.—Not from its [—the world's—] being governed by the Lord, is there the effectuation of fruit, for it is by works [—i. e., by merit and demerit—] that this is accomplished,—["by works alone, which are indispensable,"—and if we *do* make the additional and cumbrous supposition of a Lord, He cannot reward a man otherwise than according to his works].

स्वोपकारादधिष्ठानं लोकवत् ॥ ३ ॥

The supposed Lord would be selfish.

Aph. 3.—[If a Lord were governor, then] having intended his own benefit, His government [would be selfish], as is the case [with ordinary governors] in the world.

लौकिकेश्वरवदितरथा ॥ ४ ॥

And therefore not the Lord spoken of.

Aph. 4.—[He must then be] just like a worldly lord, [and] otherwise [than you desire that we should conceive of Him; for "if we agree that the Lord also is benefited, He also must be something mundane,—just like a worldly lord;—because, since his desires are (on that supposition) not (previously) satisfied, he must be liable to grief, &c"].

पारिभाषिको वा ॥ ५ ॥

The difficulty perhaps originates in a mistaken expression.

Aph. 5.—Or ["if whilst there exists also a world, there be a Lord, then, let yours, like ours, be merely"] a technical term ["for that soul which emerged at the commencement of the creation,—since there cannot be an eternal Lordship, because of the contradiction between mundaneness and the having an unobstructed will"].

न रागादृते तत्सिद्धिः प्रतिनियतकारणत्वात् ॥ ६ ॥

Objection to there being a Lord.

Aph. 6.—This [that there is a Lord] cannot be established without [assuming that He is affected by] Passion, because that is the indispensable cause [of all energizing].

तद्योगेऽपि न नित्यमुक्तः ॥ ७ ॥

This objection further.

Aph. 7.—Moreover were that [Passion] conjoined with Him, he could not be eternally free, ["and thus the tenet (of His eternal freedom) must be surrendered."—"Pray (let us ask)—does Lordship arise from the immediate union, with Soul, of the wishes, &c., which we hold to be powers of Nature (—not properties of Soul—) or from an influence through proximity simply,—as in the case of the magnet? Of these he condemns the former alternative"].

प्रधानशक्तियोगाच्चेत् सङ्गापत्तिः ॥ ८ ॥

Objection on one branch of an alternative.

Aph. 8.—If it were from the conjunction of the properties of Nature, it would turn out that there is association, [which Scripture denies of Soul. "In regard to the latter alternative he says"].

सत्तामात्राच्चेत् सर्वैश्वर्यम् ॥ ९ ॥

Objection on the other branch.

Aph. 9.—If it were from the mere existence [of Nature, not in association, but simply in proximity], then Lordship would belong to every one; ["that is to say,—if Thought obtains Lordship merely from proximity, as in the case of the magnet (which becomes affected by the simple proximity of iron), then it is settled, as we quite intend it should be, that all men indifferently, experiencers in this or that (cycle of) creation, (may) have Lordship, because it is just by conjunction with all experiencers that Nature produces Mind, &c.;—therefore your tenet, of there being only one Lord, is overthrown"].

प्रमाणाभावान्न तत्सिद्धिः ॥ १० ॥

Denial that there is any real evidence of a Lord.

Aph. 10.—It is not established [that there is an eternal Lord], because there is no real evidence of it, [—"in the first place, there is not *sense*-evidence, so that only the evidence of inference and of testimony can be offered; and these are inapplicable;" as he proceeds to show].

सम्बन्धाभावान्नानुमानम् ॥ ११ ॥

Denial that it can be established by inference.

Aph. 11.—There is no inferential proof [of there being a Lord], because there is here no case of [invariable] association [between a sign and that which it might betoken;—"and so there is no inferential proof of there being a Lord; because, in such arguments as 'Mind, or the like, has a maker, because it is a product,' the fact of invariable concomitancy is not established, since there is no compulsion" that every product should have had an intelligent maker].

श्रुतिरपि प्रधानकार्यत्वस्य ॥ १२ ॥

Denial that there is scripture for it.

Aph. 12.—Moreover, there is scripture for this [world's] being the product of Nature [—not of a Lord. So, leaving this topic, "he refutes diffusely, by a cluster (of seven aphorisms), the opinion of an opponent in regard to that which was established in (Aph. 20 of) the first section, viz., 'Bondage does not arise from Ignorance (conjoined with Soul)'"].

नाविद्याशक्तियोगो निःसङ्गस्य ॥ १३ ॥

Conjunction in the case of the solitary, were a contradiction.

Aph. 13.—With that which is solitary, there cannot be conjunction of the power of Ignorance, [and "since Soul has no association (with anything whatever) it is plainly impossible for it to be united with the property of Ignorance." "But then (it may be replied,)—what is to be asserted is, that the conjunction of Ignorance is simply through force of Ignorance (which is a negation, or nonentity), and so, since this is no *reality*, there is no *association* occasioned thereby. To this he rejoins"].

तद्योगे तत्सिद्धावन्योऽन्याश्रयत्वम् ॥ १४ ॥

A suggestion repelled.

Aph. 14.—Since the existence of this [alleged *negative* Ignorance] is established [only] on the ground of its [pretended] conjunction, there is a vicious circle, ["i. e., a resting of each on the other alternately, or resting a thing on itself,—in short,—a regressus in infinitum." And "in reply to the suggestion (of the Naiyáyika)—but then, as in the case of seed and sprout, the regressus in infinitum is no objection,—he replies"].

न बीजाङ्कुरवत् सादिसंसारश्रुतेः ॥ १५ ॥

The world has a beginning.

Aph. 15.—It is not as in the case of seed and sprout, for we hear in scripture that the world [—"mundane state of souls, consisting of all undesirable things, Ignorance, &c.,"] *has* a begin-

ning; [—"because we hear in scripture that these cease to exist at the dissolution of all things, in profound sleep, &c." "But then (you Vedántins will say—), according to us Ignorance is technically so termed, and is not, e.g., in the shape, specified by the *Yoga*, of supposing what is not soul to be soul; and so, just like your 'Nature,' since this (Ignorance) of ours has an unbroken eternity, though it be lodged in Soul, there is no detriment to the solitariness thereof:—in regard to this doubt, having deliberated on this artificial sense of the word 'Ignorance,' he objects to it"].

विद्यातोऽन्यत्वे ब्रह्मबाधप्रसङ्गः ॥ १६ ॥

Soul and knowledge not identical.

Aph. 16.—["If the meaning of the word 'Ignorance' *(avidyá)* be only 'otherness than knowledge,'] then *Brahma*—["soul itself"]—would be found to be excluded, [—"to perish,—through his being annihilable by knowledge,"]—since *He* is other than knowledge.

बाधे नैष्फल्यम् ॥ १७ ॥

Knowledge, not excluding ignorance, were resultless.

Aph. 17.—Were there not exclusion ["of the existence by ignorance by knowledge,] then there would be resultlessness, [—"because of its not debarring Ignorance," which is the only result competent to knowledge. "He censures the other alternative," that knowledge *might* exclude Soul].

विद्याबाध्यत्वे जगतोऽप्येवम् ॥ १८ ॥

On the Vedánta theory the world ought to vanish.

Aph. 18.—If [on the other hand] it [Ignorance] meant the being excludable by Knowledge, it would be predicable in like manner of the world also, [—for, "if, on the other hand, the being excludable by Knowledge, in the case of the soul, be what is meant by the being Ignorance, in that case 'the world,' the whole mundane system, Nature, Mind, &c., would also in like manner be Ignorance; and so, the whole system of things being Ignorance, since the Ignorance would be annihilated by

one man's knowledge, the world should become invisible to others also"].

तद्रूपत्वे सादित्वम् ॥ १९ ॥

The Vedánta theory self-contradictory.

Aph. 19.—If it [Ignorance] were of *that* nature [i. e., "suppose it to be the case that to be Ignorance means simply the being excludable by Knowledge, still] it would have had a commencement, ["for such a thing could not have had an *eternal* existence in souls (—as held by Vedántins, see Aph. 15—), but must have had a commencement; for it is proved by such texts as "Consisting of knowledge alone," &c., that at the time of the universal dissolution, &c., the soul consists of Knowledge alone. Therefore it is settled that there is no other Ignorance than that stated in the Yoga system, and this is a property of the understanding, not of the soul." Now, "by a cluster of (six) aphorisms he clears up the primâ facie view of an opponent in regard to that which was stated in the same Book (—Book V., Aph. 2—), that Nature's energizing is due to desert"].

न धर्मापलापः प्रकृतिकार्यवैचित्र्यात् ॥ २० ॥

Desert is undeniable.

Aph. 20.—There is no denying desert, ["on the ground of its being no object of sense, because it is inferred,"] because of the diversity in the operations of Nature [—accommodating one person and inconveniencing another,—which would otherwise be unaccounted for].

श्रुतिलिङ्गादिभिस्तत्सिद्धिः ॥ २१ ॥

Proofs of this.

Aph. 21.—It [the existence of Desert] is established by scripture, by tokens, &c.

न नियमः प्रमाणान्तरावकाशात् ॥ २२ ॥

Sense-evidence not the only kind of evidence.

Aph. 22.—There is here no necessity ["that a thing of which there is

no sense-evidence must be non-existent,"—] because there is room for *other* proofs.

उभयचाप्येवम् ॥ २३ ॥

Demerit as certain as merit.

Aph. 23.—It is thus, moreover, in both cases,—["the evidence applies to Demerit just as it does to Merit"].

अर्थात् सिद्धिश्चेत् समानमुभयोः ॥ २४ ॥

The proof of each the same.

Aph. 24.—If the proof be from an argument ["in this shape, viz., that otherwise an injunction would be unaccounted for; but there is none such in respect of *demerit*,—so how can scriptural or logical argument be extended to *demerit?* If any one says this, it is not so, since the token exists"] alike in respect of both, ["i. e., of both merit and demerit:—because *prohibitory* injunctions, such as 'He should not approach another's wife,' betoken demerit"].

अन्तःकरणधर्मत्वं धर्मादीनाम् ॥ २५ ॥

Merit, &c., inhere in what.

Aph. 25.—It is of the internal organ [—not of *soul*—] that Merit, &c., ["the '&c.,' including all those that are stated in the *Vais'eshika* Institute as peculiar qualities of soul,"] are the properties.

[To the objection that the existence of an internal organ, as well as of the Qualities from which such might arise, is debarred by scripture, he replies.]—

गुणादीनां च नात्यन्तबाधः ॥ २६ ॥

The Qualities exist, though not in soul.

Aph. 26.—And the existence of the Qualities [—"Purity, &c., and their properties, happiness, &c., and their products also, Mind, &c.,"] is not absolutely debarred [by scripture. "They are not to be denied as existences; but it is to be altogether denied that they belong to soul, just as we deny that heat

(—in red hot iron—) belongs to the iron." "In regard to the doubt,—why, again, may we not deny them an essence, as we do to what is meant by the words *sleep, wish,* &c.?—he says."]

पञ्चावयवयोगात् सुखसंवित्तिः ॥ २७ ॥

The above thesis argued.

Aph. 27.—By a conjunction of the five members [of an argumentative statement], we discern that Happiness exists:—[and "here, in order to get a particular subject of his assertion, he takes *happiness* alone, one portion of the matter in dispute, as a representative of the entire matter:—but the better reading is, 'we discern that Happiness, *&c.*, exist.' The five members of an argumentative statement are the Proposition, Reason, Example, Synthesis (of the two premises), and Conclusion; and he means that by the 'conjunction,' i. e., the combination, of these, all things, happiness, &c., are proved to exist. And the employment (of the argument) is this:—

'Pleasure is real;—

Because it produces motion in something;—

Whatever produces motion in anything is real,—as are sentient beings;

And pleasure produces motion in things, as in horripilation, &c.;

Therefore it is real."

"The *Chárváka* next doubts whether there be any evidence other than sense-evidence, since (he contends) there is no truth in the assertion (of an inductive conclusion) that such and such is pervaded by such and such, &c."].

न सकृद्ग्रहणात् सम्बन्धसिद्धिः ॥ २८ ॥

The validity of inference questioned.

Aph. 28.—Not from *once* apprehending [concomitance of a supposed token and thing betokened], is a connection, [i. e., a pervadedness or invariable attendedness of the token by the betokened] established;—["and *frequency* (of the same apprehension)

follows (the rule of the single apprehension, just as a thousand times nothing amounts to nothing);—therefore (argues the sceptic) since the apprehending of an invariable attendedness is impossible, nothing can be established by *Inference*. This he clears up"].

नियतधर्मसाहित्यमुभयोरेकतरस्य वा व्याप्तिः ॥ २९ ॥

This point cleared up.

Aph. 29.—Pervadedness is a constant consociation of characters, in the case of both, or of one of them;—["'Consociation of characters,' i. e., consociation in the fact of being characters (or properties of something):—in short concomitancy. And so we mean, that, that concomitancy is 'pervadedness,' (furnishing solid ground for inference) which is absolutely non-errant, whether in the case of both, predicate and reason, or in the case of the reason only. 'Of both' is mentioned with reference to the case of 'equal pervadedness' (—e. g., every equilateral triangle is equiangular, and conversely every equiangular triangle is equilateral). And the invariableness may be apprehended through an appropriate confutation (or reductio ad absurdum of the denial of it); so that there is no impossibility in apprehending 'pervadedness'" and of inferring on the strength of it],

न तत्त्वान्तरं वस्तुकल्पनाप्रसक्तेः ॥ ३० ॥

Pervadedness not an additional principle.

Aph. 30.—It [Pervadedness] is not [as some think,—see Aph. 31]—an additional principle [over and above the twenty-five, B. I. Aph. 61,] for it is unsuitable to postulate entities ["præter rationem"].

निजशक्त्युद्भवमित्याचार्याः ॥ ३१ ॥

A heterodox opinion regarding 'Pervadedness.'

Aph. 31.—But [certain] doctors say that it [Pervadedness] is [another principle,—in addition to the twenty-five—], resulting from the power of the thing itself. [These "other teachers assert

that 'Pervadedness' is positively a separate principle, in the shape of a species of power generated by the native power of the 'pervaded.' But (they continue) 'Pervadedness' is not simply a power of the (pervaded) thing itself,—else it would exist wherever the thing is, (—which 'pervadedness does *not* do,) for even smoke, when it has gone to another place [than the point of its origination], is not attended by fire. And, by going into another place, that power is put an end to; therefore (—contend these teachers—) there is no over-extension in the above-stated definition;—for, according to our doctrine, the smoke (which betokens fire) is to be specialized as that which is at the instant of origination."]

आधेयशक्तियोग इति पञ्चशिखः ॥३२॥

Opinion of the Pancha-s'ikha.

Aph. 32.—The Panchas'ikha says that it ('Pervadedness') is the possession of the power of the sustained:—[for, says the Pancha-s'ikha, "*pervadingness* is the power which consists in being the *sustainer*, and 'Pervadedness' is the having the power which consists in being the sustained,—for Intellect and the rest are treated as being pervaded (or invariably attended) by Nature, &c.,"—and this just means that each product in succession is *sustained* by what preceded it in the series. "But then, why need a 'power of the sustained' be postulated?—let 'Pervadedness' be simply an essential power of the *thing* pervaded. To this the Panchas'ikha replies"].

न स्वरूपशक्तिर्नियमः पुनर्वादप्रसक्तेः ॥३३॥

The Panchas'ikha's reply to an objection.

Aph. 33.—The relation is not an essential power, for we should have [in that case] a tautology, ["because, that is to say, just as there is no difference between 'water-jar' and 'jar for water,' so also there is none in the case of 'Intellect' and 'what is Pervaded'" by Nature, of which Intellect consists. And "he himself explains the 'Tautology'"].

विशेषणानर्थक्यप्रसक्तेः ॥ ३४ ॥

The reason why.

Aph. 34.—Because we should find the distinction unmeaning, [as Intellect does not differ from Nature at all except as does the sustained from the sustainer. "He (the Panchas'ikha) mentions another objection"].

पक्षवादिष्वनुपपत्तेश्च ॥ ३५ ॥

A further reason.

Aph. 35.—And because it [pervadedness] would not be reconcileable in buds, &c.,—["for buds, &c., are invariably attended (at their origination) by trees, &c.; but this cannot be called simply an essential power in the bud, because, since the essential power (—that which belongs to the bud of *being* a bud—) does not depart even in the case of an amputated bud, we should even then find it attended (by the tree which, however, no longer accompanies it). But the power (see Aph. 32, which consists in having the character) of the 'sustained,' is destroyed at the moment of amputation, so that there is no 'Pervadedness' *then*,"—"But then what?—the Panchasikha says that 'Pervadedness' is not a result of any *essential* power. Then, since smoke is not *sustained* by fire (—see Aph. 32—where he contends that 'sustainedness' is what really expresses *pervasion*—), it would turn out that it (viz., smoke) is *not* (as token and betokened) *accompanied* by fire. So, with reference to this, he says"].

आधेयशक्तिसिद्धौ निजशक्तियोगः समानन्यायात् ॥ ३६ ॥

Reply, that this would prove too much.

Aph. 36.—Were it [thus] settled that it is a power of the 'sustained,' then by the like argument, its dependence on an essential power, as pretended by the heterodox doctors referred to in Aph. 31, might be proved also,—and thus the argument

proves nothing as it proves too much. "It was with a view to substantiating what was stated (in Aph. 27), viz., 'The Qualities, and the rest, are established (as realities) by the employment of the five-membered (form of argumentative exposition),' that he has repelled, by an exposition of 'Pervadedness,' the objection to Inference as evidence (—or as a means of attaining right notions). Now, in order to establish the fact that *words*, of which the five-membered (exposition) consists, are generators of knowledge, the objection of others to a *word's* being a means of right knowledge, in the shape of (the objection of) its being inadequate, is disposed of, by means of an exposition of the powers, &c., of words"].

वाच्यवाचकभावः सम्बन्धः शब्दार्थयोः ॥ ३७ ॥

Sound and sense.

Aph. 37.—The connection between word and meaning is the relation of expresser and expressed. ["To the 'meaning' belongs the power termed expressibleness,—to the 'word' the power termed expression;—simply this is their 'connection,'—their inter-relation as it were. From one's knowing this (connection between a given word and meaning), the meaning is suggested (or raised in the mind) by the word."]

त्रिभिः सम्बन्धसिद्धिः ॥ ३८ ॥

Sense of words how learnt.

Aph. 38.—The connection [between a word and its sense] is determined by three [means,—"by means of these three, viz., information from one competent (to tell us the meaning), the usage of the old man (whose orders to his sons we hear, and then observe what actions ensue in consequence,—see the *Sáhitya Darpaṇa*, Aph. 11—), and application to the same thimg which has a familiar name,"—whence we gather the sense of the less familiar synonym].

न कार्ये नियम उभयथा दर्शनात् ॥ ३९ ॥

Imperatives and predications.

Aph. 39.—There is no restriction ["no necessity that this apprehension

of the meaning of a word, should be restricted"] to what is to be done—["should occur only in the case of something (directed) to be done,"]—because we see it both ways, [i. e., "in (the secular life and dealings of) the world, we see the usage of the old man, &c., in regard to what is *not* to be done (—being something already extant—) also, as well as in regard to what is to be done"].

लोके व्युत्पन्नस्य वेदार्थप्रतीतिः ॥ ४० ॥

Scriptural and secular sense of words the same.

Aph. 40.—He who is accomplished in the secular [connection of words with meanings] can understand the sense of the Veda.

न त्रिभिरपौरुषेयत्वाद्वेदस्य तदर्थस्यातीन्द्रियत्वात् ॥ ४१ ॥

A doubt.

Aph. 41.—Not by the three [means mentioned in Aph. 38, objects some one, can the sense of the Veda be gathered], because the Veda is superhuman, and what it means transcends the senses.

न यज्ञादेः स्वरूपतो धर्मत्वं वैशिष्ट्यात् ॥ ४२ ॥

This cleared up.

Aph. 42.—Not so, [what is meant by the Veda is not something transcending the senses],—because sacrificings, &c., are in themselves merit, pre-eminently; ["and sacrificings, &c., since they imply wishings, &c., (of which we are perfectly conscious,) are not something transcending intuition. But the nature of *merit* (which the objector alleges to transcend intuition) does not belong to something mysterious that resides in sacrificings, &c., whence what is enjoined in scripture need be beyond intuition." And "he repels also what has been asserted, that, inasmuch as it (the Veda) is superhuman, there can be no information from any competent person" in regard to its import].

निजशक्तिर्व्युत्पत्त्या व्यवच्छिद्यते ॥ ४३ ॥

Knowledge of the Veda traditional.

Aph. 43.—The natural force [of the terms in the Veda] is ascertained through the conversancy [therewith of those who successively transmit the knowledge. "But still, how can there be apprehension of the sense of scriptural terms in the case of Gods, fruits (of actions), &c., which transcend sense? To this he replies"].

योग्यायोग्येषु प्रतीतिजनकत्वात् तत्सिद्धिः ॥ ४४ ॥

Intelligibility of the Veda undeniable.

Aph. 44.—This really takes place, because they [viz., the words] give rise to knowledge both in the case of things adapted [to sense] and things not adapted.

न नित्यत्वं वेदानां कार्यत्वश्रुतेः ॥ ४५ ॥

Eternity of the Veda denied.

Aph. 45.—The Veda is not from eternity, for there is scripture for its being a production.

न पौरुषेयत्वं तत्कर्तुः पुरुषस्याभावात् ॥ ४६ ॥

The Lord not the author.

Aph. 46.—They [the Vedas] are not the work of [the Supreme] Man, because there is no such thing as the [Supreme] Man, [whom you allude to as being possibly] their maker. ["Supply 'because we deny that there is a *Lord.*'" And "adverting to the anticipation that there may be some other author, he says."]

मुक्तामुक्तयोरयोग्यत्वात् ॥ ४७ ॥

Who are not authors of the Veda.

Aph. 47.—Since both the liberated is unsuited [to the work, by his indifference], and the unliberated [by his want of power, neither of these can be author of the Vedas. "Then in that case, since they are not the work of (the Supreme) Man, it follows that they are eternal. To this he replies"].

नापौरुषेयत्वान्नित्यत्वमङ्कुरादिवत् ॥ ४८ ॥

An illustration.

Aph. 48.—As in the case of sprouts, &c., their eternity does not follow from their not being the work of [any Supreme] Man. ["But then, since sprouts, &c., also, just like jars, &c., are productions, we must infer that they are the work of (the Supreme) Man. To this he replies."]

तेषामपि तद्योगे दृष्टबाधादिप्रसक्तिः ॥ ४९ ॥

Plants denied to be works.

Aph. 49.—Were this the case with these also, [viz., that vegetables are works], we should find a contradiction to experience, &c., [for "it is seen in the world, as an invariable fact, that whatever is the work of Man is produced by a *body*. This would be debarred, &c., were the case as you contend,"—for we see no *embodied* Supreme Man, to whose handiwork the sprouts of the earth could be referred. "But then, since they were uttered by the Primal Man, the Vedas moreover are really the work of (the Supreme) Man:—to this he replies"].

यस्मिन्नदृष्टेऽपि कृतबुद्धिरुपजायते तत्पौरुषेयम् ॥ ५० ॥

Only what is voluntary is a work.

Aph. 50.—That [only] is Man's work, in respect of which, even be it something invisible, an effort of understanding takes place, [i. e., a consciousness that Thought preceded." "Thus it has been remarked that a thing is not Man's work merely though its having been uttered by Man:—for no one speaks of the respiration during profound sleep as being Man's work (or voluntary act). But what need to speak of antecedence of Understanding? The Vedas, just like an expiration, proceed of themselves from the Self-existent, through the force of fate, unpreceded by thought. Therefore they are not (a Supreme) Man's work." "But then, in that case, since they are not preceded by a correct knowledge of the sense of the sentences, like the speech of a parrot the Vedas also can convey no right knowledge. To this he replies"].

निजशक्त्यभिव्यक्तेः स्वतः प्रामाण्यम् ॥ ५१ ॥

The Vedas their own evidence.

Aph. 51.—They are self-evidently conveyers of right knowledge, from the patentness of their own power [to instruct rightly. "The authoritativeness of the whole of the Vedas is established, not by such a thing as its being based on the accurate knowledge of the enouncer, but quite spontaneously;—because—as for its 'own,' i. e., natural, power of generating right knowledge, —*thereof* we perceive the manifestation in the invocations (which produce the result promised), and in the medical scripture (—the following of which leads to cures—), &c. And so there is the aphorism of the *Nyáya* (B. II. 68),—'And the fact of its being a cause of right knowledge, like the invocations and the medical scripture,' &c." "In regard to the proposition (laid down in Aph. 26, viz.,) 'And the existence of the Qualities is not absolutely debarred,' there was alleged, and expounded (under Aph. 27) syllogistically, one argument, —viz., by the establishing the existence of Happiness, &c. Now he states another argument in respect of that" same proposition].

नासतः ख्यानं नृशृङ्गवत् ॥ ५२ ॥

Cognition is evidence of existence.

Aph. 52.—There is no Cognition of the non-existent,—such as a man's horn; [so that not only is the existence of pleasure, &c., proved by the reasoning (under Aph. 27), it is proved also by mere consciousness. Of pleasure, &c., were they absolutely *nonentities*, even the *consciousness* could not be accounted for; —because there is no cognizing of a man's horn, and the like," which have no existence at all. "But then, (interposes the Naiyáyika,) if such be the case, let the Qualities, &c., be absolutely *real;* and then, in the expression 'not *absolutely* debarred' (—in Aph. 26—), the word 'absolutely' is (superfluous, and hence) unmeaning. To this he replies"].

न सतो बाधदर्शनात् ॥ ५३ ॥

The Qualities, &c., not absolutely real.

Aph. 53.—It is not of the *real* [that there is here cognizance], because exclusion *is* seen [of the Qualities,—"for we see that they are excluded (—and not admitted to exist—) at the time of destruction (of the mundane system), &c." "But then, even on that showing (interposes the Vedantin, jumping at the admission—),—let the world be different both from 'real,' and 'unreal,' in that case also the denial (in Aph. 26) of its being absolutely unreal is quite justifiable,"—and, moreover, in strict accordance with Vedantic doctrine. To this he replies].

नानिर्वचनीयस्य तद्भावात् ॥ ५४ ॥

A Vedantic advance rejected.

Aph. 54.—It is not of what cannot be [intelligibly] expressed [that there is cognizance]—because there exists no such thing; [—"and there takes place, moreover, no cognizance of such a thing as is not to be expressed as either 'existing' or 'not existing;' 'because there exists no such thing,'—i. e., because nothing is known other than what exists or what does not exist:—such is the meaning. The import is,—because it is proper to form suppositions only in accordance with what is seen." "But what then!—on that showing, do you really approve of (the Nyáya notion of) 'cognizing otherwise' (—or our fancying that nature to belong to one—which belongs to another) ? He replies—Nay"].

नान्यथाख्यातिः स्ववचोव्याघातात् ॥ ५५ ॥

A Nyáya view rejected.

Aph. 55.—There is no such thing as cognizing otherwise [or cognizing that as belonging to one which belongs to another],—because your proposition is self-destructive. ["The meaning is, that this also is not proper to be said, viz., that one thing appears under the character of another thing (—e. g., a rope under the character of a serpent, for which it may be mistaken in the dusk),—'because your proposition is self-destructive.' Of

another nature (e. g., snakehood), in a different thing (e. g., a rope), *equivalence to a man's horn* is (what is virtually) expressed by the word 'otherwise' (—than the truth,—both a man's horn and the presence of snakehood in a rope mistaken for a snake being alike otherwise than real);—and (yet) its *cognition* (thus) *otherwise* is asserted (—as if *that* could be cognized which is equivalent to what can *not* be cognized—)! Hence your proposition is self-destructive;—for even those who contend for 'cognizing otherwise' (as one mode of cognition) declare that the cognition of what *does not exist* is impossible." Now, "expounding what he had said above, (in Aph. 26), 'not absolutely debarred,' he sums up his doctrine."]

सदसत्ख्यातिर्बाधाबाधात् ॥ ५६ ॥

Summing up.

Aph. 56.—They [the 'Qualities' are cognized rightly and wrongly, through their being denied and not denied [appropriately or otherwise. "There is *non-denial* as far as regards their existing at all,—because all things (—and things are made up of the 'Qualities'—) are eternal; but there is denial *relatively*, in Soul, of all things,—just as is the case with the redness, &c., in webs, &c.," which may have no redness without its following that redness altogether and everywhere is nonexistent. "This investigation is concluded. Now the consideration of Words, having incidentally presented itself in this connection, is set forth at the end of it"].

प्रतीत्यप्रतीतिभ्यां न स्फोटात्मकः शब्दः ॥ ५७ ॥

The Yoga theory of speech rejected.

Aph. 57.—A word does not consist of [what the *Yogas* call] the "expresser" *(sphoṭa)*, by reason both of cognizance [—which would disprove the existence of such imaginary thing—], and non-cognizance [—which would in like manner disprove it. "It is held by the *Yogas* that there exists, in distinction from the several letters, an indivisible unit, the word,—such as 'jar,' &c.,—(which they call) the 'expression;' just as there is a jar, or the like, possessing parts, which is something else

than the parts, the body, neck, &c.;—and that particular sound, termed a word, is called the 'expresser,' because of its making apparent the meaning:—such a word (—we *Sánkhyas* assert in opposition to the *Yogas*—) is without evidence (of its existence). Why?—'by reason both of cognizance and of non-cognizance' (—as thus);—Pray is that word (which you choose to call the 'expression'—) cognized or not? On the former alternative, what need of that idle thing (—the supposed, 'expression?'—For)—by what collection of letters, distinguished by a particular succession, this ('expression') is manifested, let *that* be what acquaints us with the meaning. But on the latter alternative (viz., that it is *not* cognized), the power of acquainting us with a meaning does not belong to an 'expression, which is *not* cognized. Therefore the hypothesis of an 'expresser' is useless." "The eternity of the Vedas was contradicted before (—under Aph. 45—):—now he contradicts also the eternity of *letters*."]

न शब्दनित्यत्वं कार्यताप्रतीतेः ॥ ५८ ॥

The eternity of letters denied.

Aph. 58.—Sound is not eternal, because we perceive it to be made:—[so —"it is not proper to say (as the *Mimánsakas* say) that letters are eternal, on the strength of our recognizing, e. g., that 'This is that same G;' for they are proved to be non-eternal, by the cognition, e. g., that '(the sound of) G has been produced:'—such is the meaning. And the *recognition* has reference to the *homogeneousness* with that (one which had been previously heard):—for, otherwise, it would turn out that a *jar*, and the like, is eternal, inasmuch as it is *recognised*"].

He ponders a doubt.

पूर्वसिद्धसत्त्वस्याभिव्यक्तिर्दीपेनेव घटस्य ॥ ५९ ॥

A doubt.

Aph. 59.—[But then, some one may say,] there is [in the case of sounds] the manifestation of something whose existence was previously settled,—as [the manifestation] of a [pre-existent] jar by a

lamp; [and so "of Sound, whose existence was previously a fact, the manifestation—through noise, &c.,—*that* alone is the object in the cognition of its *production* (—which you speak of in Aph. 58).—He repels this"].

सत्कार्यसिद्धान्तश्चेत् सिद्धसाधनम् ॥ ६० ॥

The doubt disposed of.

Aph. 60.—If the dogma of products being real [is accepted by you], then this is a proving of the already proved, [—for "if you say that 'manifestation' means the taking of a present condition by means of rejecting an un-arrived (or future) condition, then this is our dogma of the reality of products (—B. I., 113); and *such* an eternity belongs to *all* products (—not specially to *Sound*—), so that you are proving the already proved (or conceded); such is the meaning. And if, 'manifestation' is asserted to be just in the shape of the cognition of what is presently real, then we should find (—on your theory—) that jars, &c., also are eternal; because it would be proper (on that theory—) that the object in the perception of production, by the operation of the causes (—the potter, &c.—), should be that of *knowledge* only," and just as the jar is *shown* by the lamp, not made by it, so the jar must be only *shown* by the potter. Now "an objection, not previously mentioned, is to be adduced; therefore the refutation of the non-duality of Soul is recommenced"—having been already handled under B. I., 149].

नाद्वैतमात्मनो लिङ्गात् तद्भेदप्रतीतेः ॥ ६१ ॥

Non-duality of Soul denied on grounds of Inference.

Aph. 61.—Non-duality of Soul is not,—for its distinctions are cognised through signs, [—"by the sign that *one* quits Nature (or escapes from the mundane condition), while another does not quit it, &c." "But in regard to the non-distinction, between Soul and not-Soul, asserted in the texts 'All this is Soul only,' 'All this is Brahm only,' he tells us how there is even sense-evidence destructive of this" allegation that there is no duality at all].

नानात्मनापि प्रत्यक्षबाधात् ॥ ६२ ॥

Non-duality denied on grounds of Sense.

Aph. 62.—Moreover, there is not [non-difference of Soul] from not-Soul, because this is disproved by sense-evidence, [—"because, if Soul were not other than the whole perceptible, it would also not be different from a jar and a web,—since the jar, e. g., would not be other than the web, which (by hypothesis) is not other than the Soul:—and *this* is excluded by sense-evidence, which constrains us to apprehend a distinction" between a jar and a web].

नोभाभ्यां तेनैव ॥ ६३ ॥

The reasons combined.

Aph. 63.—Not between both [—Soul and not-Soul,—is there non-difference],—for that same [couple of reasons given in Aphs. 61 and 62. "But then, in that case, what is the drift of such texts as, 'All this is Soul alone?' To this he replies"].

अन्यपरत्वमविवेकानां तत्र ॥ ६४ ॥

Scripture accommodates itself to human frailty of understanding.

Aph. 64.—There it is for the sake of something else, in respect of the undiscriminating, [—"i. e., the observation is (designed to be) provocative of meditation. For in the secular world, through want of discrimination, body and the embodied, the experienced and the experiencer, are regarded as indifferent,"—and Scripture humours the worldling's delusion, with a view to eventually getting him out of it. "He declares that, according to the asserters of (there being nothing existent but) a Single Soul, there could be no material cause of the world"].

नात्माविद्या नोभयं जगदुपादानकारणं निःसङ्गत्वात् ॥ ६५ ॥

The Vedánta system supplies no material for the world.

Aph. 65.—Neither Soul, nor Ignorance, nor both, can be the material cause of the world,—because of the solitariness [of Soul. For "the soul alone, or Ignorance

lodged in the soul, or both together—like a pair of jar-halves (conjoined in the formation of a jar)—, cannot be the material of the world,—'because of the *solitariness* of the soul. For things undergo alteration only through that particular conjunction which is called 'association;'—hence the (ever) solitary soul, without a second, since it is not associated, cannot serve as a material cause:—nor can it do so by means of (association with) Ignorance either, because the conjunction of Ignorance has been already excluded by the fact of *solitariness*. Moreover, that the two together should be the material is impossible, even as it is that either severally should be the material, just 'because of the *solitariness*;'—such is the meaning. And if you choose that Ignorance shall subsist as a substance located in the soul, as the air in the heavens, then there is an abandonment of the non-duality" which you Vedántins contend for. "He himself (at B. I., 145) decided that the soul consists of light (or knowledge). In regard to this he repels the primâ facie view,—founded on the text 'Brahm is reality, knowledge, and joy,'—that the essence of the soul is *joy* also"].

नैकस्यानन्दचिद्रूपत्वे द्वयोर्भेदात् ॥ ६६ ॥

Soul not joy and knowledge both.

Aph. 66.—The two natures, joy and knowledge, do not belong to *one*,—because the two are different, [—"a single subject has not the nature both of joy and of intelligence,—because, since pleasure is not experienced at the time of knowing pain, pleasure and knowledge are different." "But then, in that case, what becomes of the text, that it (Soul) consists of joy? To this he replies"].

दुःखनिवृत्तेर्गौणः ॥ ६७ ॥

A Vedánta term explained away.

Aph. 67.—Metaphorical [is the word joy, in the sense] of the cessation of pain, [—for "the word 'joy,' in the scriptural expression which means really the cessation of pain, is metaphorical. This is stated in the maxim 'Pleasure is the departure of both

pain and pleasure.'" And "he states the cause of this metaphorical employment"].

विमुक्तिप्रशंसा मन्दानाम् ॥ ६८ ॥

Why the term was used in a sense not literal.

Aph. 68.—It is [as] a *laudation* of emancipation, for the sake of the dull, [that the scripture lauds, as if it were *joy*, the emancipation, consisting in the cessation of pain, which (cessation) is the essence of the soul;"—for the soul is such joy as consists in the absence of pain. Next, "in order to justify perfectly the demonstration already given (—in B. III., 14, 15, &c.—) of the internal organ, he repels the primâ facie view that the Mind is all-pervading"].

न व्यापकत्वं मनसः करणत्वादिन्द्रियत्वाद्वा ॥ ६९ ॥

The Mind not all-pervading.

Aph. 69.—The Mind [—"meaning the totality of the internal instruments,"—] is not all-pervading,—for it is an instrument, ["as a saw, or the like, is,"] and because it is moreover an *organ*.

सक्रियत्वाद्गतिश्रुतेः ॥ ७० ॥

Proof of this.

Aph. 70.—[The Mind is not all-pervading], for it is moveable,—since there is scripture regarding the motion; [—"that is to say,—since, inasmuch as there is scripture regarding the *going* of the Soul (—which, being all-pervading, cannot *go*—) into another world, it is settled that it is its adjunct, the internal organ, that is moveable, and so it cannot be all-pervading. "In order to prove that it is a product, he repels also the opinion that the Mind is without parts"].

न निर्भागत्वं तद्योगाद्घटवत् ॥ ७१ ॥

The Mind has parts.

Aph. 71.—Like a jar, it [the Mind] is not without parts, because it comes in contact therewith [i. e., with several Senses simultaneously. "The word 'therewith' refers to 'organ,' which occurs in a preceding aphorism (69). The Mind is not without parts,

because it comes in contact simultaneously with several sense-organs; but, like a jar, it is of medium size (—neither infinite nor atomic—), and consists of parts." "And it is to be understood that the internal organ when in the state of a *cause* (and not modified and expanded, e. g., into knowledge, which is its product—) *is* indeed atomic."]

प्रकृतिपुरुषयोरन्यत् सर्वमनित्यम् ॥ ७२ ॥

Eternity belongs to what.

Aph. 72.—Everything except Nature and Soul is uneternal.

न भागलाभो भोगिनो निर्भागत्वश्रुतेः ॥ ७३ ॥

Soul and Nature not made up of parts.

Aph. 73.—No parts [from the presence of which in the discerptible one might infer destructibility] are found in the Experiencer,—for there is scripture for its being without parts, ["for there are such texts as 'without parts, motionless, quiescent, unobjectionable, passionless.'" "It has been stated that Emancipation is the cessation of pain. In order to corroborate this, he repels the opinions of others in regard to Emancipation"].

नानन्दाभिव्यक्तिर्मुक्तिर्निर्धर्मत्वात् ॥ ७४ ॥

A view of Emancipation disputed.

Aph. 74.—Emancipation is not a development of joy, because there are no *properties* [in Soul "in the shape of joy"].

न विशेषगुणोच्छित्तिस्तद्वत् ॥ ७५ ॥

Second view disputed.

Aph. 75.—Nor, in like manner, is it the excision of special qualities ["because there are *no* properties" in Soul].

न विशेषगतिर्निष्क्रियस्य ॥ ७६ ॥

A third view disputed.

Aph. 76.—Nor [is Emancipation] any particular going of that [Soul "to the world of Brahma,"] which is motionless [and therefore does not *go*].

नाकारोपरागोच्छित्तिः क्षणिकत्वादिदोषात् ॥ ७७ ॥

A fourth view disputed.

Aph. 77.—Nor is it [Emancipation] the removal of the influence of [intellectual] forms,—because there is the objection that *this* would be momentary, &c. [For, "the opinion of the Nihilist, that the Soul consists of momentary knowledge, that Bondage is the modifying thereof by objects, and that emancipation is the destruction of the influence thereof called Memory,—is inadmissible, because through the fault of *momentariness*, &c., such emancipation (as merely momentary like all else,) is not the Soul's aim."]

न सर्वोच्छित्तिरपुरुषार्थत्वादिदोषात् ॥ ७८ ॥

A fifth view disputed.

Aph. 78.—Nor is it [Emancipation] destruction of all, for this has among other things the fault of *not* being the Soul's aim:—["the entire destruction also of the Soul, which consists of knowledge, is not emancipation,—because, among other reasons, we do not see in the world that the annihilation of the soul is the soul's aim"].

एवं शून्यमपि ॥ ७९ ॥

A sixth view disputed.

Aph. 79.—So too the Void [—"the annihilation of the whole universe consisting of cognition and the cognizible, is thus also not emancipation, because Soul's aim is not effected by Soul's annihilation"].

संयोगाच्च वियोगान्ता इति न देशादिलाभोऽपि ॥ ८० ॥

A seventh view disputed.

Aph. 80.—And conjunctions terminate in separations, therefore it is not the acquisition of lands, &c., [that is Emancipation; for, "from its perishability, possessorship is not emancipation"].

न भागियोगो भागस्य ॥ ८१ ॥

An eighth view disputed.

Aph. 81.—Nor is it [Emancipation] conjunction of the Part with the Whole;—[Emancipation is not absorption of 'the part,' i. e., the Soul, into 'the Whole,' i. e., that of which it is (on the view in question) a part, viz., the Supreme Soul,—for the reason assigned (in Aph. 80) viz.,—'conjunctions terminate is separation,' and because we do not admit a Lord, (B. I. 92), and because thus self-dissolution is not Soul's aim"].

नाणिमादियोगोऽप्यवश्यम्भावित्वात् तदुक्तिस्तेरितर-योगवत् ॥ ८२ ॥

A ninth view disputed.

Aph. 82.—Nor is it [Emancipation] moreover conjunction with the power of becoming as small as an atom, &c., since, like other conjunctions, the cessation of this must necessarily take place.

नेन्द्रादिपदयोगोऽपि तद्वत् ॥ ८३ ॥

A tenth view disputed.

Aph. 83.—Nor, just as in that case [of other superhuman powers, such as assuming atomic bulk,] is it [Emancipation] moreover conjunction with the rank of Indra, &c., ["by reason of perishableness," of this as well as the others. He next "repels the objection of an opponent to what has been stated (under B. I., 61), that the Organs are products of Self-consciousness"].

न भूतप्रकृतित्वमिन्द्रियाणामाहङ्कारिकत्वश्रुतेः ॥ ८४ ॥

The organs whence.

Aph. 84.—The Organs are not formed of the Elements [as the Naiyáyikas assert], because there is scripture for their being derived from self-consciousness. ["Holding to the opinion that *Power*, &c., also are principles, he repels the determination of categories [insisted upon by] his [various sects of] opponents, and the notion that Emancipation comes through a mere knowledge of these" categories.]

न षट्पदार्थनियमस्तद्बोधान्मुक्तिः ॥ ८५ ॥

The categories of the Vaiśeshika objected to.

Aph. 85.—The rule of six categories is not [the correct one], nor does Emancipation result from acquaintance therewith, [as the Vaiśeshikas maintain].

षोडशादिष्वप्येवम् ॥ ८६ ॥

And those of the Nyáya, &c.

Aph. 86.—So too is it in the case of the Sixteen, [categories of the *Nyáya*], &c.

नाणुनित्यता तत्कार्यत्वश्रुतेः ॥ ८७ ॥

The eternity of Atoms unscriptural.

Aph. 87.—[The five Elements being *products*, as declared in B. I., Aph. 61,] Atoms are not eternal [as alleged in the *Nyáya*], for there is scripture for their being products; [and "although that text of scripture is not now seen by us, because it has disappeared in the lapse of time, &c., yet it is to be inferred from the words of the doctors, and from the statement of Manu" in Ch. I. v. 27. "But then, how can an Atom, which is without parts, be a product?—To this he replies"].

न निर्भागत्वं कार्यत्वात् ॥ ८८ ॥

The scripture decisive of the question.

Aph. 88.—Since it is a product, it is not without parts,—["that is to say,—since the fact, established by scripture, of their being products, cannot be otherwise accounted for, the (so-called) Atoms of Earth, &c, are *not* without parts." "He repels the objection of the Nihilist, that direct cognizance of Nature or Soul is impossible because (forsooth) the cause of a thing's being directly cognizible is colour"].

न रूपनिबन्धनात् प्रत्यक्षनियमः ॥ ८९ ॥

A cavil disposed of.

Aph. 89.—There is no necessity that direct cognition should have *colour* as its cause:—["it is no rule that to be directly cogni-

zable should result from colour only (—or other object of sense—) as the cause,—because direct cognition may result from Merit, &c., also,"—e. g., mystical practices, and so forth. "Well, if that be the case, pray, is the *dimension* of an Atom (on the consideration of which the Naiyáyikas rear certain speculations) a reality or not? With reference to this he decides the question of dimension" as follows].

न परिमाणचातुर्विध्यं द्वाभ्यां तद्योगात् ॥ ९० ॥

Dimension of what kinds.

Aph. 90.—There are not four varieties of dimension, because those can be accounted for by two :—["there are not four kinds of dimension, viz., small, great, long, and short,—but there are only two sorts,—'because those can be accounted for by two,'—that is to say, the four varieties can be accounted for by merely two, the atomic (or *positively* small) and the great;—such is the meaning. For the short and the long are merely subordinate kinds of the dimension called great,—else we should have, e. g., no end of dimensions—in the shape of the crooked, &c." "He rebuts the Nihilist's denial of genera," as follows].

अनित्यत्वेऽपि स्थिरतायोगात् प्रत्यभिज्ञानं सामान्यस्य ॥ ९१ ॥

Genus proved by recognition.

Aph. 91.—Though *these* [individuals] be un-eternal, recognition, as being associated with constancy, is of the genus.

न तदपलापस्तस्मात् ॥ ९२ ॥

And not to be denied.

Aph. 92.—Therefore it [genus] is not to be denied.—["But then, (it may be said,) recognition is to be accounted for simply by a *nonexistence*, in the shape of the exclusion of what is not the thing (recognized),—and let *this* be what is meant by the word 'genus' :—to this he replies"].

नान्यनिवृत्तिरूपत्वं भावप्रतीतेः ॥ ९३ ॥

Genus positive, not negative.

Aph. 93.—It [genus] does not consist in the *exclusion* of something else, because it is cognized as an entity;—["because 'This is that same' is the cognition of something *positive*;—for otherwise the only thing cognized would be 'This is not a non-jar.'" "But still, recognition may be caused by *likeness*:—To this he replies."]

न तत्त्वान्तरं सादृश्यं प्रत्यक्षोपलब्धेः ॥ ९४ ॥

Likeness not a distinct principle.

Aph. 94.—Likeness is not a separate principle, for it is directly apprehended [as one manifestation of 'Community.' "Likeness is nothing other than sameness in many parts, &c.,"—the *likeness* of a fair face to the moon, e. g., consisting in the *sameness* of the pleasureable feeling, &c., occasioned by the sight of either. "The conjecture—let likeness be just a peculiar power, and not (a modified aspect of) Community,—he repels."]

निजशक्त्यभिव्यक्तिर्वा वैशिष्ट्यात् तदुपलब्धेः ॥ ९५ ॥

Nor a peculiar power.

Aph. 95.—Nor is it [likeness] a manifestation of something's own power, because the apprehension of it is different ["from the apprehension of a power:—for the cognition of a power is not dependent on the cognition of another thing;—the cognition of likeness, on the other hand, is dependent on the cognition of a correlative, as is the case with the cognition of a non-existence,—so that the two conceptions are heterogeneous." "But still, let the likeness among individual jars, &c., be merely that they have (all alike) the name, e. g., of jar:—to this he replies."]

न सञ्ज्ञासञ्ज्ञिसम्बन्धेऽपि ॥ ९६ ॥

Nor the relation between names and things.

Aph. 96.—Nor moreover is it [likeness] the connection between name and named, ["because he who does not even know the connection between a name and the thing named, may yet cognize a likeness" e. g., between two jars.]

न सम्बन्धनित्यतोभयानित्यत्वात् ॥ ९७ ॥

How it cannot be so.

Aph. 97.—That connection [between name and named] is not eternal, since both [the correlatives] are uneternal, [—"how then should there be, through *that*, the likeness of a departed thing in a thing present?" "But then,—though the correlatives be uneternal, let the *relation* be eternal,—what is to hinder *this*?—to this he replies."]

नातः सम्बन्धो धर्मिग्राहकमानबाधात् ॥ ९८ ॥

Another suggestion repelled.

Aph. 98.—The connection is not so [—not eternal—], for this reason, viz., because this is excluded by the evidence which acquaints us with the thing; [i. e., the supposition is inconsistent with the definition of the term. For "*Connection* exists only where *disjunction* is incidentally possible,—because otherwise there is no room for the supposition of *connection*, the case being accounted for, just by the *natural state of the matter*. And this incidental disjunction is impossible if connection be *eternal*;—therefore connection is not eternal." "But on this showing, there could be no such thing as the eternal (connection called) Co-inherence between those two eternals a Quality and thing qualified,"—which Co-inherence, or intimate relation, is one of the categories of the Nyáya. To this he replies.]

न समवायोऽस्ति प्रमाणाभावात् ॥ ९९ ॥

The Category of Intimate Relation rejected.

Aph. 99.—There *is* so such thing as Co-inherence, [such as the Naiyáyikas

insist upon,] for there is no evidence of it. ["But then, (it may be said,) the evidence of it is the perception that something is qualified (or conjoined with a quality which *inheres* in it), and the unaccountableness otherwise of the cognition of something as qualified. To this he replies."]

उभयत्राप्यन्यथासिद्धेर्न प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं वा ॥ १०० ॥

This argued.

Aph. 100.—Neither perception nor inference [is evidence for the existence of Co-inherence], since, as regards both alike, ["i. e., the perception of qualifiedness and the inferring of it,"] the case is otherwise disposed of, ["viz., just by *the natural state* (of the thing and its qualities), so neither of the two (—perception and inference—) is evidence for (the imaginary category called) Co-inherence." "It is a tenet that from the agitation of Nature the conjunction of Nature and Soul takes place, and thence results creation. In regard to that there is this objection of the atheists, that, 'Nothing whatever possesses the action called agitation; everything is momentary; where it arises—even there it perishes;—therefore there is no motion inferrible from conjunction (of anything) with another place,—(the fruit, for instance, which appears to reach the ground, not being that fruit—no longer existent—which appeared to drop from the tree).' To this he replies."]

नानुमेयत्वमेव क्रियाया नेदिष्ठस्य तत्तद्वतोरेवा-परोक्षप्रतीतेः ॥ १०१ ॥

Motion is matter of perception.

Aph. 101.—Motion is not a matter of inference, for he who stands near has direct cognition both of it and of what it belongs to.

["In Book Second the different opinions merely were mentioned, that the Body is formed of five elements, and so forth,—but no particular one was settled. In regard to this question he denies the view of an opponent."]

न पाञ्चभौतिकं शरीरं बहूनामुपादानायोगात् ॥ १०२ ॥

The Body is of earth only.

Aph. 102.—The Body does not consist of *five* elements, because many [heterogeneous things] are unsuitable as the material, [—and the *Sánkhya* opinion is that, whilst there is but one material, the material of every Body is earth].

न स्थूलमिति नियम आतिवाहिकस्यापि विद्यमानत्वात् ॥ १०३ ॥

There is a Subtile as well as a Gross Body.

Aph. 103.—It [the Body] is not necessarily the Gross one, for there is also the vehicular [transmigrating or Subtile] one.

["Senses, (—the organ of vision, for example,—) distinct from the eye-balls, have been already mentioned. In order to demonstrate this point, he refutes the opinion that the senses reveal what they do not reach to."]

नाप्राप्तप्रकाशकत्वमिन्द्रियाणामप्राप्तेः सर्वप्राप्तेर्वा ॥ १०४ ॥

Connection between sense and object.

Aph. 104.—The senses do not reveal what they do not reach to,—because of their not reaching, or because [else] they might reach everything; [—"for we do not see that lamps, or the like, reveal what they do not reach to;—and because, if they were to reveal what they do *not* reach to, we should find them revealing *all* things,—those walled off, and the like. Therefore there is an organ, other than the eye-ball, for the sake of connection with the distant sun, &c.:—such is the import. And the instruments reveal the objects just by delivering the object to the soul,—for they are themselves unintelligent,—as a mirror reveals the face;—or, in other words, their revealing an object is just their taking up an image of the object." "He repels the conjecture—but then, in that case, the opinion (of the Naiyáyika) that the sight is luminous is quite right,—for we see Light alone glide rapidly to a distance in the form of rays."]

न तेजोऽपसर्पणात् तैजसं चक्षुर्वृत्तितस्तत्सिद्धेः ॥ १०५ ॥

The Sight not formed of Light.

Aph. 105.—Not because Light glides [—and the Sight does so too—] is the Sight luminous [or formed of Light] because the thing is accounted for by [the theory of] modifications [to be now explained. "The Sight is not to be asserted to be luminous on the ground that light is seen to glide;—Why?—because, just as in the case of the vital air, where there is no luminosity, the gliding forth can be accounted for through a kind of modification:—such is the meaning. For, as the vital air, without having parted from the body, glides out, ever so far, from the end of the nose, under the modification called breathing, (and thus smells a distant flower,)—just so the Sight, though a non-luminous substance, without quitting (connection with) the body, instantly darts off (—like the protruded feeler of a polyp—) to a distant object, such as the sun, by means of the species of change called modification." "But what is the proof that there is any such modification? To this he replies"].

प्राप्तार्थप्रकाशलिङ्गाद्वृत्तिसिद्धिः ॥ १०६ ॥

Proof of his theory of vision, that it accounts for the phenomena.

Aph. 106.—By the sign of the display of the attained object, the [existence of the] modification [which could alone account for that display] is proved.

["He shows us the nature of the modification, to account for the going—though without parting from the Body."]

भागगुणाभ्यां तत्त्वान्तरं वृत्तिः सम्बन्धार्थं सर्पतीति ॥ १०७ ॥

Of the theory further.

Aph. 107.—The 'modification' is another principle than a fragment or a quality [of the Sight or other sense], because it is for the sake of *connection* that it glides forth:—["the modification is not a *fragment* of the Sight, or other sense,—a part disjoined like a spark,—nor a *quality*, e. g., Colour,—for this

reason, viz., 'because it is for the sake of *connection* that it glides forth;'—but, whilst being a portion thereof, the modification is something else than a fragment or a quality. For if there were disruption,—connection of the sun, &c., with the Sight, would not take place,—and if it were a quality, the motion called 'gliding forth,' would be unaccountable;"—for a quality cannot move by itself. "But if thus the 'modifications' are *substances*, how is the term 'modification' applied to the *qualities* of intellect, in the shape of Desire, &c.? To this he replies"].

न द्रव्यनियमस्तद्योगात् ॥ १०८ ॥

"Modifications" may be qualities as well as substances.

Aph. 108.—It ['modification'] is not confined to substances, because it is etymological [—not technical,—and applies etymologically to a quality as well. "Since it is also stated in scripture that the sense-organs are formed of the Elements, the doubt may occur whether the texts are perhaps to be applied distributively according to the difference of particular worlds. In regard to this he says"].

न देशभेदेऽप्यन्योपादानतास्मदादिवन्नियमः ॥ १०९ ॥

The materials of the organs everywhere the same.

Aph. 109.—Not though there be a difference of locality, is there a difference in the material [of which the organs are formed]; the rule is as with the like of us: [—"not through difference of place, as the world of Brahmá and the like, is it also the fact that the organs have any other material than self-consciousness; but the rule is, that those of all alike are formed of self-consciousness, as is the case, e. g., with us who live in this terrestrial world; for we hear (in scripture) of only one Subtile Body (made up of the organs) transmigrating through the different localities." "But then, at that rate, how is the text relating to the materiality (of the organs) to be accounted for? To this he replies"].

निमित्तव्यपदेशात् तद्व्यपदेशः ॥ ११० ॥

A non-literal text accounted for.

Aph. 110.—The mention thereof [—of materiality as if belonging to the organs,—] is because there is [intended to be made thereby a more emphatic] mention of the concomitant cause: [—"that is to say,—there is designation as the material cause, in the case even where the cause is but concomitant,—with a view to indicating its *importance;* just as fire is (spoken of as arising) from fuel, (—which fuel is a necessary concomitant of, though not really the substance of, the fire—); hence are they (the organs) spoken of as being formed of the Elements. For, only in reliance on the support of Light, or other Element, are the Organs, the Sight, &c.,—formed from the accompanying Self-consciousness,—capable of existing;—just as fire, in reliance on an earthly support, results from the attendant Light" or Heat, which cannot manifest itself alone].

ऊष्मजाण्डजजरायुजेष्विच्छासाङ्कल्पिकसांसिद्धिकं चेति न नियमः ॥ १११ ॥

Varieties of Gross Bodies.

Aph. 111.—The heat-born, egg-born, womb-born, vegetable, thought-born, and spell-born,—such is not an exhaustive division [of Gross Body,—though a rough and customary one. "It was stated before, that Body has only one Element as its material. In this same connection he observes discriminatively as follows"].

सर्वेषु पृथिव्युपादानमसाधारण्यात् तद्व्यपदेशः पूर्ववत् ॥ ११२ ॥

The material of Bodies.

Aph. 112.—In all [Bodies] Earth is the material:—in consideration [however] of some speciality, there is the naming as this or that [other element than earth, as entering into the constitution of some given body,] as in the preceding case [treated under Aph. 110, "of the materiality of the Organs"].

न देहारम्भकस्य प्राणत्वमिन्द्रियशक्तितस्तत्सिद्धेः ॥ ११३ ॥

The vital air not the material of the Body.

Aph. 113.—The vital air is not, [on the allegation that it is "the principal thing in the Body," to be considered] the constitutor of the Body, because it [the vital air, or spirit,] subsists through the power of the organs, [and "does not subsist in the absence of the organs:—therefore, since, in a *dead* Body, in consequence of the absence of the organs, there is the absence of the vital air, the vital air is not the constituent of the Body." "But then, at that rate, since the vital air is not the cause of the Body, the Body might come into existence even without the vital air:—to this he replies"].

भोक्तुरधिष्ठानाद्भोगायतननिर्माणमन्यथा पूतिभावप्रसङ्गात् ॥ ११४ ॥

Soul essential to a living Body.

Aph. 114.—The site of experience [viz., the Body] is constructed [only] through the superintendence of the experiencer [Soul], otherwise should we find putrefaction, [—"and thus, by the several operations of circulating the juices, &c., the vital air is a *concomitant* cause of the Body, through the sustaining of it." "But then, (it may be said) it is only the vital air itself that can be the superintender, because it is this which operates,—not the Soul, since *it* is motionless, and since there is no use in the superintendency of what does not operate. To this he replies"].

मृत्यद्वारा स्वाम्यधिष्ठितिर्नैकान्तात् ॥ ११५ ॥

The soul "acting by other's actions."

Aph. 115.—Through a servant, not directly, is superintendence [exercised] by the master, [—and "in the constituting of the Body, 'superintendence,' in the shape of energizing, is not 'directly,' i. e., immediately, (exercised) 'by the master,' i. e., by Soul,—but through its servant, in the shape of the vital airs;—just as in the case of a king's building a city." "It

was stated befere (B. II. Aph. 1,) that Nature's (exertion) is for the emancipation of the already free. In reference to the objection of opponents in regard to this,—viz., 'How can the soul be eternally free when we see it bound?'—with a view to demonstrating its eternal freedom, he says"].

समाधिसुषुप्तिमोक्षेषु ब्रह्मरूपता ॥ ११६ ॥

Soul ever free.

Aph. 116.—In Concentration, profound sleep, and emancipation, it [Soul] consists of Brahm: [—but "then what is the difference of emancipation from profound sleep and concentration? To this he replies"].

द्वयोः सबीजमन्यत्र तद्वृत्तिः ॥ ११७ ॥

Perfect and imperfect emancipation.

Aph. 117.—In the case of the two, ["viz., concentration and profound sleep"] it ["the identity with Brahm"] is with a seed, ["i. e., associated with some cause of Bondage" or re-appearance in the mundane state]: in the case of the other ["i. e., in emancipation,"] this [cause] is absent, [—"this is the distinction." "But then,—Concentration and profound sleep are *evident*,—but what evidence is there of *Emancipation?* This objection of the atheist he repels"].

द्वयोरिव त्रयस्यापि दृष्टत्वान्न तु द्वौ ॥ ११८ ॥

The reality of Emancipation.

Aph. 118.—But there are not the two [only, viz., Concentration and profound sleep,] because the triad also [emancipation inclusive] is evident, just as are the two. ["The meaning is, that since Emancipation also is 'evident,' i. e., is inferrible, through the example of Concentration and profound sleep, there are not two, viz., profound sleep and Concentration only,—but Emancipation also really is. And the argument is thus:—the quitting of that identity with Brahm which (identity) exists during profound sleep, &c., takes place only through the force of the faults, Desire, &c., lodged in the mind; and

if this fault be annihilated by knowledge, then there results a *permanent* condition, quite similar to profound sleep, &c.,—and it is just *this* that is Emancipation." "But then (—suggests some one, with reference to Aph. 117—), granting that, even notwithstanding the existence of the 'seed' (or source of return to the mundane state) called Memory, a mental modification after the form of any object does not arise during *concentration,* inasmuch as Memory is (then) dulled (or deadened) by apathy, yet in *profound sleep* since Memory prevails there will really be cognition of objects,—consequently it is not proper to say that there is identity with Brahm during profound sleep. To this he replies."]

वासनयानर्थख्यापनं दोषयोगेऽपि न निमित्तस्य प्रधानबाधकत्वम् ॥ ११९ ॥

Memory inactive during profound sleep.

Aph. 119.—There is not the revelation, by memory, of an object likewise during the conjunction of a [more potent] fault [—such as sleep—] ; the secondary cause does not debar the principal : [—Thus, "as in the case of apathy, so also when there is the conjunction of the fault of sleep, Memory does not reveal its own objects,—does not remind us of its objects. For the 'secondary,' the subordinate, Memory, cannot defeat the more potent fault of Sleep :—such is the meaning. For the really more potent fault makes the memory powerless,—incompetent to produce its effects :"—and so there is nothing in this to prevent identification of soul with Brahm during profound sleep any more than during apathetic Concentration. "It was stated in the Third Book (Aph. 83), that the retention of a Body by him who is emancipated while yet living, is in consequence of a mere vestige of impression. To this it is objected as follows. Experience is observed, in the case of the (alleged person) emancipated during life, just as in the case of the like of us,—(and this experience continuous) even though it may be constantly in respect of a single object :—now this

is unaccountable (on the hypothesis of his really *being* emancipated), because the antecedent *impression* is annihilated exactly on its having produced the first (instant of) experience, and because no subsequent impression arises, inasmuch as *knowledge* debars it,—just as is the case with Merit. To this he replies."]

एकः संस्कारः क्रियानिर्वर्तको न तु प्रतिक्रियं संस्कार-भेदा बऊकल्पनाप्रसक्तेः ॥ १२० ॥

An objection met—to the possibility of emancipation in one yet living.

Aph. 120.—A single impression [suffices to generate and] lasts out the experience;—but there are not different impressions—one to each [instant of] experience,—else we should have a postulation of many [—where a single one may suffice. "In like manner in the case of the whirling of the potter's wheel, the self-continuant principle, called motal inertia, is to be regarded as only one,—continuing till the completion of the whirling"].

न बाह्यबुद्धिनियमो वृक्षगुल्मलतौषधिवनस्पतितृणवी-रुधादीनामपि भोक्तृभोगायतनत्वं पूर्ववत् ॥ १२१ ॥

The Vegetable organism really a Body.

Aph. 121.—Knowledge of the external is not indispensable [to constitute a Body]; trees, shrubs, climbers, annuals, trees with invisible flowers, grasses, creepers, &c., ["which have internal consciousness"] are also sites of experiencer and experience,—just as in the former case, ["the former case—meaning the putrescence already mentioned of the Bodies of men, &c., which takes place in the absence of the superintendence of an experiencer (the living soul).—Just in the same way does withering, &c., take place in the Bodies of trees, &c. And to this effect there is scripture"].

स्मृतेश्च ॥ १२२ ॥

Law as well as scripture is authority for this.

Aph. 122.—And from the legal institutes [may the same fact be inferred that, vegetables have bodies and are conscious. "But

then, from the fact of trees, &c., also being thus conscious, we should find merit and demerit accruing to them. To this he replies"].

न देहमात्रतः कर्माधिकारित्वं वैशिष्ट्यश्रुतेः ॥ १२३ ॥

Vegetables not moral agents.

Aph. 123.—Not merely through a Body is there susceptibility of Merit and Demerit,—for the scripture tells us the distinction,—["because we are told in scripture that the liability results from the being distinguished by a Brahmanical Body, or the like" [animal Body, not vegetable]. And "showing that the liability to Merit and Demerit is solely through the *kind* of Body, he mentions how Body is of three kinds"].

त्रिधा त्रयाणां व्यवस्था कर्मदेहोपभोगदेहोभय-देहाः ॥ १२४ ॥

Body of three principal kinds.

Aph. 124.—Among the three [—i. e., among those highest, lowest, and intermediate,—all living beings,—] there is a threefold distribution,—the Body of merit, the Body of experience, and the Body of both. ["Of these, a Body of merit belongs to the pre-eminent sages, a Body of experience to Indra and others, and a Body of both to the royal sages. Here the division is (not exhaustive, but) into three, because of the pre-eminence of these,—for otherwise we should have all alike possessed of a Body of experience"—like Indra. "He mentions also a fourth Body."]

न किञ्चिदप्यनुशयिनः ॥ १२५ ॥

A fourth kind of Body.

Aph. 125.—Not any one of these moreover is that of the apathetic, [for "the Body which belongs to the ascetics is different from all these three; such as was that of Dattátreya, Jaḍabharata, and others"].

न बुद्ध्यादिनित्यत्वमाश्रयविशेषेऽपि वह्निवत् ॥ १२६ ॥

Argument against the existence of a Lord.

Aph. 126.—Eternity does not [as alleged by those who wish to establish the existence of a Lord] belong to knowledge, &c., even in the case of the particular site [—viz., that of the supposed Lord—], just as is the case with fire, [—"that is to say,—just as we infer, from the example of ordinary fire, that the empyrean fire also is not eternal"].

आश्रयासिद्धेश्च ॥ १२७ ॥

[The argument really ex abundantiâ.

Aph. 127.—And because the site [—viz., the supposed Lord—] is unreal, [it matters not, in the present instance, whether knowledge, &c., may be eternal or not. "But then, at that rate, how can it be even conceivable that there should arise Omniscience, &c., adequate to the creation of the universe,—since we do not behold, in mundane life, *such* superhuman powers (—though we do see some—) arising from penance and the rest (of the alleged means of acquiring superhuman powers)? To this he replies"].

योगसिद्धयोऽप्यौषधादिसिद्धिवन्नापह्नपनीयाः ॥ १२८ ॥

The height to which asceticism may elevate.

Aph. 128.—The marvellous effects of concentration, just like the effects of drugs, &c., are not to be gainsaid; ["that is to say,—by the example of the wonderful virtues of drugs, &c., the superhuman powers also of assuming atomic magnitude, &c., which result from concentration, and are adapted to the work of creation, &c., are established." And "he refutes him who asserts that Thought belongs to the Elements,—since this is hostile to the establishment of the existence of Soul"].

न भूतचैतन्यं प्रत्येकादृष्टेः सांहत्येऽपि च सांहत्येऽपि च ॥ १२९ ॥

Argument against Materialism.

Aph. 129.—Thought does not belong to the Elements, for it is not

found in them separately, nor moreover in the state of combination,—nor moreover in the state of combination: [—"Thought does not exist in the five Elements even when in the state of combination, because we do not find Thought in them severally at the time of disjunction,"—and there can be nothing in the product which does not pre-exist in the cause].

BOOK VI.

["HAVING explained in four Books all the matter of the Institute, and having thoroughly established it by refuting the opinions of opponents in the Fifth Book, now in a Sixth Book he recapitulates the same matter which is the essence of the Institute, while condensing it. For, by making further what is called a systematic exposition, the learners acquire an undoubting, accurate, and more solid knowledge. Therefore reiteration is not here to be imputed as a fault, because the method is that of fixing a stake (by repeated blows); and because arguments, &c., not previously stated, are adduced."]

अस्त्यात्मा नास्तित्वसाधनाभावात् ॥ १ ॥

The existence of Soul.

Aph. 1.—Soul is,—for there is no proof that it is not, [—"since we are aware of this that 'I think,' ('cogito ergo sum')—because there is no evidence to defeat this. Therefore all that is to be done is to *discriminate* it" from things in general].

देहादिव्यतिरिक्तोऽसौ वैचित्र्यात् ॥ २ ॥

Soul is not Body, &c.

Aph. 2.—This [soul] is different from the Body, &c., because of heterogeneousness [or complete difference between the two].

षष्ठीव्यपदेशादपि ॥ ३ ॥

The usage of language is evidence for this.

Aph. 3.—Also because it [the Soul] is expressed by means of the sixth [or possessive] case, [—"for the learned express it by the possessive case in such examples as 'This my body,' 'This my understanding;'—for the possessive case would be unaccountable if there were absolute non-difference" [between the Body,

or the like, and the Soul to which it is thus attributed as a possession. "But then,—suppose that this also is like the expression 'The Soul's Thought' (—Soul and Thought being identical—), 'Ráhu's head' (—the trunkless Ráhu being *all* head), 'The statue's body,' &c. To this he replies"].

न शिलापुत्रवद्वर्मिग्राहकमानबाधात् ॥ ४ ॥

An objection disposed of.

Aph. 4.—It is not as in the case of the statue, because ["when we say 'the statue's body,' there is a mere fiction," for] there is there a contradiction to the evidence which acquaints us with the thing, [—sense being the evidence that there is here no body other than the statue—; "but in such an expression as 'My Body,' there is no contradiction of the evidence, for the contradiction is only in supposing the Body to be the Soul"].

अत्यन्तदुःखनिवृत्त्या कृतकृत्यता ॥ ५ ॥

Soul's aim how accomplished.

Aph. 5.—Through the entire surcease of pain, there is done what was to be done;—[and if you say, "But then, since there is an equality of gain and loss, inasmuch as, through the removal of Pain there is cessation of Pleasure also, *that* cannot be Soul's aim:"—to this he replies].

यथा दुःखात् क्लेशः पुरुषस्य न तथा सुखादभिलाषः ॥ ६ ॥

Pleasure no compensation for Pain.

Aph. 6.—Not such fondness for pleasure is there to Soul as there is annoyance from Pain, ["and so the aversion to Pain, having excluded also the fondness for Pleasure, gives rise to a desire for the cessation of Pain simply;—so that there is not an equality of gain and loss," but a clear gain in the desired release].

कुत्रापि कोऽपि सुखीति ॥ ७ ॥

Pleasure sparingly dispensed.

Aph. 7.—["And pain is multifarious in comparison of pleasure], for [only] some one somewhere is happy, [—"among innumerable

grasses, trees, brutes, birds, men, &c., very few,—a man, a god, or the like,—are happy"].

तदपि दुःखशबलमिति दुःखपक्षे निःक्षिपन्ते विवेचकाः ॥ ८ ॥

'Surgit amari aliquid.'

Aph. 8.—It [Pleasure] also is variegated by Pain; therefore the discriminating cast it into the scale of [and reckon it as so much] Pain.

सुखलाभाभावादपुरुषार्थत्वमिति चेन्न द्वैविध्यात् ॥ ९ ॥

Cessation of suffering is a joy.

Aph. 9.—If you say that this [cessation of Pain] is not Soul's aim, inasmuch as there is no acquisition of Pleasure, then it is not as you say,—for there are two kinds [of things desired. "For we see amongst men quite a distinct aspiration (—the first—) 'May I be happy,'—(the second—) 'May I not be miserable,'"—and the latter is *our* conception of beatitude].

निर्गुणत्वमात्मनोऽसङ्गत्वादिश्रुतेः ॥ १० ॥

A doubt.

Aph. 10.—The Soul [—some one may suggest—] has *no* quality, for there is scripture for its being unaccompanied, [and "therefore the cessation of Pain (a property which does not belong to it) cannot be Soul's aim." "He clears up the doubt"].

परधर्मत्वेऽपि तत्सिद्धिरविवेकात् ॥ ११ ॥

This cleared up.

Aph. 11.—Though it [the Pain] be the property of something else, yet it exists in it [the Soul] through non-discrimination, [—for "though the qualities, pleasure, pain, &c., belong [only] to the *Mind*, they exist,—i. e., they abide in the shape of a *reflection*,—in it, viz., in Soul;—through 'non-discrimination' as the cause,—that is to say, through the conjunction of Nature with Soul. And this has been expounded in the First Book." Well, "the binding of Soul by the qualities (or fetters) arises

from non-discrimination, but from what does non-discrimination arise? With reference to this he says"].

अनादिरविवेकोऽन्यथा दोषद्वयप्रसक्तेः ॥ १२ ॥

Two reasons why non-discrimination must have been from eternity.

Aph. 12.—Non-discrimination [of Soul from Nature] is beginning-less, because otherwise two objections would present themselves, [—"for, had it a beginning, then if [1°] it arose quite spontaneously, bondage might befal even the liberated; and if [2°] it were produced by Desert, &c., there would be a *regressus in infinitum*, inasmuch as we should have to search for another (previous instance of) non-discrimination to stand as the cause of that Desert, &c., also." "But then, if it be without beginning, it must be endless;—to this he replies"].

न नित्यः स्यादात्मवदन्यथानुच्छित्तिः ॥ १३ ॥

Non-discrimination, though from eternity, may be cut short.

Aph. 13.—It [non-discrimination] cannot be everlasting [in the same manner] as the soul is, else it could not be cut short [—as we affirm that it can be. "It is not everlasting, indivisible, and beginning-less, in the same way as the soul is; but it is beginning-less in the shape of an *on-flow* (which may be stopped);—for otherwise the cutting short of a beginning-less *entity* would be unfeasible,"—though the beginning-less antecedent *non-entity* of a given jar may be readily understood to terminate on the production of the jar].

प्रतिनियतकारणनाश्यत्वमस्य ध्वान्तवत् ॥ १४ ॥

Bondage how destructible.

Aph. 14.—It [Bondage] is annihilable by the appropriate cause [discrimination of Soul from Nature], just as is darkness [annihilable by the appropriate cause, viz., Light].

अत्रापि प्रतिनियमोऽन्वयव्यतिरेकात् ॥ १५ ॥

This enforced.

Aph. 15.—Here also [—viz., in the case of Bondage and Discrimination, as in the case of Darkness and Light—] there is adaptation, [as is proved] both by positive and negative consociation—[Liberation taking place where Discrimination is, and not where not].

प्रकारान्तरासम्भवाद्विवेक एव बन्धः ॥ १६ ॥

Bondage not innate.

Aph. 16.—Since it cannot be [accounted for in] any other way, it is non-discrimination alone that is [the *cause* of] Bondage, ["which cannot be innate." "But then, since liberation also, from its being a product, is liable to destruction; Bondage should take place over again:—to this he replies"].

न मुक्तस्य पुनर्बन्धयोगोऽप्यनावृत्तिश्रुतेः ॥ १७ ॥

Bondage does not recur.

Aph. 17.—Further, Bondage does not again attach to the liberated, because there is scripture for its non-recurrence.

अपुरुषार्थत्वमन्यथा ॥ १८ ॥

Evidence of this.

Aph. 18.—Else it [liberation] would not be Soul's aim [—which it is].

अविशेषापत्तिरुभयोः ॥ १९ ॥

Force of the evidence.

Aph. 19.—What happened to both would be alike, [if liberation were perishable. "That is to say,—there would be no difference between the two, the liberated and the bound, because of their being alike liable to future bondage; and therefore such (perishable emancipation) is not Soul's aim,"—but emancipation final and complete. "But then, at that rate, if you acknowledge that there is a *distinction* between the bond and the free, how is it that you have asserted (B. I., Aph. 19) the *eternal* freedom (of *all* souls alike?) To this he replies"].

मुक्तिरन्तरायध्वंसेन परः ॥ २० ॥

The nature of liberation.

Aph. 20.—Liberation is nothing other than the removal of the obstacle [to the soul's recognition of itself as free. "But then, at that rate, since Bondage and Liberation are *unreal,* Liberation must be contradictory to the texts, &c., which set forth what is Soul's aim" as some positive and real acquisition, not merely a removal of a screen. He replies].

तत्रापि विरोधः ॥ २१ ॥

An objection repelled.

Aph. 21.—Even in that case there is no contradiction, [—for "even if Liberation consist [only] in the removal of an obstacle, there is no contradiction in its being Soul's aim." "But, if Liberation be merely the removal of an obstacle, then it should be accomplished through mere *hearing* (of the error which stands in the way),—just as a gold coin on the neck, (which we have sought for in vain while it was) withheld from us by ignorance (of the fact that it has been tied round our neck with a string), is attained (on our being told where it is) :—to this he replies"].

अधिकारिवैविध्यान्न नियमः ॥ २२ ॥

Another objection repelled.

Aph. 22.—This [attainment of Liberation on the mere *hearing* of the truth] is no necessity, for there are three sorts of those competent [to apprehend the truth,—but not all are qualified to appropriate it on merely hearing it. "Not *hearing* alone is seen to be the cause of knowledge, but there are others also" —as he proceeds to show].

दार्ढ्यार्थमुत्तरेषाम् ॥ २३ ॥

Utility of other means besides hearing.

Aph. 23.—Of others [—other means besides hearing—] for the sake of reinforcement, [there is need,—as he goes on to show].

स्थिरसुखमासनमिति न नियमः ॥ २४ ॥

Formality in postures not imperative.

Aph. 24.—There is no [absolute] necessity that what is steady and [promoting] ease, should be a [*particular*] posture [—such as any of those referred to at B. III., Aph. 34;—i. e., "there is no necessity that a 'posture' should be the 'lotus-posture,' or the like,—because whatever is steady and (promotes) ease, is a (suitable) 'posture'"].

ध्यानं निर्विषयं मनः ॥ २५ ॥

The efficient means of Concentration.

Aph. 25.—Mind without an object is Meditation, [—"that is to say,—what Internal Organ is void of all modification, *that* is 'Meditation,'—i. e., Concentration, in the shape of exclusion of the modifications of Intellect;—for it will be declared how Meditation effects this" exclusion of the modifications of intellect,—and the means here assume the name of the result. "But then, since Soul is alike whether there be Concentration or non-concentration, what have we to do with Concentration? Having pondered this doubt, he clears it up"].

उभयथाप्यविशेषश्चेन्नैवमुपरागनिरोधाद्विशेषः ॥ २६ ॥

The distinction not without a difference.

Aph. 26.—If you say that even both ways there is no difference, it is not so;—there is a difference through the exclusion [in the one case] of the tinge [of reflected pain which exists in the other case. "But how can there exist a *tinge* in that which is unassociated" with anything whatever, as Soul is alleged to be? To this he replies].

निःसङ्गेऽप्युपरागोऽविवेकात् ॥ २७ ॥

Soul tinged by what does not belong to it.

Aph. 27.—Though it [Soul] be unassociated, still there is a tingeing [reflectionally] through non-discrimination, [for,—"though there is not a *real* tinge in that which is unassociated (with tincture or anything else), still there is *as it were* a tinge;

hence the tinge is treated as simply a *reflection* by those who discriminate the tinge" from the Soul which it delusively seems to belong to].

जवास्फटिकयोरिव नोपरागः किन्त्वभिमानः ॥ २८ ॥

Its seeming presence explained.

Aph. 28.—As is the case with the Hibiscus and the crystal [B. I., 19], there is not a tinge, but a fancy [that there is such].

ध्यानधारणाभ्यासवैराग्यादिभिस्तन्निरोधः ॥ २९ ॥

How to be got rid of.

Aph. 29.—[And as for the aforesaid tinge] it is debarred by Meditation, Restraint, Practice, Apathy, &c.

लयविक्षेपयोर्व्यावृत्त्येत्याचार्याः ॥ ३० ॥

The ancient dogma on this point.

Aph. 30.—It is by the exclusion of dissolution and distraction,—say the teachers, [—"that is to say,—through the removal, by means of Meditation, &c., of the Mind's condition of (being dissolved in) Sleep, and condition of (waking) Certainty, &c., there takes place also the exclusion of the tingeing of Soul by the condition;—because, on the exclusion of any (real) object, there is the exclusion also of its reflection;—so say the ancient teachers"].

न स्थाननियमश्चित्तप्रसादात् ॥ ३१ ॥

Meditation may take place anywhere.

Aph. 31.—There is no rule about localities, for it is from the tranquillity of the Mind [that Meditation, or the like, results; "therefore such a place as a cave is not indispensable for it." "The discussion of Liberation is completed. Now, with an eye to the unchangeableness of Soul, he discusses the cause of the world"].

प्रकृतेराद्योपादानतान्येषां कार्यत्वश्रुतेः ॥ ३२ ॥

Nature the material of the world.

Aph. 32.—Nature is the primal material, for there is scripture [to the effect] that the others ["Mind, &c.,"] are products.

नित्यत्वेऽपि नात्मनो योग्यत्वाभावात् ॥ ३३ ॥

Soul not the material of the world.

Aph. 33.—Not to Soul does this belong, [viz., to be the material of the world], though it be eternal,—because of its want of suitableness,—[for—"suitableness to act as material implies the possession of qualities, and the being associable :—and by reason of the absence of both of these, Soul, though eternal (—and therefore no product—) cannot serve as material." "But then, since, from such texts as 'Many creatures have been produced from Soul,' we may gather the fact that Soul is a cause, the assertions of an illusory creation, &c., ought not to be accepted :—having pondered this, he replies"].

श्रुतिविरोधान्न कुतर्कापसदस्यात्मलाभः ॥ ३४ ॥

The opposite view unscriptural.

Aph. 34.—The illogical outcaste does not gain [a correct apprehension of] Soul, because of the contradictoriness [of his notions] to scripture, [—for—"the various views, in regard to Soul's being a cause, which are conceivable, are all opposed to scripture; therefore the base illogical holders of these have no knowledge of the nature of Soul. Hence it is to be understood that those also (—e. g., the Naiyáyikas—) who assert that the Soul is the substance of the qualities Pleasure, Pain, &c., are quite illogical,—these also have no correct knowledge of Soul. And if it be asserted that Soul is a cause (of the world) just as the sky is the *recipient* cause of the clouds, &c., (—and towards which it stands in the relation of a cause in so far as without the room afforded by it these could not exist—), then we do not object to *that*,—for, what we deny is only that there is transformation" of Soul, as material, into the world, as product. But, "since we see, that, in the case of things motionless, locomotive, &c., the (material) cause is nothing else than *earth*, &c., how can *Nature* be the material of all? To this he replies"].

पारम्पर्येऽपि प्रधानानुवृत्तिरणुवत् ॥ ३५ ॥

Nature the ultimate material cause.

Aph. 35.—Though but mediately [the cause of products], Nature is inferred [as the ultimate cause of the intermediate causes], just as are Atoms [by the Vais'eshikas].

सर्वत्र कार्यदर्शनाद्विभुत्वम् ॥ ३६ ॥

Nature all-pervading.

Aph. 36.—It [Nature] is all-pervading, because its products are seen everywhere. ["But then, only if it be *limited*, can it be said that 'Wherever a product arises, there does it (Nature) go (or act);"—for what is unlimited, and fills all space, can find no other space to *move* into,—"to this he replies."]

गतियोगेऽप्याद्यकारणताहानिरणुवत् ॥ ३७ ॥

An objection parried.

Aph. 37.—Though motion may attach to it, this does not destroy its character as ultimate cause,—just as is the case with the Atoms—["the earthy and other Atoms, according to the opinion of the Vais'eshikas"].

प्रसिद्धाधिक्यं प्रधानस्य न नियमः ॥ ३८ ॥

Nature the proper substitute for eight of the substances in the Nyáya list.

Aph. 38.—Nature is something in addition to the familiarly known [nine Substances of the Naiyáyikas]:—it is no matter of necessity [that there should be precisely nine: "and the argument here is the scriptural declaration that *eight* (of the pretended primitive substances) are *products*"—].

सत्त्वादीनामतद्धर्मत्वं तद्रूपत्वात् ॥ ३९ ॥

Nature consists of the three Qualities.

Aph. 39.—Purity, and the others, are not the *properties* of it, [viz., Nature],—because they are its *essence*, "because they are what *constitute* Nature"].

अनुपभोगेऽपि पुमर्थं सृष्टिः प्रधानस्योष्ट्रकुङ्कुम-
वहनवत् ॥ ४० ॥

Nature's disinterestedness.

Aph. 40.—Nature, though it does not enjoy [the results of its own energizing], creates for the sake of Soul,—like a cart's carrying saffron [for the use of its master. See B. III., 58].

कर्मवैचित्र्यात् सृष्टिवैचित्र्यम् ॥ ४१ ॥

Nature treats each according to his deserts.

Aph. 41.—The diversity of creation is in consequence of the diversity of Desert. ["But then,—granting that *creation* is due to Nature, yet whence is *destruction?*—for a contrary couple of results cannot belong to one and the same cause. To this he replies."]

साम्यवैषम्याभ्यां कार्यद्वयम् ॥ ४२ ॥

Contrary results from Nature how.

Aph. 42.—The two results are through equipoise and the reverse of equipoise;—[for "Nature is the triad of Qualities, Purity, &c.; and their 'reverse of equipoise' is their aggregation in excess or defect; the absence of this ('*reverse* of equipoise') is 'equipoise;'—through these two causes two opposite results, in the shape of creation and destruction, arise from one and the same." "But then, since it is Nature's nature to create, there should be the mundane state even after the (discriminative) knowledge (which is alleged to put an end to it). To this he replies"].

विमुक्तबोधान्न सृष्टिः प्रधानस्य लोकवत् ॥ ४३ ॥

Nature's energy does not debar emancipation.

Aph. 43.—Since [—or when—] the emancipated has understood [that he never was really otherwise], Nature does not create,—just as in the world [a minister does not toil when the king's purpose has been accomplished. "But then, Nature never rests from creating, for we see the mundane condition of the ignorant;—and so, since Nature goes on creating, to the emancipated also Bondage may come again:—to this he replies"].

नान्योपसर्पणेऽपि मुक्तोपभोगो निमित्ताभावात् ॥ ४४ ॥

No reason why Nature should invade the emancipated.

Aph. 44.—Even though it [Nature] may invade others [with its creative influences], the *emancipated* experiences not, in consequence of the absence of a concurrent cause [—e. g., non-discrimination,—in the absence of which there is no reason why the emancipated should be subjected to Nature's invasion. "But then,—*this* arrangement could be possible then only if there were a *multiplicity* of souls; but *that* is quite excluded by the text of the non-duality of Soul: —having pondered this doubt, he says"].

पुरुषबहुत्वं व्यवस्थातः ॥ ४५ ॥

Multeity of Soul proved from the Veda.

Aph. 45.—The multeity of Soul is proved by the distribution [announced by the *Veda* itself "in such texts as 'whoso understand this—these are immortal, while others experience only sorrow.'" "But then,—the distribution of Bondage and Liberation may be through the difference of adjunct:—to this he replies"].

उपाधिश्चेत् तत्सिद्धौ पुनर्द्वैतम् ॥ ४६ ॥

Unity excluded by the supposition of Soul's.

Aph. 46.—If [you acknowledge] an adjunct [of Soul], then, on *its* being established, there is *duality*, [—upsetting the dogma founded on in Aph. 44. "But then,—the adjuncts, moreover, consist of 'Ignorance' (—which, according to the Vedánta, is no reality—), so that by these there is no detriment to (the Vedantic dogma of) non-duality:—with reference to this doubt he says"].

द्वाभ्यामपि प्रमाणविरोधः ॥ ४७ ॥

The Vedánta cannot evade non-duality.

Aph. 47.—Even by the two the authority is contradicted,—["even by acknowledging the two, viz., Soul and Ignorance, a contra-

diction is constituted to the text (which is alleged as) the authority for non-duality"].

द्वाभ्यामप्यविरोधान्न पूर्वमुक्तं च साधकाभावात् ॥ ४८ ॥

The establishment of the Vedánta tenet implies a contradiction.

Aph. 48.—The primâ facie view [of the Vedánta] is not [to be allowed any force as an objection], because by [admitting] two [—viz., Soul and Ignorance—], there is no opposition [to our own dualistic theory of Soul and Nature]; and the subsequent [dogma—that one single Soul is the only reality—is not to be allowed], because of the non-existence of a proof,"] which proof, if it *did* exist, would, along with Soul, constitute a duality.]

प्रकाशतस्तत्सिद्धौ कर्मकर्तृविरोधः ॥ ४९ ॥

Self-manifestation contradictory.

Aph. 49.—[And] in its [Soul's] being demonstrated by the light [of itself as you Vedantins say it is], there is the [unreconciled] opposition of patient and agent [in one, which is a contradiction. "But then, there is no contradiction here between patient and agent, because it (the Soul), through the property of light which is lodged in it, can itself furnish the relation to itself,—just as the Vais'eshikas declare, that, through the intelligence lodged in it, it is itself an *object* to itself:—to this he replies"].

जडव्यावृत्तो जडं प्रकाशयति चिद्रूपः ॥ ५० ॥

Illuminating function of Soul.

Aph. 50.—This (Soul), in the shape of Thought, discrepant from the non-intelligent, reveals the non-intelligent [which is discrepant from Soul. "But then, at this rate, if duality be established in accordance with proofs, &c., what becomes of the text declaring non-duality?—to this he replies"].

न श्रुतिविरोधो रागिणां वैराग्याय तत्सिद्धेः ॥ ५१ ॥

A salvo for the Vedic view.

Aph. 51.—There is no contradiction to scripture [in our view], because that [text of scripture which seems to assert absolute non-duality] is [intended] to produce apathy in those who have desires, [—and who would be the better for believing in "the *nothingness* of the things of time"].

जगत्सत्यत्वमदुष्टकारणजन्यत्वाद्बाधकाभावात् ॥ ५२ ॥

The world's reality irrefragable.

Aph. 52.—The world is real, because it results from an unobjectionable cause, and because there is [in Scripture] no debarrer [of this view of the matter. "We see, in the world, that no reality belongs to dream-objects, or to the (fancied) yellowness of (invariably white) conch-shells, and the like,—inasmuch as these are results of the internal organ, &c., when (not normal, but) injured by (i. e., under the injurious influence of) Sleep, &c.:—and this is not (the state of things) in the (waking) Universe in which Mind is the first" according to B. I., 71. And "he declares that the Universe is real, not merely in its existent state (at any given instant), but also always"].

प्रकारान्तरासम्भवात् सदुत्पत्तिः ॥ ५३ ॥

Creation excluded.

Aph. 53.—Since it cannot be in any other way, manifestation [of whatever is manifested] is of what is real—[i. e., of what previously existed; for,—"since, through the aforesaid reasons, it is impossible that the unreal should come into existence, what does come into existence, or is manifested, is what really existed (previously) in a subtile form." And "though it is declared that the being the agent and the being the experiencer belong to diverse subjects, he justifies the distribution (of agency to Self-consciousness, and of experience to Soul), by two aphorisms"—as follows].

अहङ्कारः कर्ता न पुरुषः ॥ ५४ ॥

The real agent who.

Aph. 54.—Self-consciousness, not Soul, is the agent.

चिद्वसाना भुक्तिस्तत्कर्मार्जितत्वात् ॥ ५५ ॥

Experience is got rid of when.

Aph. 55.—Experience surceases at [discrimination of] Soul [as being quite distinct from Nature], since it arises from its [Soul's] Desert, [—which is not *really* Soul's, but which, while non-discrimination lasts, is made over to Soul, just as the fruits of the acts of a king's ministers are made over to the king. And, "he shows the reason for what was stated before, that surcease of action does not result from goings to the world of Brahmá,"—as follows].

चन्द्रादिलोकेऽप्यावृत्तिर्निमित्तसद्भावात् ॥ ५६ ॥

Paradise no security against transmigration.

Aph. 56.—Even in the world of the moon, &c., there is return [to mundane existence], because of there really being a cause [of such return,—"such a cause, viz., as Non-discrimination, Desert, &c. But if you say, "through the counsels of the persons dwelling in these various (super-mundane) worlds, there ought to be no return (to mundane existence): to this he replies"].

लोकस्य नोपदेशात् सिद्धिः पूर्ववत् ॥ ५७ ॥

This point enforced.

Aph. 57.—Not by the counsel of [supra-mundane] people is there effectuation [of emancipation], just as in the former case, [—the case, viz., of counsel given by mundane instructors. "But at this rate, what becomes of the text that there is no return from the world of Brahmá?—to this he replies"].

पारम्पर्येण तत्सिद्धौ विमुक्तिश्रुतिः ॥ ५८ ॥

A salvo for a scriptural text.

Aph. 58.—There is scripture [declaratory] of Emancipation [on going to the world of Brahmá], this [emancipation] being effected

[more readily in that world than in this, but only] by the intermediacy [of the appropriate means. And "he justifies the text of Soul's *going* (to the locality where it is to experience), even though it be all-filling," and can therefore have no place into which to move].

गतिश्रुतेश्च व्यापकत्वेऽप्युपाधियोगाद्भोगदेशकाललाभो व्योमवत् ॥ ५९ ॥

Another.

Aph. 59.—And, in accordance with the text of its "going," though it [Soul] is all-pervading, yet, through time, it reaches its place of experience [—or body—], through conjunction with an adjunct,—as in the case of Space; [for, "as Space, though it is all-pervading, is spoken of as moving to some particular place in consequence of its conjunction with an adjunct such a jar,"—when we say "the space occupied by the jar is moved to the place to which the jar is carried,"—so is it here. And "he expounds, in two aphorisms, the statement that the site of experience (the body) is formed through the superintendence of the experiencer (Soul)"—as follows].

अनधिष्ठितस्य पूतिभावप्रसङ्गान्न तत्सिद्धिः ॥ ६० ॥

The Body's existence dependent on Soul.

Aph. 60.—This [constitution of a body] is not accomplished in the case of what is [organic matter] not superintended [by Soul], because we find putrefaction [in organic matter where Soul is absent].

अदृष्टद्वारा चेदसम्बद्धस्य तदसम्भवाज्जलादिवदङ्कुरे ॥ ६१ ॥

Desert not the maker of the Body.

Aph. 61.—If you say that [independently of any superintendence] it is through Desert [that a Body is formed, it is not so,] since what is unconnected [with the matter to be operated upon] is incompetent thereto,—as is the case with [unapplied] water,

&c., in respect of a plant. ["That is to say,—because it is impossible that Desert, which is not directly conjoined with the semen and other (elements of the Body), should operate *through Soul* in the construction of the Body, &c.,—just as it is for water, &c., *unconnected* with the seed, to operate *through the husbandman,* in the production of a plant." "According to the theory of the Vais'eshikas and others, it is settled that Soul is the superintendent (in the construction of the Body) *in virtue of its being conjoined with Desert;*—but he tells us, that, in his own doctrine, since Desert, &c., are not properties of Soul, the Soul cannot *through these* be the cause" of the Body].

निर्गुणत्वात् तदसम्भवादहङ्कारधर्मा ह्येते ॥ ६२ ॥

Reason for this.

Aph. 62.—For this is impossible [—that the Soul should, *through its Deserts, &c.,* be the cause of Body], because it has *no* qualities, —for these [viz., Desert, &c.,] are properties of Self-consciousness [—not of Soul. "And so, in *our* opinion, it is settled that the Soul superintends (in the causing of the body) quite directly, by conjunction simply, without reference to anything intermediate." "But, if Soul be all-pervading, then the limitedness of the living soul, which is set forth in scripture, is not a fact. To repel this doubt, he says"].

विशिष्टस्य जीवत्वमन्वयव्यतिरेकात् ॥ ६३ ॥

Soul how limited and unlimited.

Aph. 63.—The nature of a living soul belongs to that which is qualified, [—not to Soul devoid of qualities,—as is proved] by direct and indirect arguments, [—for, "to be a living soul means the being possessed of the vital airs,—and this is the character of the soul distinguished by personality, not of pure Soul," which is unlimited. "Desiring now to set forth the difference between the products of Mind (or the Great Principle) and of Self-consciousness, he first states the products of Self-consciousness"].

अहङ्कारकर्त्रधीना कार्यसिद्धिर्नेश्वराधीना प्रमाणाभावात् ॥ ६४ ॥

The real agent what.

Aph. 64.—The effectuation of works is dependent on the agent Self-consciousness, not dependent on a Lord [such as is feigned by the Vais'eshikas], because there is no proof [of the reality of such. And "by this aphorism is set forth,—as is also established by scripture and the legal institutes,—the creative and the destructive agency of Brahmá and Rudra (respectively), due to their adjunct, Self-consciousness" or personality. "But then, grant that Self-consciousness is the maker of the others,—still who is the maker of Self-consciousness?—to this he replies"].

अदृष्टोद्भूतिवत् समानत्वम् ॥ ६५ ॥

The real agent whence.

Aph. 65.—It is the same as in the arising of Desert,—["just as at the creations, &c., the manifestation of Desert, which sets Nature energizing, results solely from the particular *time*,—since, if we were to suppose other Desert as the instigator of this, we should have an infinite regress,—just so Self-consciousness arises from the *time* alone as the cause, but there is not another maker thereof also;—thus are the two cases alike"].

महतोऽन्यत् ॥ ६६ ॥

Orthodox recognition of Brahmá S'iva and Vishnu put forward.

Aph. 66.—The rest is from Mind [the Great Principle. That is to say —"what is other than the products of Self-consciousness [or personality], viz., Creation, &c., that, viz., Preservation, &c., results from the Great Principle, because it,—that is to say,—inasmuch as it consists of pure Goodness, having no Conceit, Passion, &c., is moved solely by benevolence towards others. And by this aphorism is declared the character as Preserver, of Vishnu, due to the

Great Principle as adjunct" of the soul which, without adjunct, would neither create, preserve, nor destroy. See Aph. 64. "It has been stated before that the relation of Nature and Soul as the experienced and the experiencer is caused by Non-discrimination (of the one from the other). Here—what is Non-discrimination itself caused by? With reference to this doubt he states that all philosophers in common reject the objection that we should have an infinite regress on the supposition of a *stream* of Non-discrimination, because *this* (regress) is *valid*,"—an infinite regress, which is in conformity with the truth, being no sound cause of objection].

कर्मनिमित्तः प्रकृतेः स्वस्वामिभावोऽप्यनादिर्बीजाङ्कुरवत् ॥ ६७ ॥

A theory which may be acquiesced in without detriment to the argument.

Aph. 67.—The relation of possessed and possessor also, if attributed [as it is by some] to Desert, in the case of Nature [and Soul], is beginning-less, as is the relation of seed and plant, [which takes the shape of an infinite regress of alternants].

अविवेकनिमित्तो वा पञ्चशिखः ॥ ६८ ॥

A second.

Aph. 68.—Or [the case is the same one of a valid infinite regress,] if it [the relation between Nature and Soul] be attributed to Non-discrimination [of soul from Nature], as the Panchas'ikha [holds].

लिङ्गशरीरनिमित्तक इति सनन्दनाचार्यः ॥ ६९ ॥

A third.

Aph. 69.—[The case is the same] if, as Sanandanáchárya does, we attribute it [the relation between Nature and Soul] to the Subtile Body, [which, in the shape of its elemental causes, attends Soul even during the periodical annihilations of the world. And in conclusion "he sums up the import of the declarations of the Institute"].

यद्वा तद्वा तदुच्छित्तिः पुरुषार्थस्तदुच्छित्तिः पुरुषार्थः ॥ ७० ॥

The summing up.

Aph. 70.—Be that the one way or the other, the cutting short thereof [—viz., of the relation between Nature and Soul—] is Soul's aim,—the cutting short thereof is Soul's aim.

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